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Abstract (Dutch)
Een groot aantal zakelijke transacties wordt tegenwoordig elektronisch uitgevoerd, in
toenemende aantallen. Dit gebeurt zowel in de ontwikkelde als ontwikkelingslanden,
als gevolg van de verspreiding van het internet, mobiele apparaten en elektronische
diensten. Ook individuen en organisaties in de derde wereld zijn bezig ook de invoer-
ing van technologieën en wetgeving voor het leveren, ondersteunen en beschermen
van handel via het internet en andere elektronische media. De Business-to-Consumer
(B2C) markt via telecommunicatiediensten heeft veel aandacht gekregen bij de
ontwikkeling van Afrikaans regio’s. De activiteiten en beslissingen die door de
consumenten worden uitgevoerd bij de aankoop van goederen en diensten te kopen
uitgevoerd zijn reeds eerder zijn beschreven met behulp van zogenaamde Consumer
Buyer Behavior (CBB) modellen. Traditionele structuren van e-commerce systemen
leiden tot verscheidene beperkingen voor de mogelijkheden van dienstverlening
in de B2C-transacties. Dergelijke systemen bieden gestructureerde catalogi van
goederen en diensten met een zoek- of navigatie faciliteiten waarmee klanten de
door hen gewenste items kunnen bereiken.
De afgelopen 10 jaar zijn agent-systemen voorgesteld bij diverse bewerkingen van
de elektronische handel (e-commerce) om de automatisering van CBB modellen
faciliteren. Uit de industriële praktijk is gebleken dat verdergaande automatisering
nodig is zowel aan de kant van de leveranciers als van de consumenten om de tijd
en moeite te verminderen voor de voltooiing transacties. Automatisering maakt het
leveranciers gemakkelijker om de doelgroep van klanten te bereiken met aangepaste
advertenties, producten, prijzen en diensten.
Agent-mediated technologieën komen niet zonder uitdagingen. Om de hen toegewezen
taken uit te kunnen voeren, moeten agenten wellicht samenwerken met andere
agenten uit hun omgeving. Zulke agenten, of andere entiteiten uit de omgeving
(zoals het platform waarop ze werken) kunnen kwaadaardig zijn. Dit leidt tot de
vertrouwensvraag tussen agenten en de platforms. Een typisch onderdeel is dat
software agenten verplicht moeten worden hun reputatie te ontlenen aan een be-
trouwbare bron, waardoor een niveau van vertrouwen ontstaat dat vereist is voor
de betrokken deelnemers. Daarnaast, reputatie-modellen in agent systemen leiden
weer tot nieuwe uitdagingen, zoals ‘strategic liars’ en informele verwachtingen van
de deelnemers. In dit proefschrift wordt een agent-mediated systeem ontwikkeld
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dat veilig en stimulerend is, gebaseerd op het dubbele veilingsmechanisme voor de
handel in landbouwproducten in ontwikkelingslanden zoals Oeganda.
De landbouwmarkt in ontwikkelingslanden werkt vanuit eeuwenoude benaderingen.
Ondanks de vele inspanningen van verschillende organisaties en individuen om
elektronische marktsystemen voor de landbouwmarkten en elektronische handel in
ontwikkelingslanden zoals Oeganda te ontwikkelen, zijn deze systemen niet breed
geaccepteerd, en vele grootschalige implementaties zijn mislukt. Deze mislukkingen
kunnen grotendeels worden toegeschreven aan tekortkomingen in het ontwerp van
stimulerende compatibele marktmechanismen die kopers en verkopers aanmoedigen
deel te nemen aan het marktsysteem.
De oplossing voorgesteld in dit proefschrift is bestand tegen de genoemde veilighei-
dsvraagstukken. Het is de bedoeling dat dit kopers en verkopers zal aanmoedigen
deel te nemen aan dit marktsysteem. Gedurende een pilot studie van het het sys-
teem van 6 maanden registreerden zich 1030 gebruikers met goederen ter waarde
$2.000.000. Deze enthousiaste adoptie van dit systeem suggereert dat ons ontwerp
aan de gebruikersverwachtingen heeft voldaan.
ii
Abstract (English)
A large number of business transactions nowadays are being carried out electron-
ically. Electronic transactions are increasing in numbers both in the developed
and developing world due to the proliferation of the Internet, mobile devices and
electronic services. Individuals and organizations in the developing world are also
implementing technologies and legislation for providing, supporting and protecting
trade through the Internet and other electronic media. The Business-to-Consumer
(B2C) market via telecommunications services has gained significant attention in
developing regions of Africa. The activities and decisions carried out by consumers
in-order to purchase goods and services have previously been defined in literature us-
ing Consumer Buying Behavior (CBB) models. Traditional structures of e-commerce
systems present several limitations for possibilities of service provision in B2C trans-
actions. Such systems provide structured catalogs of goods and services with search
or navigation facilities through which customers reach their desirable items.
Over the past 10 years, agent systems have been suggested in various operations
of electronic commerce (e-commerce) to facilitate automation in CBB models. In-
dustrial practices have demonstrated that more automation is needed on both the
suppliers and consumers side to reduce the time and effort required for transactions
completion. Automation would also facilitate suppliers to reach target customers
faster with customized advertisements, goods, prices and services.
Agent-mediated technologies do not come without challenges. In order for agents
to execute tasks assigned to them, they may have to interact with other agents
in the environment. Some of these agents or other entities (such as platforms)
in the environment could be malicious. These challenges present trust questions
among agents and platforms on which they execute. Software agents would typically
be required to obtain reputation information from a reliable source in-order to
establish the level of trust with which the participating entities should be engaged.
Furthermore, reputation models used in agent systems also raise new challenges of
strategic liars and informal expectations from participants.
This thesis has developed an agent-mediated system that is secure and incentive
compatible based on a double auction market mechanism for agricultural trade in
developing countries such as Uganda.
iii
Agricultural markets in developing countries such as Uganda are operated using
centuries-old approaches. Despite numerous efforts by various organizations and
individuals to develop electronic market systems to support agricultural markets
and electronic trade in developing countries such as Uganda, the adoption of these
systems has not be realized and many large scale deployments have failed. These
failures can be largely attributed to shortcoming in the design of incentive compatible
market mechanisms that would encourage buyers and sellers to participate in the
market systems.
The solution presented in this thesis is resistant to the security issues mentioned. It
is envisaged that this will encourage buyers and sellers to participate in this market
system. The system registered 1030 users with commodities worth 2 million US
dollars being submitted to the market in a 6 months’ pilot study. This enthusiastic
adoption of this system suggests that our design has met user expectations.
iv
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1Research background and
approach
This study seeks to address security and automation aspects of agri-
cultural trade systems for developing countries such as Uganda. This
chapter presents an introduction to agricultural trade activities in devel-
oping countries such as Uganda and presents a background to existing
approaches for designing systems for agricultural trade. Section 1.1
presents an introduction to the setup of agricultural markets in devel-
oping countries. A background to existing approaches for the design
of markets for agricultural trade is presented in section 1.2. In section
1.3, we present a motivation and research problem undertaken for this
study. Section 1.4 presents research objectives and questions that we
investigated in this thesis. The research approach is presented in section
1.5 and the thesis outline presented in section 1.6.
1.1 Agricultural markets in developing countries such
as Uganda
Agricultural markets in developing countries such as Uganda are mostly supported
by small scale farmers that grow produce for food and then sell the excess to nearby
or roadside markets. The organization of markets in Uganda for example is in such
a way that small scale traders and brokers aggregate produce at the farm level and
then store it for future sales or sell immediately to traders with large trucks, typically
of about 10 tonnes capacity. The large scale traders then transport this produce to
urban markets where they sell to wholesale store owners or retailers.
Agricultural markets in developing countries are characterized by high-levels of
inefficiency resulting from poor methods of information collection and dissemination
[1, 2] between buyers and sellers. Over the past 10 years, the telecommunications
infrastructure in developing countries such as Uganda has been developed to meet
critical communication needs for both data and voice services. Several information
systems have been implemented in form of agricultural advisory services in various
developing countries. Gakuru et al. [3] previously presented an inventory of
Agricultural advisory services in Sub-Saharan countries.
1
These advisory services have helped farmers in obtaining information for agricultural
best practices to enhance their farm yields. Various implemented electronic advisory
services have promised farmers access to market information that they previously
did not have. Farmers in developing countries face a problem of competitive pricing
for their produce due to an information gap between the markets, traders, brokers
and farmers[3]. In 2005, Barrett et al., [1] presented a historical account of vari-
ous changes and improvements which had taken place in agricultural markets of
developing countries since the 1960s.
1.1.1 Current organization of agricultural markets in Uganda
In order for us to gain an understanding of agricultural markets organization in
Uganda and similar developing countries, we visited several markets in both the
urban and rural areas of the country.
A series of interactions with traders in one popular Ugandan market (Kalerwe)
located 4 kilometers from the capital Kampala revealed interesting details about
trade organization for agricultural products. Traders learn about products availability
through brokers situated in the villages. These brokers are normally acquaintances
of the traders with whom they would have exchanged mobile numbers on previous
physical interactions. Due to a wide mobile network coverage in the country, brokers
do not find difficulty in accessing mobile networks. Proliferation of low-cost mobile
phones in the country has also widely eliminated mobile phone accessibility problems.
Telephone calling services are also widely available at pay calling stations.
In this environment, brokers play a pivotal role of connecting farmers to traders. The
brokers normally get paid depending on the amount and quality of produce that they
identify for the traders. When traders perceive goods received through the brokers
as being highly profitable, then the broker would get paid more. The negotiations
between traders and the brokers are currently informal, with no clear parameters for
valuation of broker services. Traders for example purchasing matooke, could make 10
stopovers before obtaining a required load for a 5 tonne truck. If all these stopovers
involved a broker, then they would have to pay at each location a fee proportional
to the amount of produce collected. For other crops such as potatoes and cassava,
the traders could buy the entire garden or a fraction. In such circumstances brokers
are paid based on the quality and quantity of the harvest obtained from the garden.
Some farmers have organized themselves into small groups for purposes of making
bulk sales. This arrangement seems to mostly work well for matooke (bananas) and
other products with small yields, but mostly preferred to be purchased in bulk by
the traders. Farmer groups have created an improvement in the market organization
since small quantities from several farmers can get bulked at shared stores. Bulk
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collection points save traders from having to traverse several villages collecting
produces in small quantities in-order to obtain the required volumes for a trip.
Our market interactions revealed to us several challenges in the current market
organization that we present in the next subsection.
1.1.2 Challenges with the current organization of agricultural
markets
Despite improvements in road networks, telecommunication infrastructure and free
market conditions in most developing economies, some of the issues that impeded
an efficient market place 50 years ago are still prevalent. Agricultural trade in
developing countries is still based on informal contracts and market information
largely shared by word-of-mouth. Our interactions with the traders revealed that
they are always willing to travel to new trade routes or at least recommend them to
other traders in neighboring markets. This arrangement seems to have a slow growth
rate for trade networks amongst traders and farmers. Discovery of new farmers
with desired produce is highly limited to historic interactions with the brokers and
farmers. The majority of farmers rely on their small networks of brokers and nearby
markets to participate in trade for their produce. Most rural farmers have limited
information about market trends for their products and also suffer from small trade
networks which essentially reduces their negotiation power for better prices. Traders
from urban markets are equally limited to their traditional trade networks which
have been known over the years through peers and previous trades. Possibilities of
expanding to new trade routes and markets are highly limited due to rudimentary
means of learning about trade partners in new and remote locations. Currently,
traders communicate with a host of brokers known to them through previous trading
activities, but this network does not scale efficiently to create new impact in the
market place. The ability for traders to learn about new trade opportunities and for
farmers to evaluate demand for their products is limited.
Brokers typically pay informers in the rural areas to alert them about produce
opportunities. Brokers and traders also use other methods such as small village
billboards in rural areas to advertise their mobile phones to farmers and produce
sellers. The presence of brokers in rural markets seems to enhance the market
information availability, even though this approach does not scale well for market
actors covering an entire country.
Trade networks among farmers and traders hardly grow beyond their historical social
networks. Internet based e-commerce systems which have been ubiquitously adopted
in the developed have not yet had an impact on agricultural trade in developing
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countries. Low bandwidth conditions, poor electricity infrastructure and high entry
prices for computers have been significant hindrances to the adoption of Internet
supported commerce.
The current market environment suffers from the following major problems;
• The current trading environment requires farmers to collect their produce
and wait by the road side for the traders to collect the merchandise. Selling
prices for the farmers’ products are negotiated on arrival of the traders. These
negotiations are typically one-sided, since traders have the leverage of meeting
other farmers along their trade routes while farmers have to worry about the
long waits and spoilage for their fresh produce.
• In addition to farmers struggling to sell their produce, traders also have to
travel long distances with the uncertainty of finding the goods promised to
them by the brokers or farmers. This situation arises from the the fact that
traders do not have any binding agreements between them and farmers or
brokers before they travel to the locations of the merchandise. Typically traders
rely on gentleman’s agreements established through mobile phone calls and
broker contacts. It is also very common for farmers to sell to other traders
or brokers that show-up before arrival of those previously negotiated with.
Such situations would mean that traders have to travel further along their
trade routes or find new ones in order to obtain the required load for their trip.
The farmers can afford to act this way due to absence of binding formal trade
agreements between stakeholders.
• Farmers usually travel to their trading points with historical price information
for their merchandise. It is difficult for farmers to take advantage of changes
in market prices since they take long to learn about the changes. Traders
normally take advantage of such situations to buy at low prices. Such low
cost transactions have a ripple-effect on other activities of the farmers. If the
farmers sell at low prices it means that they may not be able to meet costs for
drugs and pesticides whose prices might have increased.
1.2 Existing approaches to the design of electronic
agricultural markets
Several private and public organizations have contributed to the enterprise support
of small scale farmers in Uganda. These efforts have ranged from efforts to increase
farm yields, savings and credit schemes, and market linkage growth. Presented in
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the enumeration below are systems and organizations which have invested various
efforts in promoting dissemination of agricultural market information.
i. FarmGain:
FarmGain Africa Ltd (http://farmgainafrica.org) is a firm which specializes
in market information for agro-business development. Farmgain has been
providing radio and SMS based market information to rural farmers with
an alternate web interface for Internet connected users. These prices are
obtained from retail and wholesale markets covering Uganda and Kenya. Warid
Telecom (www.waridtel.co.ug) has implemented a SIM toolkit application
which provides market information reported by FarmGain. This system is
pricey for farmers. An SMS for a single commodity costs 150 Ugandan shillings,
which is close to the price of a kilogram of maize grain in the rural areas.
ii. FoodNet:
Since September 1999, Foodnet (http://www.foodnet.cgiar.org) with support
from the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) (http://www.iita.
org/) has been collecting market information on market data from 19 markets
across Uganda. This information was being collected on a daily basis mainly
from wholesale markets. Initially this information was disseminated through
national newspapers, email, fax, radio stations, government departments and
agricultural development agencies.
In November of 2005 an SMS based market information service was launched
through MTN and ZAIN telecom operators. Judging by the updates on the
website and short number codes (198 and 755) being quoted, it seems that
this service is no longer being maintained. Since 2008, mobile phone operators
have been required to use 4-digit numbers for provision of SMS based value-
added-services.
iii. FIT Uganda:
In July of 2008, FIT Uganda (http://www.fituganda.com) a private sector busi-
ness consulting firm which provides capacity building to SMEs launched an
agricultural market information service to provide real-time market infor-
mation to subscribers. FIT Uganda was funded by Cordaid and DANIDA to
implement a market information system to improve access by farmers and
traders to affordable agricultural market information.
iv. AgriNet:
AgriNet (http://www.agrinetug.net) is a private company in Uganda whose
mission is provide agricultural market information to farmers via an SMS
interface. The website for AgriNet was last updated in 2008 which is a very
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long period for an information service company. Though the information on
their website claims goals of market intelligence, this effort has not bared fruits
since the market information presented is old and outdated.
v. GRAMEEN:
Grameen foundation (http://www.grameenfoundation.org) in partnership with
local telecom service provider MTN launched village phones to extend mobile
phone services to rural areas of Uganda. These village phones were also used
to pioneer initiatives for providing agricultural market information to the rural
poor (http://www.grameenfoundation.org/what-we-do/empowering-poor) via group
led or call-center units. In 2007, Grameen Foundation started a mobile
applications laboratory in Uganda (APPLab (http://www.grameenfoundation.
applab.org/section/index)) to promote capacity in the development of soft-
ware applications aimed at empowering poor communities through ICTs.
A two year collaboration with Google and MTN was started to develop a
suite of mobile applications to provide market linkage information between
buyers and sellers. A mobile based service known as Google Trader (http:
//www.google.co.ug/africa) was thus launched in 2009 as a result of this
collaboration. Google Trader provided a listing of general merchandise (Agri-
culture, appliances, housing, etc) with their price information, location and
contacts through web and SMS interfaces. In addition to this service providing
only classifieds of items available for sale, only MTN subscribers can use it.
This exclusivity might be linked to the longterm partnership between MTN,
Google and Grameen.
vi. NOGAMU:
National Organic Agricultural Movement of Uganda (NOGAMU) (http://
nogamu.org.ug) has particularly been focusing on linking farmers to reliable
buyers. NOGAMU’s market information services have focused on organic export
opportunities for local farmers. An organic trading point (OTP) containing
profiles of target international markets was created to advise existing and
potential exporters. This information resource is not readily available to small
scale rural farmers since it can only be obtained either by email requests or
physical visits to the NOGAMU offices.
International market linkage efforts by NOGAMU present an important possi-
bility for rural farmers being organized into sub-county/regional groups which
could be motivated to produce more organic products for export.
vii. NAADS:
Most of the work related to the mobile-phone-based market have only been
concerned with market information dissemination component. According to
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Tab. 1.1.: Agricultural Market Systems Comparison
farmer groups information obtained from the National Agricultural Advisory
Services (NAADS)report of 2003[4] 1 indicates that 8,638 groups were formed
between 2002 and 2003 in the 16 participating districts. Currently, Uganda has
a total of 111 districts. These groups were represented by heads tasked with
disseminating information amongst their members through short messaging
services (SMS) and voice mobile calls.
This review also shows that the analyzed systems mostly provide classified of items
available for sale, but do not facilitate trade. A part from stating that you can buy
item X from person Z, it is not possible to know whether the item was actually
bought and neither is it possible to know the prices and negotiations involved. This
essentially makes it difficult to have active updates for market information due to
dependency on data collectors. A system through which this information can be
gathered from actual tradings would provide more accurate and reliable information.
Furthermore, the costs of obtaining this data would be significantly lower, since
data collectors do not need to be paid to visit markets to collect prices information.
1This is the most recent report from NAADS on groups facts and figures
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Figure 1.1 presents a comparison table for features of the reviewed systems against
those in the proposed mobile-phone based market system.
1.3 Motivation and research problem
Agricultural market interactions between farmers and traders in the current trading
environment has been greatly improved by the introduction of mobile phones and
the wide coverage of the GSM network in the country. However, this communication
has changed very little of the procedures and techniques for actuating transactions
between farmers and traders. Traders still rely on word-of-mouth for discovery of
new farmer locations and farmers still rely on informal links with a loosely connected
network of brokers to sell their merchandise.
It has been more than 20 years since the creation of successful electronic commerce
systems such as Amazon (www.amazon.com) and EBay (www.ebay.com). Despite the
rapid growth of e-commerce systems, their usage and adoption in the developing
countries is still very low. Such slow growth might be attributed to several limitations
such as power infrastructure, lack of computers, sparse Internet connectivity and
absence of credit or debit card systems. This situation has not be different for
Uganda. Internet access is still pricey and out of reach for low income earners that
form a majority of the population in agricultural trade.
The growth of mobile networks and low cost mobile phones in Uganda has been
very fast over the past 5 years. Uganda has a wide GSM network coverage with over
9.4 million people (31% of the total population)2 having access to a mobile phone
[5]. Given this proliferation of mobile phones, it is envisaged that a mobile-phone
based market system would improve market information exchange for agricultural
trade in a manner similar to e-commerce systems in the developed countries.
The current market environment gives high negotiation power to the traders since
farmers have to travel and wait by road side markets with risks of spoilage for
their produce. The mobile-phone-based market systems is expected to alleviate this
problem by facilitating farmers to interact with several traders and brokers via their
mobile phones before traveling to the markets. Better still, these negotiations could
be carried out before harvesting to further alleviate worries of spoilage for farmers’
produce. A mobile-phone-based market system is expected to offer farmers a gateway
to market information so that they can price their products more competitively.
The mobile-phone-based market system is expected to offer traders and farmers
a formal procedure through which agreements can be created between parties
2Uganda has a young population, with 49.9% of the population below the age of 14 [5].
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engaging in various trade activities. The proposed auction system is expected to
provide evidence for agreements entered into by various trading partners. The
negotiation interactions between stakeholders would provide concrete information
for creation of formal agreements between farmers, brokers and traders. Payments
through a mobile-money services could also act as commitment from either party to
the transaction agreement. Traders would have greater ability to plan and optimize
their trade routes since the trade expectations would have been defined before
starting their trip.
In the current environment, brokers act as market facilitators since they are typically
more informed about the market than farmers and more informed about rural
areas than traders. The participation of brokers in the current agricultural trade
environment is considered to be highly disadvantageous to farmers. Brokers typically
make very high profit margins while farmers barely break even.
As previously indicated by Jensen et al., [6] brokers play a key role in supporting
market transactions and should not be eliminated despite the involved costs. The
mobile-based market system is expected to provide brokers with new transparent
roles to more effectively improve the overall effectiveness of the agricultural market
system. The new role played by brokers is expected to be more transparent to both
the traders and farmers since all groups would have access to market information
and pricing details for various markets in the country.
1.3.1 Shortcomings of price advisory systems
Price advisory systems are ineffective for several reasons. First, there can be problems
with data accuracy and relevance. Information is gathered by asking buyers and
sellers to report the current price for different products. However, both parties are
biased, and reported prices may therefore fail to accurately reflect actual sales taking
place. Even when price estimates do accurately reflect actual sales in one place, they
often fail to reflect prices for individuals of different circumstances across a wider
region. For example, a farmer selling goods who is located a long way down a bad
road will be able to sell good at a lower price than a farmer conveniently located
next to a highway. In addition, only mean prices are reported, giving no indication
of supply and demand curves. Price information is therefore unhelpful to farmers
who are very eager to sell even at a low price, or farmers who have less need to sell
and are prepared to wait for a high price.
The structure of most advisory services also fails to provide detail about produce
specifications. For example, we found that all price information provided by FEWS-
NET does not contain species information. This is important because prices can vary
by 20% between different species of crops such as beans, potatoes, coffee and rice.
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1.3.2 Shortcomings of classified listings and single-sided auctions
Classified listings, in which sellers and buyers post descriptions and offered prices,
are problematic when the mode of communication is SMS on a simple phone (with a
small screen), because the medium makes it impractical to view the details of more
than one or two items. Single-sided auction markets, in which buyers view and bid
on individual items, have the same problem, and indeed may require even more
communication to complete a trade. Such markets are not well suited to commodity
trading, as they do not take into account the fact that commodities are inherently
exchangeable and thus not every potential match needs to be viewed by a buyer or
seller.
An auction market system known as “Robit” was proposed by Reda et al. [7] for
use in settings where communication channels are narrow and possibly expensive,
through the use of SMS and telephony voice kiosks. Robit makes use of a second
price auction design mechanism for commodity trading. The implementation also
makes use of a communication platform called Sulula [8] which provides a reliable
connectivity with caching for individuals in constrained environments. While this
work is interesting and useful to the research community, we have three main
concerns about its practicality. First, the proposed scheme is silent about what
happens when a buyer or seller has more than one match for their bid or ask;
we assume that the user will be presented with possible matches one at a time
following a right-of-first-refusal protocol. This means that users need to look through
a list of matches for bids or asks. This is likely to be problematic for users with
‘feature-phones’ that have limited space for display. Second, another problem is SMS
costs. Market participants would bear higher costs with the greater amount of traffic
required by this system; furthermore, it would also be unsustainable for the system
operator, which would be required to send a large amount of acknowledgment and
notification messages. Third, Robit addresses the information asymmetry problem
by providing voice product descriptions. While these descriptions may be more
engaging for participants, we worry that they would do little to discourage dishonest
product descriptions.
1.3.3 Shortcomings of existing multiparty computation solutions
In Bogetoft et al. [9] a multiparty computation solution that aims to provide a
fair distribution of resources while preserving privacy of participants is presented.
The article proposes utilization of double auction mechanism to derive a market
clearing price which is found at the intersection between demand and supply of the
commodities being traded. We can observe a flaw or weakness with determination
of the clearing price (quoted as MCP).
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When the clearing price is left to the potential prices of bids and asks, you get
problems fixious bids and asks being submitted in the market to influence the
outcome of an aution. In this scheme buyers and sellers do not need to bid and ask
truthfully. Pseudo bid and ask prices can artificially inflate demand and therefore a
wrong clearing price would be set.
This paper largely focused on cryptography and privacy preservation but failed on
robustness of the auction mechanism. The auction mechanism that we designed
presents unique solutions for a unique market in Uganda and similar developing
countries; where by techniques that are feasible with web and smart-phone systems
are not achievable with feature-phones. In the pilot that we carried out in 4 districts
of Uganda, we hardly came across more than 1 in 100 farmers with smart phones.
The entire region we surveyed did not have access to internet facilities.
1.4 Research questions and objectives
As presented in section 1.2, we see documented effort to develop system to improve
agricultural trade in developing countries such as Uganda. These systems however
have shortcoming that we have presented in section 1.3 and therefore fail to meet
trader and farmer needs. The absence of electronic system has maintained an envi-
ronment that operates on centuries old approaches. We argue that these approaches
are inefficient and do not facilitate sufficient trade traffic.
The main objective of our research work is to develop a system that has the right
incentives for farmers and traders to actively participate in the market. In doing so,
we anticipate to make a positive contribution to the improvement of agricultural
trade.
Consequently the key research question that this research aims to address is;
"How can we design systems that enhance agricultural trade in developing countries
such as Uganda?"
In order to answer this overall question, this research will address the following
specific research questions;
i. What are the key characteristics of an inefficient market for agricultural trade
in developing countries?
ii. What are the key factors that contribute to agricultural trade inefficiency and
how can we address them?
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iii. What are the key trust and security concerns in the current market environment
and how do we plan to address them?
iv. What are the key parameters for evaluating an improved system for agricultural
trade in developing countries?
1.4.1 General objective
In order for this research work to address the general and specific research questions
in subsection 1.4 above, this thesis aims to achieve the objectives that are presented
here.
The general objective of this research work is to contribute towards techniques
necessary for developing secure and incentive compatible electronic-markets in
developing countries.
A design mechanism is said to be incentive compatible or truthful if at all times a
playeri can find a strategy ◊i that is dominant (optimal) no matter what the other
players do [10].
1.4.2 Specific objectives
The specific objectives for this research project are thus derived from the general
objective and security challenges presented in section 3.1.3. In order to achieve the
general objective, the specific objectives of the research are:
i. to design an incentive compatible auction market for mobile-based agricultural
trade in developing countries such as Uganda.
ii. to develop extended threat models for agent-mediated applications in an
open-distributed environment.
iii. to design and implement an agent-mediated auction market for autonomic
trading based in an open distributed environment.
iv. to test and validate the designed and implemented applications based on the
defined incentive compatibility and security requirements.
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1.5 The research approach
Undertaking a research effort to improve agricultural markets in developing coun-
tries such as Uganda is a largely multi-disciplinary effort. This research is multi-
disciplinary in the sense that it requires an understanding of the following areas of
research;
i. An economics point of view for defining market efficiency and attributes of an
inefficient market.
ii. An economics and mechanism design (Game theory) understanding and inter-
pretation of causes for inefficiencies in the agricultural market environment.
iii. An information scientific evaluation of existing solutions and attempts to solve
the information asymmetry problem among market participants.
iv. From a computer science and design science perspective, we investigate new
and existing technologies or techniques that could be used to deliver a solution
that meets our research goals.
The research approach defines the underlying philosophies, methodologies and
strategies that were used to derive the research problem [11]. This perspective is
used to create a foundation for designing and implementing a platform that aims to
improve agricultural market in developing countries such as Uganda.
The subsections that follow present details of the research strategies that we used in
this study.
Agent systems study and prototyping
We reviewed a significant amount of literature presented in section 3.2 on automa-
tion using an agent-systems approach. In order to put the literature reviewed into
context, we implemented a prototype agent-mediated application on two types of
agent middleware. A detail description of this implementation is presented in the
appendix A. This agent-mediated prototype was used to model threats for such
applications. We also used the agent-mediated prototype to review security and
automation requirements for generic application implementations. The automated
book-trading application was used to study underlying platform security require-
ments and implementation artifacts for agent-mediated automation. — this was
aimed to contribute to techniques for automation and security in electronic trade.
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Analysis of agricultural market e ciency
In the context of agricultural trade, we carried out an evaluation of agricultural
markets efficiency for developing countries 2.4 and analyzed historical market data
collected by FEWSNET [12] for Ugandan wholesale markets. We analyzed historical
market data for presence of temporal and spatial arbitrage opportunities. The
agricultural markets information analysis provided us with a tremendous insight
into agricultural markets configurations in Uganda and helped us study patterns of
arbitrage in the country. It was highly evident in the results that Ugandan agricultural
markets exhibit elevated levels of inefficiency due to temporal and spatial arbitrage
opportunities that we discovered.
After obtaining results for the market analysis, we embarked on investigating factors
that led to such high-levels of inefficiency. We evaluated existing systems of trade in
Uganda — this spectrum also included traditional word-of-mouth trade linkages and
other forms of electronic trade via mobile phones and the Internet 2.3. We again
observed that many designs of these systems were not incentive compatible with
buyer and seller requirements.
Prototyping of an electronic market for agricultural trade
Before we embarked on designing a newmarket system, we visited over 5 agricultural
markets around Kampala to interact with traders — in-order to understand the
details of their operations. These interactions gave us a renewed understanding of
challenges faced by traders and farmers from the traders’ perspective. We also visiting
4 farming districts in central Uganda to in order to understand and appreciate farmer
approaches to agricultural trade. We obtained a new and detailed understanding of
agricultural trade from the farmers’ perspective and traders’ perspective. After these
interactions, we could appreciate why previous market designs we not well suited
for the market environment in developing countries such as Uganda.
Farmers in agricultural countries similar to Uganda have fuzzy measurements for
quality even for global products such as coffee. We observed that our market designs
were supposed to cater for such peculiar interactions between traders and farmers.
The results of these interactions guided our efforts to pursue a market design that
is incentive compatible and robust against security threats in an open distributed
environment.
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Testing and piloting of our market designs and
implementations
The design our market mechanism also went through a testing approach. We had
several design concepts that looked concrete on paper but impractical for farmers
and traders. These market considerations are presented in the appendix section 5.2.
We piloted the market system through interactive meetings with traders in Ugandan
city centers and farmers in both urban and rural areas. The interactive design
approach which follows an Agile methodology [13, 14] for software developed
helped us combine scientific methods for software design with a rich understanding
of agricultural methods to obtain an incentive compatible market system.
Our study of agent-systems and prototyping with Agentscape and Jade, provided
us with a strong software development methodology which aided in development
of a software system is robust and secure in an open distributed environment.
The implementation of the market design interfaces with 3 telecommunications
companies in Uganda and is hosted on a cloud server with universal accessibility to
the entire world through the Internet. This platform has been online for more than
3 years with a security incident or application bleach from the Internet. This level
of robustness and stability of the market system is attributed to an implementation
model which follows an agent-mediated model and grounded approached to software
development.
1.6 Thesis organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows;
Chapter 2: A Case study of agricultural trade in Uganda
In this chapter we formulate the general problem that is being addressed throughout
our work. We present an analysis of agricultural markets in Uganda (as a developing
country) and evaluate the status of market efficiency for agricultural produce. The
analysis draws parallels with other developing countries whose market configuration
bares similarities with that of Uganda. Historical market data from Ugandan whole-
sale markets is analyzed to determine the extent of temporal and spatial arbitrage
opportunities available.
This chapter is based on the article “A Mobile Market for Agricultural Trade in
Uganda”, Proceedings of the 4th Annual Symposium on Computing for Development,
2013 by the author, John Quinn and Kevin Leyton-Brown.
1.6 Thesis organization 15
Chapters 3 and 4: The underlying techniques for automated
and privacy preserving auction mechanism
These chapters presents underlying techniques that are key to provisioning of au-
tomation and secure interactions in agricultural electronic markets. We present an
analysis of security implications for various settings of agent-mediated negotiation
frameworks and present security implications for three example design configura-
tions. We present an overview of unique threats faced by negotiation frameworks,
discuss implications of the threats and possible countermeasures. The chapter also
presents confidentiality, privacy and integrity requirements for Publishers and Sub-
scribers in a Publish-Subscribe mediated electronic market. A conceptual market
for publishers (sellers) and subscribers (buyers) is presented to to offer an abstract
evaluation of security requirements for a virtual-market environment. We review
techniques previously suggested in literature for providing confidentiality, privacy
and integrity requirements and then present a new solution which is based on
cryptographic hashes and public-key cryptography. We present an introduction to
publish-subscribe systems, their relationship to the consumer buying behavior model
and security requirements for their deployment in a multi-agent environment.
This chapter is based on the articles; “Security in Agent-Mediated Negotiation
Frameworks”, In Proceedings of the Twentieth European Meeting on Cybernetics and
Systems Research, 2010, “Mobile-Agent Security Against Malicious Platforms,” In
Cybernetics and Systems An International Journal, vol. 41, no. 07, 2010 and “Secure
Publish-Subscribe Mediated Virtual Organizations”, In the Ninth Information Security
South Africa, 2010 by the author.
Chapter 5: An auction system for improved agricultural trade
in developing countries
This chapter presents the need for developing an incentive compatible electronic
market that efficiently connects trader agents in search of farmer agents with produce
for sale and farmer agents in search of trader agents in need of produce to buy. To
this end, this chapter presents an auction market for agricultural trade that operates
using a Short Messaging Service (SMS) interface. We consider constraints for
technology deployment in developing-world agricultural markets and conclude that
neither of the existing approaches is sufficient. We argue instead for the introduction
of a novel market mechanism better adapted to these constraints—particularly, to
the need for interacting with the market via a basic (non-Internet-enabled) phone.
16 Chapter 1 Research background and approach
This chapter is based on the article “A Mobile Market for Agricultural Trade in
Uganda”, Proceedings of the 4th Annual Symposium on Computing for Development,
2013 by the author, John Quinn and Kevin Leyton-Brown.
Chapter 6: Evaluation of an incentive compatible auction
system for agricultural trade
This chapter presents experimental and evaluation results for the auction market
which was implemented based on the principles of agent-mediated frameworks in a
Consumer Buying Behavior model. We present a discussion of the design decisions
we under took for the auction system and reputation mechanism to maintain an
incentive compatible market for agricultural produce. In this chapter we further
discuss the initially proposed auction interaction protocols and assumptions for the
market environment. We also present outcomes for the field trials that we conducted
through field visits and radio advertising.
This chapter is based on the article “A Mobile Market for Agricultural Trade in
Uganda”, Proceedings of the 4th Annual Symposium on Computing for Development,
2013 by the author, John Quinn and Kevin Leyton-Brown.
Chapter 7: Conclusions from the research
This chapter presents our conclusions and evaluations from the research study with
the perspective of reflecting on the research objectives and questions. We present
our views on limitations of some approaches we used in the study and also evaluate
the challenges faced. This chapter ends with conclusions from the study and an
outlook of future research activities to be pursued.
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2Analysis of agricultural trade
efficiency in Uganda
This chapter presents an analysis of agricultural markets in Uganda (as
a developing country) and evaluates the status of market efficiency for
agricultural produce. The analysis draws parallels with other develop-
ing countries whose market configuration bares similarities with that of
Uganda. Historical market data from Ugandan whole-sale markets was
analyzed for presence of temporal and spatial arbitrage opportunities.
Traders and farmers in urban and rural markets were interviewed to gain
understanding of their market environment. The qualitative and quanti-
tative findings are in agreement that agricultural markets in Uganda are
largely inefficient despite various efforts to develop market information
systems to facilitate agricultural trade in the country. Section 2.1 presents
an introduction to agricultural markets in Uganda and presents close
comparisons with markets in other Sub-Saharan countries. In section
2.2 we present a multi-agent model for farmer, broker and trader agents
in the Ugandan agricultural trade. Section 2.3 presents utility models
for multi-agent actors in agricultural markets. In section 2.4 we perform
a quantitative evaluation of the Ugandan agricultural market efficiency.
Section 2.5 presents an analysis summary of our study and conclusions.
2.1 Introduction
Agricultural production in Uganda is largely supported by small scale farmers that
cultivate their crops in predominantly two rainy seasons of the year. Food crops
such as bananas, cassava, potatoes, vegetables and cereals are grown by small scale
farmers for both their home consumption and commercial purposes [15]. Farmers in
rural areas typically receive small revenues from their produce partly due to limited
market access and information. Rural farmers typically depend on roadside pick-ups
by merchants from urban markets in-order to sell their produce.
Agriculture forms the backbone for the Ugandan economy. As of the year 2013,
87% of the Ugandan population lived in the rural areas [5] mostly depending on
subsistence and small scale commercial farming. Traders and farmers struggle to find
each other in this environment. Traders for example purchasing cooking bananas,
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could make 10 stopovers before obtaining a required load for a 5 tonne truck. If all
these stopovers involved a broker, then they would have to pay at each location a fee
proportional to the amount of produce collected. For other crops such as potatoes
and cassava, the traders sometimes negotiate to buy an entire garden or a fraction.
The price for such transactions depends on anticipated quality and quantify of the
harvest and market prices for the produce. In such circumstances brokers are also
paid based on the anticipated outcome of the harvest, which is usually a fraction
(between 5% to 10%) of the buyer’s purchase price.
This research work presents our investigations into operations for agricultural mar-
kets in developing countries. The following section in the chapter present a back-
ground for activities and procedures that farmers undertake to find buyers and
means through which traders find farmers for produce to buy. In this study, we
use Uganda as a case study for an in-depth understanding of market structures in
developing countries. Uganda is located in the eastern part of Africa and tends to
have most of the characteristics found in developing countries [5] most especially in
the sub-Saharan Africa.
2.2 Market Environment for Farmer, Broker and Trader
Agents
To gain further insight into the current operation of agricultural trade in Uganda,
we interviewed farmer and trader agents in and around Kampala to learn and
understand better their market experiences. Specifically, we met with five traders
and seven farmers dealing in maize, beans, groundnuts and coffee. We were
particularly interested in the trading process between wholesale dealers in Kampala
and producers in the countryside.
Overall, we learned that wholesale dealers commission trucks to pick up produce,
and vary in the rural locations they are willing to travel to in order to find seller
agents. We found that communication between farmer and trader agents in the
current trading environment has been greatly improved in recent years by the
introduction of mobile phones and the wide coverage of the GSM network in the
country. However, this communication has had little impact on the ways that farmer
and trader agents actually find each other and conduct transactions. In particular,
trader agents still rely on word of mouth for discovery of new farmers, and farmer
agents still rely on informal links with a loosely connected network of broker agents
to sell their merchandise. More specifically, we found that:
• The current trading environment has a high opportunity cost for both seller
and buyer agents. Farmers harvest their produce and wait by the roadside for
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traders to collect their merchandise, risking spoilage if there are no buyers.
Similarly, trader agents bringing trucks from an urban market have to devote
resources in traveling to areas in which they hope to buy produce without
being sure of what they will find.
• Prices for farmers’ produce are negotiated when trader agents arrive. Trader
agents incur higher transaction costs in finding trading partners, but also tend
to have a stronger bargaining position because they have a greater number
of options in their trading partners and access to better price information.
Farmers with fresh produce can be forced to sell at a low price when faced
with potential spoilage if no agreement is reached.
• Farmer agents take longer to learn about changes in supply and demand than
trader agents. The profits resulting from short term spikes in urban wholesale
prices therefore tend to be taken by traders.
• Trader agents can face considerable uncertainty in finding the goods they
are looking for. Local broker agents in rural locations advise trader agents
about farms with produce ready to sell, but trader agents currently find this
process to be unreliable. Traders may try to get a seller to agree to reserve their
produce (though without settling on a price, as mentioned above), relying on
gentleman’s agreements established through mobile phone calls and broker
contacts. Despite entering into such agreements, farmers may still sell to trader
or broker agents that show up first.
2.2.1 Experiences with Farmers
The majority of farmers rely on their small networks of broker agents and nearby
markets to participate in trade for their produce. Most rural farmer agents have
limited information about market trends for their products and also suffer from small
trade networks which essentially reduces their negotiation power for better prices.
Trader agents from urban markets are equally limited to their traditional trade
networks which have been known over the years through peers and previous trades.
Possibilities of expanding to new trade routes and markets are highly limited due to
rudimentary means of learning about trade partners in new and remote locations.
Currently, trader agents communicate with a host of broker agents known to them
through previous trading activities, but this network does not scale efficiently to
create new impact in the market place. The ability for trader agents to learn about
new trade opportunities and for farmer agents to evaluate demand for their products
is limited.
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Some farmers have organized themselves into small groups for purposes of making
bulk sales. This arrangement seems to mostly work well for matooke (cooking
bananas) and other products with small yields, but mostly preferred to be purchased
in bulk by the traders. The farmer groups have created an improvement in efficiency
of the trading environment. Bulk collection points save traders from having to
traverse several villages collecting produces in small quantities in order to obtain
the required volumes for a trip.
2.2.2 Experiences with Traders
An interview with traders in one popular Ugandan market (Kalerwe) located 4
kilometers from the capital Kampala revealed interesting details about trade orga-
nization for agricultural products. Trader agents learn about products availability
through broker agents situated in villages. These brokers are usually acquaintances
of the traders with whom they would have exchanged mobile numbers on previous
physical interactions. Due to a wide mobile network coverage in the country, bro-
kers do not find difficulty in accessing mobile networks. Proliferation of low-cost
mobile phones in the country has also widely eliminated mobile phone accessibil-
ity problems. Telephone calling services are also widely available at pay calling
stations.
Our interactions with trader agents revealed that they are always willing to travel
to new trade routes or at least recommend them to other traders in neighboring
markets. This arrangement seems to have a slow growth rate for trade networks
among traders and farmers. Discovery of new farmers with desired produce is highly
limited to historic interactions with the brokers and farmers.
2.3 The Existing Multi-Agent Market Model
This section presents a multi-agent model for the current agricultural market environ-
ment in Uganda. We discuss the utility models for farmer, broker and trader agents in
the market and discuss how this relates to market efficiency. We represent the broker,
farmer and trader environment using a multi-agent paradigm of interaction which
is shown in figure 2.1. This model represents and environment in which agents of
similar or different types (farmers, traders and brokers) can directly interact with
each other in the same locality or communicate across localities via an established
communication channel. The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) [16]
further defines an interaction protocol for request-response interaction which is
show in figure 2.2. The consumer in this model makes a request to suppliers and a
supplier in-turn makes a response to the consumer. The consumer would then either
accept and confirm or reject the response from the supplier.
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Fig. 2.1.: Agent-based organization for farmer, broker and trader agents
Fig. 2.2.: FIPA-Based Demand-Supply Agent Model
The current market environment in the Ugandan agricultural market involves bro-
kers buying produce from farmers and selling it to wholesale and retail traders in
urban and semi-urban markets. In this environment, brokers play a pivotal role of
connecting farmers to traders. The brokers normally get paid depending on the
amount and quality of produce that they identify for the traders. When traders’
perceive goods received through the brokers as being highly profitable, then the
broker would get paid more. The negotiations between trader and broker agents
are thus based on costs incurred by brokers (Cb) to obtain and transport produce to
wholesale or retail markets. On the other hand traders valuations for broker services
are priced based on the trader-utility (µT ) anticipated the market. The traders,
brokers and farmers agent model is presented using tuples Q = (µ, C,P) which
consist of the agents’ utility µ, the cost incurred to perform a given task such as
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Fig. 2.3.: FIPA-Based broker, farmer and trader Agent Interaction Model
growing produce or searching for produce as C and the price for a given commodity
as P.
• The farmer agent utility (µF ) is computed as PF ≠ CF where CF is the cost
incurred by the farmer agent to put the produce onto the market and PF is the
selling price of the produce.
• The broker agent utility (µB) is computed as PB ≠ (PF + CB) where CB is the
cost incurred by the broker in finding produce and bringing it to the market.
• The trader agent utility (µT ) is computed as PT ≠ (PB + CT ) where CT rep-
resents the costs incurred by the trader to obtain produce from the broker
without the purchase price.
The interaction between these three agents is represented in an agent interaction
model which is shown in figure 2.3. In this figure the initial request comes in from a
trader agent that contacts brokers (n) for a desired commodity. The broker agents in
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turn contact a network of farmer agents (k) for the commodity requested by a trader.
A number r out of the k number of farmers contacted by the broker, are considered
to have made offers to the broker. The broker filters through the submitted responses
(r) from farmer agents — rejecting those that do not meet the required specification
and accepting those that are considered acceptable to the trader agent. The broker in
this example model is considered to have accepted offers from i number of farmers
and rejected (r ≠ i) number of offers from farmers. The broker agents then also
submit responses to the trader agent based on what was received from farmer agents.
This model considers that a number m of brokers out of n that received the request
from the trader responded. The trader agent then accepted a j number of offers
from brokers and rejected (m≠ j).
We argue that the current market organization is highly inefficient. Almost all market
agents have to independently evaluate submissions from there counterparts. Firstly,
the trader has to keep memory of a collection of brokers that would possibly get him
good deals. He has to look around for n brokers and then submit requests to them.
The brokers on the other hand also have to reckon with the cost of contacting sparsely
located farmers and identifying the most reliable among them to be requested for
produce quotations. The broker also has to perform evaluations for all the response
received (r) from farmers and select the most optimal to be submitted to the trader.
The trader also has to perform memorizations and evaluations similar to those of
brokers with all requests sent and responses received.
2.4 Quantitative Evaluation of Market E ciency
In this section, we perform a quantitative evaluation of efficiency in the Ugandan
agricultural markets through analysis of temporal and spatial arbitrage opportunities
in historical market data. The temporal and spatial arbitrage analysis aims to
evaluate the amount of money that could be made following simple patterns of
purchase such as buying during harvest periods, storing the produce for a given
period of time and then selling during periods of planting, i.e., scarcity — for
temporal arbitrage.
Our investigations were also interested in spatial arbitrage opportunities, i.e., the
return on investment that would be made when buying produce from a rural market
and then transporting it to a market in the urban markets. In an efficient market
environment, the profit that is to be made is not expected to be persistently above
the gains in the rural market environments. The return-on-investment would be
expected to only cover transport and labor costs for moving produce from one market
to another.
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Fig. 2.4.: Box-whisker Chart for Percentage Return on Spatial Arbitrage
Arbitrage refers to the process of making profitable gains on investment due to
differences in market prices [17]. In a developing country like Uganda, spatial
arbitrage opportunities could exist as a result of differences in market prices based
on locations. Prices for products in upcountry markets are mostly lower than those
for products in urban markets such as capital cities. Efficient market places are
expected to have price differences catering for only transportation and labor costs for
moving merchandise from one market to another. Inefficient markets would however
allow gains at destination markets which exceed those at source markets with all
costs for movement across markets included. Market trends in Uganda tend to show
relatively higher prices for commodities in Kampala than other towns in the country.
This motivated an investigation into trade gains that could be achieved by moving
agricultural products from upcountry markets to Kampala. On the other hand,
temporal arbitrage refers to exploits in price differences at various time intervals in
the market. Typically this involves hoarding products across periods which are not
profitable with anticipation that sales at future dates will be profitable. In order to
meet profitability, the storage and labor costs are also considered in the final selling
price of the commodity.
2.4.1 Spatial Arbitrage Investigation
The market prices evaluated were obtained from Lira, Masindi, Gulu and Mbarara
which are located in a radius of more than 200 kilometers from the capital Kampala.
All these towns are separated from each other by distances of more than 100
kilometers. The cost for hiring a 5 tonne truck for a distance of 215 kilometers was
500,000 Ugandan shillings (UGX) in 2010; which is approximately USD 238 for the
entire round trip. Approximate transportation costs for the previous years (2008
and 2009) were also used to obtain the unit transportation cost per kilometer for
a kilogram of produce. The unit transportation costs were used to compute profits
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Matooke Maize Beans
1stQuartile -16.0 2.6 2.1
Mean 13 22.6 14
3rdQuartile 30.1 36.2 28.5
Tab. 2.1.: % ROI comparison table
to be made when agricultural products were to be moved from suburban to urban
based markets. Our analysis evaluated the percentage return on investment (ROI)
which could be achieved by transporting matooke (plantain), maize and beans from
upcountry markets to Kampala.
The resultant box-whisker chart is presented in figure 2.4 showing boxplot values for
return on investment for matooke, maize and beans. The choice of these products
for spatial arbitrage analysis was mainly influenced by completeness of data for the
period between January 2008 and October 2010. Table 2.1 presents values from the
box-whisker chart indicating the quartiles and mean values for percentage return
on investment when goods are moved from suburban markets to Kampala. Despite
having minimum values for all the products located below the 0% mark, the first
quartiles for maize and beans are above zero and the mean values for all the products
are above 13% ROI. It is only matooke that has a first quartile in the negatives. The
rest of the products have 2.1% and 2.6% ROI in the first quartiles for beans and maize
respectively. This data shows that movement of maize from upcountry markets to
Kampala is more profitable than moving matooke or beans. Of course movement of
products from urban markets to upcountry markets is completely unprofitable since
prices were higher in Kampala for all the three commodities (i.e., matooke, beans
and maize). These trends in market prices can be linked to the fact that upcountry
markets are closer to farmers than urban markets. With the third quartiles indicating
gains of above 28%, spatial arbitrage values for the Ugandan agricultural produce is
highly profitable. These figures indicate that the agricultural market environment
lacks efficient mechanisms for communicating these opportunities hence people
missing out.
2.4.2 Temporal Arbitrage Investigation
Our evaluation of historical market data for temporal-arbitrage opportunities con-
sidered products which can be stored for at least six months after harvest. The
temporal-arbitrage analysis took into consideration costs for storage, labor and
fumigations during the hoarding period. This chapter presents our analysis of tem-
poral arbitrage opportunities in maize and beans in three Ugandan districts, namely;
Gulu, Kampala and Masindi. Gulu and Masindi are both suburban townships while
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(a) Gulu (b) Kampala
Fig. 2.5.: Temporal arbitrage opportunities for beans in the town of Gulu and the capital
city Kampala. The hue indicates the percentage profit from buying and selling
beans at different times, taking into account the costs of storage. A simple trading
strategy such as buying in months of production and selling in months of dry weather
(For Gulu, buying in December-March and selling in June-September; for Kampala,
buying in January-March and June, selling in August-October and May) can be
highly profitable in Gulu, less so in the urban market of Kampala which operates
more effectively.
Kampala is an urban center. We analyzed agricultural market data from January
2008 to October 2010 for arbitrage opportunities . This data was obtained from the
Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) Uganda[12].
Temporal arbitrage refers to the availability of profitable opportunities for commodi-
ties that have been stored in anticipation of obtaining higher profits at future dates.
Among the agricultural products considered in this study, only beans and maize
could be stored for long periods. This evaluation considers a maximum storage
period of 18 months for both beans and maize. It is assumed that after 18 months the
quality of beans and maize starts to degrade and to therefore become unprofitable.
The cumulative storage and fumigation costs would be prohibitive for very long
storage periods. The storage costs for a 5 tonne store in Kampala in 2010 was
approximated at UGX 100,000. While the cost for upcountry towns such as Gulu
and Masindi for a 5 tonne store in 2008 was approximated at UGX 30,000. The
other important component of temporal arbitrage is “time value for money”; which
we tightly couple with inflation in this context. If the products are stored for a very
long periods, inflation is also likely to eat away the gains at periods which may seem
profitable. Currencies in developing countries like Uganda are known for being
unstable. The charts in figure 2.5 present possible dates for purchases against dates
of sale for the different products. As indicated by the colorbars, the green to red
color shades indicate regions of profitability while the green to blue color shades
represents regions for which losses would be made given a particular combination of
purchase and sale dates. The upper-left and lower-right green triangles of the charts
represent regions which are logically impossible for trade. i.e. it is not possible
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Commodity Town Purchase Month Sale Month
Beans Gulu Jan, Feb, Mar, Dec Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep
Beans Kampala Jan, Feb, Mar, Jun May, Aug, Sep, Oct
Maize Masindi Jan, Feb, Mar, Sep May, Jun, Aug, Dec
Maize Kampala Jan, Feb, Mar, May Aug, Oct, Nov, Dec
Tab. 2.2.: Temporal Arbitrage Strategies
to sell a product before purchasing it (upper-left triangle). The lower-right green
triangle indicates a region for which storage dates would go beyond 18 months.
Temporal Arbitrage Patterns
In this section we present patterns and dominant strategies for temporal arbitrage
opportunities based on the heatmaps shown in figure 2.5. The price information for
maize and beans was used to locate months with the lowest and highest prices in
the dataset. The price information was organized in ascending order to obtain the
most appropriate months for carrying out purchases and sales. The first four months
(with the lowest produce prices) are considered to be purchase months and last four
months are selected as sale months. The temporal arbitrage strategy for beans is
to buy in the first quarter of the year and sell in the third quarter. The temporal
arbitrage strategy for maize is to also buy in the first quarter of the year and to sell
in the second and fourth quarter of the year. This strategy might change by a month
in either direction due to seasonal changes for rains particularly in the tropical
areas. As the rain seasons change, the strategies for temporal arbitrage are also
affected. What remains fundamentally the same is that during harvest, the prices of
agricultural produce reduce and increase during the planting season. The tropical
rains in Uganda sometimes stretch into months that are predominantly known to be
dry. For example, historical rain patterns, indicate June as a dry months, but this
changed in 2011. Table 2.2 presents the months for which purchases and sales can
be done to achieve profitable temporal arbitrage for beans and maize. The obtained
strategic months for purchases and sales were used to compute possible returns
on investment for the considered historical data. Figure 2.6 presents bar charts
generated from profitable regions of the temporal arbitrage colormaps presented in
figures 2.5. These bar charts present the best opportunities of temporal arbitrage
trade from the data for maize and beans. We also notice that the dominant strategy
for obtaining profitable temporal arbitrage does not work well with 2009 purchases.
The high gains on purchases of 2008 are a result of maize prices almost doubling
in 2009. If a trader purchased maize in 2008 and kept it for a maximum of 18
months, they would earn returns on investment of more than 50% in 2009. This
strategy would not be profitable in 2009, since the 2009 prices for maize were
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(a) Gulu (b) Kampala
Fig. 2.6.: Bar charts showing return on investment for beans that are stored and sold after a
period between 6 and 18 months
almost double the prices for maize in 2010. This clearly meant that any temporal
arbitrage strategy employed in 2009 would not be profitable due to prices which
were significantly lower in 2010. The volatility of prices in 2009 can be attributed
to high volume purchases of maize by the World Food Program (WFP) to feed
displaced persons in neighboring conflict countries such as Sudan and DR. Congo
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/220/748036. Such high volume purchases are
likely to put upward pressure on the Ugandan maize market.
Confirming our quantitative results, the findings from our interviews suggested that
after goods arrive in urban markets, trading is more efficient and the potential gains
from new market systems are smaller.
2.5 Analysis Summary and Conclusions
Our analysis of market inefficiency in the Ugandan agricultural market looked for
spatial and temporal arbitrage opportunities for matooke, maize and beans from
four markets in Ugandan townships. The spatial arbitrage investigation shows that
traders can make huge profits by moving products such as matooke, maize and
beans from suburban markets to the urban markets (i.e., Kampala). A trader that
consistently transports agricultural produce from Mbarara, Gulu and Masindi to
Kampala is guaranteed to make an average return on investment of at least 13%.
The charts presented in section 2.4.2 show that arbitrage beans and maize are
highly reproducible and robust for beans and maize in Gulu, Kampala and Masindi.
Evaluation of return-on-investment for beans and maize show that suburban markets
(i.e., Gulu) present higher returns in temporal arbitrage than urban markets in
Kampala. The trends for both spatial and temporal arbitrage show that suburban
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markets are not as competitive as urban markets. The spatial arbitrage results also
indicate a robust strategy for maximizing profitability by movement of agricultural
products from suburban markets to urban markets.
A situation in which traders competitively exploit these arbitrage opportunities
would eventually reduce the figures for returns on investment (ROI) for spatial and
temporal arbitrage. The absence of competition for these market opportunities can
be attributed to a lack of market information. Otherwise, profitable investment
made known to traders would be shared between a large number of buyer and
seller agents and eventually a market equilibrium established. Essentially, the gains
on moving products from one market to another would only be enough to cover
transportation costs. Likewise, returns on temporal arbitrage would only be enough
to cater for storage costs. As previously indicated in a report by the Agricultural
Sector Program Support (ASPS) [18], farmers or traders without market information
typically get poorer deals than the well informed ones. Arbitrage opportunities
available at specific periods during the year can only be exploited by well informed
traders. In the absence of timely market information, it would still be difficult for
most traders to learn about profitable trade opportunities.
We observe that existing techniques and tools for agricultural market support in
Uganda have several shortcomings that were presented in section 2.4. The arbitrage
analysis performed presents evidence for a need to develop more robust techniques
and systems for agricultural trade in developing countries whose market environment
is similar to that of Uganda.
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3An agent-systems approach to
efficient and secure applications
design
Negotiation forms a key aspect of agricultural trade (and other trade
activities) in Uganda and to a similar extent other developing countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Several researchers in agent systems have proposed
various settings for agent-mediated applications. As is the case with most
software systems, there are security implications for any design decisions.
The automated negotiation section 3.2 of this chapter presents three
example agent-mediated negotiation frameworks and investigates the
implications of their design to agent-mediated applications’ security. We
present an overview of unique threats faced by negotiation frameworks,
discuss implications of the threats and possible countermeasures.
In section 3.2 we present an introduction to agent-mediated negotia-
tion and an overview of security aspects for negotiation frameworks.
Section 3.2.1 presents design elements for agent-mediated negotiation
frameworks. In section 3.2.3 we present assets and the stakeholder
environment for negotiation frameworks. Section 3.2.3 presents mobility
comparisons for three agent-mediated negotiation frameworks. Section
3.2.4 presents an attack model and trusted computing base for agent-
mediated negotiation frameworks while section 3.3 presents possible
attacker goals and attack vectors. In section 3.4 we present conclusions
and discussions for security in agent-mediated negotiation frameworks.
3.1 Agent-mediated autonomic applications
To achieve a high level of automation, a robust paradigm of software configuration
is needed to handle complex tasks of varying offers — in terms of price, quality and
warranty among others. It is envisioned that this software paradigm would provide
businesses with a platform for electronic services automation for inventory manage-
ment (commodities discovery) and prices discovery. The agent systems paradigm
[19, 20] provides an alternative approach electronic commerce automation.
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An agent is commonly defined as “a software program that can carry out a task
autonomously on behalf of its owner”[19]. In order for agent systems to facilitate
e-commerce services, they are expected to exhibit generic characteristics discussed
in the bulleting below. Some of these characteristics were previously presented by
Wooldridge et al.[21].
Agents are expected to have the ability of acting independently without constantly
referring back to their owner or user. In the case of e-commerce services, an agent is
supposed to have the ability to make choices concerning goods or services that an
owner might need depending on the owner’s desires, budget and time of delivery
using the initial information that was given. Researchers in Artificial Intelligence (AI)
impose stronger notions to agents in which they are expected to exhibit human like
characteristics such as knowledge, belief, intention, and obligation [22, 21]. Some
of these characteristics are essential to agent operations, yet they can be optionally
used in some environments.
• Autonomy: Agents are expected to have the ability of acting independently
without constantly referring back to their owner or user. In the case of e-
commerce services, an agent is supposed to have the ability to make choices
concerning goods or services that an owner might need depending on the
owner’s desires, budget and time of delivery using the initial information that
was given.
• Social ability: Agents should be able to communicate with other agents and
possibly humans via some agent communication language.
• Reactivity: Agents should be able to respond appropriately to the prevailing
circumstances in their environment and also respond in a timely manner to
changes that occur.
• Pro-activity: Agents are expected to have the ability to act in anticipation of
future goals so that their owner’s objectives are met.
In this thesis we consider two types of agents; the human agents that act in an
electronic market environment to achieve their consumer needs and software agents
that acts in a distributed environment on behalf of their human agents to achieve
specific directed goals.
The implementation of software agents follows a standard that was established
by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) (http://www.fipa.org).
This standard enlists four major components of an agent system, namely; Message
transport — for delivery of messages, Agent directory — for hosting of agents, Service
Directory — for discovery of agent services published by other agents and Agent
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Fig. 3.1.: FIPA-Agent Abstract Architecture
Communication Language (ACL) — for a common language of communication
between agents. This agent abstract architecture is shown in figure 3.1. FIPA
provides this abstract architecture to allow for interoperability between different
agent systems implementations. Concrete implementations of this architecture may
differ due to optional components of the architecture.
Software agents being dynamic in nature, autonomous and proactive, are useful in
ways that represent a computing paradigm natural to humans. An agent can act as a
broker for its owner with minimal expenses as compared to the traditional human
broker in market transactions. Information retrieval activities can be enhanced to the
benefit of users if a profile concerning the searcher is known before hand. Software
agents are typically expected to receive instructions from their human owners and
to interact with other systems and information repositories on the Internet. It is
anticipated that some of these entities could act maliciously towards each other.
This largely introduces trust questions among agents and platforms on which they
execute. To explain the trust problem in the agent paradigm further, we consider
an example of a person who wishes to purchase items from one of the shops in her
new neighborhood. This kind of buyer would wish to choose a reliable shop among
those available that meets her financial (pricing, discounts and promotions) and
other set constraints such as branding, shopping environment and customer care. It
would be wise for such a consumer to consult with people who have stayed in that
place long enough in order to obtain information concerning the shops or markets.
Such a customer is expected to have a fair level of trust of her neighbors to accept
the information and recommendations being suggested. In such a situation, the
consumer is faced with a trust challenge. Such a situation is similar to what agents
3.1 Agent-mediated autonomic applications 35
face whenever they seek reputation information from new sources that could be
unreliable or would have been compromised by malicious elements.
Due to the increasingly sophisticated nature of attackers, reputation information is
sometimes altered to benefit individual agents and at times wrong information about
agents is sent to reputation repositories. Attackers that carry out such actions are
technically referred to as strategic liars. Additionally, most trust models have been
generic in nature, and thus giving rise to confusing trust contexts. Confusing trust
contexts arise in cases where one entity assumes certain parameters for trust, yet
those parameters are insignificant or irrelevant for the prevailing environment. Ex-
amples of strategic liars and confusing trust contexts have previously been presented
in literature[23, 24]. Such challenges require improvement in trust management
models to close existing gaps in agent-mediated e-commerce environments. Addi-
tionally, existing security techniques need to be improved to cater for the unique
processes of agent-mediated e-commerce.
3.1.1 Agents in b2c e-commerce
B2C e-commerce which involves selling of goods and services to a consumer by a
business enterprise is very popular nowadays, since many people have recognized
the convenience of shopping at the click of the mouse. However, as more people
move towards on-line shopping or B2C e-commerce, so is the need to improve
software technologies to meet the new demands of customization, efficient retrieval
of information and timely deliveries of goods and services.
A Consumer Buying Behavior (CBB) model in which agents act as mediators in
the five stages of need identification, product brokering, buyer coalition formation,
merchant brokering and negotiation is shown in Figure 3.2. To illustrate functional
behavior of the CBB model, let us consider an example of an individual who wishes
to buy a text book concerning Ugandan history using an agent-mediated system.
The consumer is expected to instruct his software agent to search for a book on
Ugandan history that was published less than 4 years ago, costing no more than
$50 and should be new with hard cover. Armed with this information, the agent
moves to available on-line markets dealing in book sales and searches for availability
of books costing no more than $50 in addition to all the other attributes that the
agent owner needs. Initial results may indicate availability of books selling at a price
higher than $50, so the agent sets out to look for more markets that could probably
be cheaper — all these initiatives are expected to take place without the agent-owner
intervention.
The software-agent could additionally monitor current shops for short-term price
reductions in addition to negotiating for better prices. The software-agent could
also monitor auction markets for probable cheaper options — without actually
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Fig. 3.2.: Consumer Buying Behavior Model (Adopted from [25, 26])
performing a bid since such an action would require committing its master’s money.
The software-agent could also have an option of relaxing requirements of its master;
these options may include considering books on Ugandan history that are more
than 4 years old, books that are not hard-covered or even secondhand books that
could be cheaper. The agent could also try to find out other agents with whom a
coalition can be formed to buy a bigger package of books at a reduced price. The
agent can then report back after performing negotiations on the availability of books
concerning Ugandan history ranking them in the order of preference based on the
master’s preferences. The owner has possibilities of making a choice out of what the
software agent has provided, or even rejecting them and instructing the agent with
new requirements or constraints.
3.1.2 Advantages of using agent-mediated systems in
e-commerce
Since software-agents have the ability to act autonomous, socially, reactively and
pro-actively, their use in electronic commerce presents several advantages and
improvements in open distributed environments. In the listing below, some of the
advantages that are attributed to agents in electronic commerce are presented.
i. Automation: Ability for agents to act autonomously presents many opportuni-
ties for enabling automation in agent-mediated e-commerce.
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ii. Responsiveness: Since agent systems have reactive and pro-activeness properties,
they are expected to facilitate timely responses to changes in their environment
and business markets.
iii. Flexibility: Research[22] from the AI field agrees with the fact that multi-agent
systems can actually be conceptualized and developed with human like notions
of knowledge, belief, intention and obligation which certainly implies that they
(agents) can act flexibly in the environments in which they participate.
iv. Scalability: As more information grows on the Internet currently available
paradigms will most likely fall short of the new demands. Since software-agents
can process information from the source and reason about its relevance to the
agent owner and negotiating for goods and services without communicating
very often with the sender, this paradigm scales well to the growing information
in open distributed environments.
v. Economical: Resource utilization is low (in terms of bandwidth) for agent-
mediated electronic commerce since agents minimize the amount of communi-
cation and message exchanges along communication channels.
Technologies for supporting development of agent system are already in place.
Several languages are available for supporting interactions between agents such
as eXtensible Markup Language (XML)[27] and Agent Communication Languages
(ACL)[28] that are used to code information and services in meaningful structures
that agents can easily understand and process.
3.1.3 Security challenges in agent-mediated consumer buying
behavior models
The deployment of agent systems in large-scale open distributed environment sys-
tems presents a host of digital security challenges. In the enumeration below, we
present some of the challenges that are likely to be faced by agent systems in
electronic-commerce systems.
i. Availability - Agents in E-Commerce systems represent stake holders that have
several objectives some of which could be malicious or depriving to other
participants.
ii. Non-repudiation and Identity Management - Agents operating in open dis-
tributed environments have the ability to perform various tasks and later on
obtaining a different identity to hide their previous actions. In an e-commerce
environment, agents could accept payments for goods that they may not deliver
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after receiving payments. Additionally, selling agents can even deny having
ever received payment for goods to be delivered to customers.
iii. Integrity - Information that is carried by agents in the electronic environment
needs to be protected from malicious elements that may want to destroy it or
even alter its meaning.
Furthermore, due to the increasingly sophisticated nature of attackers, reputa-
tion information is sometimes altered to benefit individual agents and at times
wrong information about agents is submitted to reputation repositories.
iv. Privacy and Confidentiality - As agents traverse networks to fulfill their
objectives, they carry information with them that usually represents needs of
their owners. This information is used as a basis for interaction and service
negotiation with other agent systems in the network. In many cases (and for
several different reasons) agent owners would wish to keep all or part of this
information private.
v. Strategic Liars - Agents in the CBB model cannot be expected to always
behave truthfully. Agents could for example lie about their preferences when
interacting in the market, they could vote untruthfully when indicating their
liking or dislike for commodities in the market.
Security requirements such as confidentiality, integrity and availability are inherently
required for all electronic-commerce paradigm even with out the application of agent
systems.
3.2 An agent-mediated negotiation framework
In recent years, agent systems have been used in various real world applications such
as distributed planning, scheduling, e-commerce and resource management. A key
component to most agent-mediated applications in e-commerce, is the negotiation
process through which entities participating in a transaction find a position of
agreement in the event of a discrepancy. Negotiation has previously been defined
as dynamic processes in which parities involved exchange offers, make concessions,
or influence each other in order to reach an agreement[29]. With the advancement
of agent systems technologies, much research work has been done in integrating
automated negotiation [30, 31] in agent-mediated applications. The minimum
requirement for automated negotiation in agent systems is the ability to construct
proposals and respond to requests.
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Negotiation frameworks provide building blocks for facilitating automated negotia-
tion processes. Functional requirements for negotiation frameworks have previously
been defined by Mobach et al. [32], and the design of a negotiation framework
for AgentScape platform [33] was based on these requirements. However, as is the
case with several other complex software systems, several researchers have mainly
focused on functional requirements and either ignored security completely or only
considered it after advanced stages of functional designs. This situation is true for
the negotiation framework suggested by [32] and MAGNET by Collins et al.[34, 35].
Some of these frameworks have considered implicit and explicit assumptions such as
participants in the protocol being rational and not behaving maliciously towards one
another. In a practical open distributed environment, such assumptions would be
very strong due to high possibilities of a negotiation framework being compromised
by internal and external attackers.
In the context of negotiation frameworks, we introduce a distinction between inter-
nal, external and agent attackers.
• Internal-attackers refers to individuals and or entities that could be participating
in the negotiation protocol. Such attackers could be people or software agents
that are performing a bilateral trade or bidding in an auction.
• External attackers on the other hand refers to entities that are not participating
in the negotiation protocol but have the ability to affect normal operations of
the negotiation framework.
Such attackers are assumed in the Dolev-Yao [36] attacker model to have
the ability of listening on the communication channel, intercept and analyze
messages being exchanged between communicating parties.
• Agent-attackers have stronger abilities than the internal and external attackers
to perform malicious activities on the negotiation framework. A malicious
platform which has the ability to terminate an agent or destroy its data is an
example of agent attacker.
In the design of negotiation frameworks, various application settings have been pro-
posed but no comparative discussion on the effect of these application organizations
to the security of the negotiation frameworks has been done. We consider three
negotiation frameworks for this comparative study.
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3.2.1 Structure of an agent-mediated negotiation framework
As previously indicated in the introduction section, negotiation frameworks facilitate
automated negotiation processes. In this section we present details of negotiation
building blocks, the activities involved, stakeholders and their software architectures.
Automated negotiation frameworks are mainly built around three structures [30],
namely:
• Negotiation Protocol: The protocol defines a set of rules and procedures that
have to be adhered to by parties participating in a negotiation. In e-commerce,
negotiation protocols ensure that participants adhere to the trading rules. In
the example of auction markets, a negotiation protocol will impose rules on
participants for the type of auction (Dutch, English or Vickrey) being carried
out.
• Negotiation Objects: These are the range of attributes over which participants
in negotiation can make choices. Such issues may include price, quality, model
of item and service agreements.
• Agent Decision Making Model: The agent decision making model works within
the provisions of the negotiation protocol and negotiation objects available.
The quality of the agent’s decision making model determines the level of
success that the agent will achieve.
3.2.2 Examples of agent-mediated negotiation frameworks
We hereby present three example agent-mediated negotiation frameworks to illus-
trate differences in agent-mediated architectures. These negotiation frameworks
were chosen because of their differences in architectural design. In order to have easy
references in the chapter, new labels (names)1 are assigned to the two negotiation
frameworks without short names.
TrinAge
This negotiation framework relies on three agents (Controller Agent (CA), Worker
Agent (WA) and Itinerary Register Agent (IRA)) [37, 38] to carry out the negotiation
process on behalf of the consumer; The negotiation process involves a client (repre-
sented by three agents) interacting with shortlisted suppliers on certain parameters
(negotiation objects) until they reach an agreement or abort the negotiation. The
1The framework developed by Mobach et al. [32] is referred to as MoVir, TrinAge refers to the
framework developed by Al-Jaljouli et al. [37, 38] and MAGNET is maintained for MAGNET [35].
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Fig. 3.3.: TrinAge Architecture
framework depends on a trusted host to provide a trusted computing base for per-
forming business critical services such as setting negotiation parameters, evaluation
of offers and decision making [37].
• The Controller Agent (CA) stores critical data such as the list of offers, expiry
time of the bid, scoring and decision functions.
• The Worker Agent (WA) stores non-critical data and tactic functions which
form the agent’s decision making model.
• The Itinerary Register Agent (IRA) stores addresses of the visited suppliers and
the time (t) at which the agent got executed at the service provider’s host.
TrinAge assumes a scenario in which agents (WA & IRA) representing a customer
move through public networks and to possibly untrusted service provider hosts
in search of offers. The framework aims to achieve confidentiality of negotiation
strategies and decision making model by separating the handling of critical and non-
critical data into two agents (CA and WA respectively). Figure 3.3 below, presents
an overview of the TrinAge architecture. We note here that the supplier (service
provider) entity is not an agent.
MoVir
Mobach et al. [32], designed a negotiation framework in which consumers ne-
gotiate with service providers through mediators. In this framework, consumers
are presented with services aggregated in virtual organizations. The creation and
management of virtual organizations is performed outside the negotiation frame-
work. Consumers can negotiate with several mediators and mediators simultaneous
negotiate with several service providers. Service provider details are hidden from
the customers by the mediators that provide an aggregated point of contact. The
application framework is very dynamic, involving service providers leaving and
joining virtual organizations at any time. The framework consists of a Consumer
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Fig. 3.4.: MoVir Negotiation Framework
Agent (CA), the Service Provider Agent (SPA) and Mediator Agent (MA) whose roles
are briefly explained below:
• The Consumer Agent (CA) represents the human buyer in the negotiation
process. Consumer agents initiate the negotiation process by looking for
services. Consumer Agents locate mediators and the services they offer through
some external services such as directory services [39]. The CA performs multi-
attribute negotiations with one or more Mediator Agents (MA). Customer
Agents may have to migrate to Mediator Agent platforms in order to accomplish
their tasks.
• The Service Provider Agent (SPA) is responsible for providing goods and
services that are sought after by consumer agents. Depending on the service
type, the SPA may be required to migrate to the Mediator Agent (MA) platform
to provide the requested service.
• The Mediator Agent (MA) represents a virtual organization of service provider
agents that are governed by specified policies. Each virtual organization is
administered by service policies that are different from other virtual organiza-
tions.
MoVir assumes an environment in which the customer agent and agents in the virtual
organization (mediator and service provider agents) execute from trusted platforms.
Figure 3.4 below presents an overview of the MoVir negotiation framework.
MAGNET
The Multi-Agent Negotiation Testbed (MAGNET) is an architecture that was de-
veloped to provide support for agent interactions in trade negotiations. MAGNET
supports automated contracting, negotiation and monitors execution of contracts
in business transactions [40, 35]. MAGNET provides an automated marketplace
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Fig. 3.5.: MAGNET Architecture
through which software agents represent their owners in an auction. In order for the
consumer agent to fulfill a set of tasks, it generates a plan from the tasks and solicits
for help from supplier agents in the market. Essentially, this framework comprises of
two agent roles; the customer and supplier roles.
Figure 3.5 below presents an overview of the MAGNET architecture in which a
trusted third party (market) mediates all communication between customers and
suppliers participating in an auction. The customer agent sends out Requests For
Quotes (RFQ) to suppliers in the market and a set of suppliers with the requested
services would reply with an indication of prices and any-other constraints such as
time. After the customer agent has received the bids, it evaluates them based on
predefined parameters such as price and time and then selects the most optimal
bids. After the bids have been selected, successful suppliers are notified and the
Execution Manager is called to oversee completion of the negotiation process with
the shortlisted suppliers. The Planner is called to renegotiate offers which are then
sent to the Bid Manager for re-assignment to the Execution Manager. The execution
manager, planner and bid manager are components of the customer agent.
3.2.3 Composing the underlying framework
In table 3.1 below, we present a summary table comparing assets that can be found
in the three negotiation frameworks. The items presented are a representation of
underlying structural details in the negotiation frameworks.
Mobility Comparisons
Mobility features are critical to security of agent systems. This is because agents
may migrate to malicious platforms. Agents executing on maliciously platforms face
greater risks of having security properties of their code or data being compromised.
Due to design differences in negotiation frameworks, some agents are expected
to migrate to other platforms in order to accomplish their tasks while in some
frameworks migration is not expected. Moreover, in the case of TrinAge, the service
provider is non-agent. Table 3.2 below presents comparisons of entities in the
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Tab. 3.1.: Comparison of assets in the negotiation frameworks
Tab. 3.2.: Comparison of entities and mobility in negotiation frameworks
various negotiation frameworks which are agents, non-agent, mobile and non-mobile
components.
Stakeholders and assets in negotiation frameworks
The presented configuration of agent-mediated negotiation frameworks reveals
that they (TrinAge, MoVir, and MAGNET) are comprised of a customer and service
provider at a minimum. In some circumstances, such as MoVir and MAGNET, a
moderator or trusted third party is used to oversee and facilitate activities between
customers and suppliers. In addition to the customers, suppliers and moderators,
agent-mediated negotiation frameworks consist of other assets such as negotiation
protocols, negotiation objects or parameters and decision making functions that
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need to be protected. Attacks on these framework elements could substantially alter
behavior of the negotiation framework.
Automated negotiation frameworks would typically have customer agents carrying
negotiation parameters and decision making functions which are used during exe-
cution of the negotiation protocol. Customer agents are responsible for receiving
bids from suppliers. Adversaries in the environment will attempt to compromise
these assets either for their own profit or to fail goals of legitimate participants.
The following common target assets have been identified in the three negotiation
frameworks:
a. Agents that are participating in the negotiation.
b. Offers or sometimes referred to as Asks.
c. Bids submitted in response to a request for offer or quotation.
d. Negotiation objects or parameters.
e. User and market predefined constraints such as delivery time, bid closing time
and expiry time of offer.
f. Shortlist of suppliers to be considered by the customer.
g. Contracts between suppliers, market/moderators and customers.
3.2.4 Attack model and trusted computing-base in automated
negotiation frameworks
In order to bring the attack model for an agent-mediated framework into context,
we model interactions between collaborating agents using figure 3.6. Figure 3.6
provides a high level representation of possible interactions between agents in
negotiation frameworks. It illustrates a scenario in which Agents A and B might
be involved in a bilateral negotiation with a supplier agent. Agents A and B are
legitimate participants in the transaction with a supplier, but agent B may wish to
cheat agent A using the knowledge he or she possess about the negotiation protocol.
In the listing below, we describe the three forms of attacks identified in negotiation
frameworks.
i. Malicious Agents: This type of attacker has privileges of legitimate participa-
tion in the negotiation. The attacker has the ability to study the negotiation
protocol and maliciously use this information against other participants in
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Fig. 3.6.: Overview of attack model for agent-mediated negotiation frameworks
the negotiation. A customer agents may collude in the market to unfairly out
compete other agents.
ii. Malicious Platforms: This is a powerful adversary that can compromise
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the agent and its data. These
attackers can have the ability to intercept intra-platform messages, to destroy
the agent and its data structures.
iii. Dolev-Yao Attacker: In the Dolev-Yao threat model [36], an attacker is as-
sumed to have the ability to listen on the communication channel and can
intercept messages being exchanged between two parties. In our scenario
of negotiation frameworks, such attackers can intercept intra-platform and
inter-platform message exchanges.
These three agent frameworks presented in subsection3.2.2 are used to highlight
differences in threats that may occur in agent-mediated negotiation frameworks
when certain design decisions are made.
Unlike TrinAge, MoVir and MAGNET assume a trusted platform for execution of all
participating agents. TrinAge assumes a scenario in which customer agents may visit
untrusted platforms and thus provides protection mechanism for survivability of the
customer agent by splitting functionality between three agents. A malicious platform
could however still destroy an agent that migrates to a hostile platform.
Table 3.3 presents a summary of attacks that are possible with the three negotiation
frameworks based on their design (see section 3.2.1) and stakeholders (see section
3.2.3) involved. MoVir and MAGNET assume a trusted platform for agent execution,
hence eliminating possibilities of an agent attacker. TrinAge caters for situations
in which the platforms are not trusted. The Worker and Itinerary Register Agents
are tasked with the risk of collecting information from untrusted service provider
platforms and returning to a trusted platform to perform business critical functions.
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Tab. 3.3.: Comparison of attack models against negotiation frameworks
3.3 Kinds of attacks and countermeasures
This section presents various threats that can be faced by the negotiation frameworks
and the means by which adversaries would achieve their goals. Confidentiality, In-
tegrity, Availability and Non-repudiation (CIAN) are well studied security properties
for digital systems; this section presents an overview of attacks that could be used
to compromise these security properties in reference to the assets and stakeholders
involved. However, because of threats which required more details than can be
achieved with CIAN, additional requirements are presented in the subsections which
follow.
3.3.1 Confidentiality attacks
In all the negotiation frameworks considered, message exchanges are involved and
participants would desire to keep their contents confidential either for privacy rea-
sons or to enable them compete fairly with other participants. Such messages include
requests for offers, requests for quotations, negotiation parameters, user predefined
constraints, bid messages and contracts with suppliers and market moderators. Addi-
tionally, an attacker might be interested in maliciously disclosing identities of agents
that participated in a particular transaction. Adversaries could also be interested in
knowing about details of the bids before the auction closing time so that they make
better bids than their competitors.
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Confidentiality countermeasures
Faced with threats of malicious disclosure of agent identities, anonymity can be used
to prevent this threat from happening by hiding identities of participants. However,
almost all transactions involved in agent-mediated negotiation would require some
form of accountability and/or authentication. It would be inappropriate to have true
anonymity yet agents may have to be accountable for some of their actions.
We instead recommend pseudonymity for such environments. Which provides
pseudo names to agents so that they actions cannot be authenticated and recorded.
Pseudonymity is also relevant for frameworks that reply on agent reputations to
build trust models. Reputations cannot be built in environments that do not have
any reference point to past activities of agent identities. An example of security
schemes using pseudonymity (referred to as virtual identities) have previously been
suggest by [41] and [42]. Practical implementations of pseudonymity have been
achieved in AgentScape [43] platform by use of agent handles as pseudonyms to
support authentication and anonymity in payment schemes.
Other issues of confidentiality also arise for example in auctions whereby informa-
tion about the bids is not supposed to be revealed to participants until the end of
the auction. Techniques such as time-lock puzzles and timed-release cryptography
[40, 44] have been suggested in systems like MAGNET to prevent such threats.
Lastly, encryption of messages, use of signed digital certificates for communication
between negotiating parties and mutual authentication would also prevent eaves-
dropping, spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks in negotiation frameworks. These
techniques can be implemented using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol
[45]. However, challenges still exist in regard with threats from internal attackers
that may also have valid certificates with the Certificate Authority and can establish
legitimate connections between targeted communicating parties.
3.3.2 Attacks against integrity
Integrity threats are targeted at changing contents of messages, agent code and
other objects such as negotiation parameters, closing time of bids and offers in order
to suite interests of an adversary. An attacker could for example change contents of
the list of shortlisted suppliers in order to prevent the customer from considering
certain suppliers in the final negotiation phases. In case the bid closing time or
expiry time of an offer is changed by an adversary, participants would not be able
to rightly accomplish their goals. A more complicate integrity problem also exists
in frameworks which support mobility. An adversary could for example launch a
man-in-the-middle attack which could be used to alter the agent’s code. If the code
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checksums are not protected, the attacker could even recompute the checksums and
insert a new version of a compromised agent.
Integrity countermeasures
As indicated is subsection 3.3.2 agent-mediated negotiation frameworks face integrity
threats against their own code and the information they carry. Countermeasures to
integrity threats can be classified into detection and prevention categories. Majority
of the techniques discussed here are detection techniques for tampering either
on agent data or code. TLS protocol implementations can be used to guarantee
integrity of messages and mobile agent code against an external attacker but will not
protect the negotiation framework against an internal attacker. Similar to attacks
on messages, man-in-the-middle attacks can be launched by an internal attacker on
mobile-agent code. Mobile agent code could be changed and new versions of agent
code inserted by adversaries during transactions. Such threats can be detected by
signing agent code and data objects. Ideally agent code should be signed by the
agent creator/developer and the data objects digitally signed by the agent owner.
Security mechanisms involving signing of code and objects would require a Public-
Key Infrastructure (PKI) for retrieve decryption keys. A PKI is also important for
mutual authentication and providing secure communication channels using TLS
between communicating parties.
A distributed trust technique was proposed by [46] to maintain integrity of migration
paths so that in case of deletion or tampering with agents’ data or code, the malicious
platforms can be held accountable. The other two known mechanisms for recording
and protecting migration paths involve (a) using a centralized trusted third party
to authorize and keep track of migration paths and (b) using signature chaining
without a trusted third parties [47]. The distributed trust technique provides better
mechanisms for protecting migration path information. It avoids the overheads of a
trusted third party and mitigates problems involved with storage of signatures of
migration paths inside the agents themselves by using signed waivers of migrations
path information from previously visited hosts.
All negotiation frameworks reviewed in section 3.2.1 implicitly assume trust for the
agent. However, this assumption cannot always hold since agents may come from
malicious customers or they (agents) might have been compromised before arrival at
the execution platforms. Sand-boxing or jailing [48] provides one of the well tested
techniques for protection of platforms against execution of untrusted code. Model
Carrying Code (MCC) [49] is another approach which provides a practical approach
to monitoring of untrusted mobile code execution on agent platforms. Compared
with Proof Carrying Code (PCC) [50], MCC overcomes limitations of verifying binary
code after application deployment [49]. The mobile-agent is expected to present a
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high-level model of its security-related behavior to the agent platform to be verified
for conformance with the security policies of the platform.
3.3.3 Attacks on availability
Denial of service attacks are a threat to proper functionality of all services involved
in the agent-mediated negotiation framework. Survivability of an agent is at a
higher risk when the negotiation framework supports mobility. Unlike TrinAge,
MoVir and MAGNET assume a trusted platform for execution of all participating
agents. TrinAge assumes a scenario in which customer agents may visit untrusted
platforms and thus provides protection mechanism for survivability of the customer
agent by splitting functionality between three agents. As previously indicated in
Table 3.3, an Agent attacker could still destroy an agent that migrates to untrusted
platforms. Moreover, other assets such as offers shortlisted from suppliers could be
removed from the shortlist by a competing supplier. Messages exchanged during
the negotiation process could be hijacked by an adversary so that they do not reach
intended participants.
Publication of services in the publish/subscribe system such as the one used in
MAGNET and MoVir could be done in a such a way that some participants do not
get the information timely. Such a scenario could lead to unfavorable competition
among participants in-case time constraints are involved in a bid. Some adversaries
could also publish bogus bids into the publish/subscribe system or even replay bids
from other suppliers to damage their reputation or that of the entire market. In
circumstances where negotiation frameworks rely on directory services to discover
markets or suppliers (e.g. MoVir), a compromise to a directory service would
imply that the suppliers will not be discovered. This kind of attack is possible
with MoVir where a mediator agent aggregates services from suppliers in a virtual
organization and assumes that all parties in the negotiation framework are trusted.
Attackers could also use more resources than they are authorized on service provider
platforms. Such actions would lead to denial of services to other agents accessing
related services.
Availability countermeasures
As a first step for protecting agent-mediated systems against availability threats,
detection mechanisms based on the techniques discussed in subsections 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 should be put in place. Security mechanisms such as recording of migration
paths using distributed trust can be used for accountability in case agent gets changed
or destroyed.
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It is also critical to manage privileges of agents on agent platforms to prevent denial
of service attacks. Schemes such as Role Base Access Control (RBAC) [51] have been
implemented in agent platforms such as AgentScape to manage roles and access to
system resources. However, this mechanism also introduces challenges to provision
of anonymity services to agent-mediated negotiation.
Threats of agents being destroyed when they migrate to malicious platforms have not
been adequately dealt with. Most security mechanisms provide for detection of agent
failure and tampering, but no solid solution has been presented for graceful failure or
protection of data owned by the destroyed agent. A faulty tolerance technique based
on replication of an agent had previous been presented by [52]. However, complete
agent replication schemes impose computational overheads on agent platforms.
The last problem we consider in this category of threats is annoyance attacks in
which an attacker may make bogus submissions to the publish/subscribe system.
Agent platforms such as AgentScape [51], JADE [53], SeMoA [54] and Cougaar
[55] have all implemented identity management schemes to facilitate authentication
and authorization requirements. However, only AgentScape has implemented partial
anonymity services which can be used for authentication and authorization. We refer
to the anonymity services provided by AgentScape as partial because they use agent
handles (which is a hash of the global agent identifier) which can be traced back
to the true identity of the agent by an authorized administrator. MoVir framework
was implemented using AgentScape [56, 57] platform and thus utilizes all security
services in AgentScape. The question of whether an agent should be allowed to
submit offers or not to a publish/subscribe system or to a mediator agent as is the
case with MoVir is largely a trust issue. The agent systems research community [58]
has largely considered reputation models for answers to trust relations.
3.3.4 Non-repudiation attacks
Non-repudiation means that there is proof for actions that were performed by
participants in a negotiation. A customer should not be able to deny having submitted
a request for an offer from suppliers. The negotiation framework should also ensure
that the supplier cannot repudiate the responses they made to their customers. In
MoVir, a mediator agent could deny having received service subscriptions from
some suppliers. In order to achieve non-repudiation, some form of identification
is required, the negotiation framework should additionally provide protection for
identification information so that adversaries do not use it to violate confidentiality
requirements.
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Repudiation countermeasures
Psuedonymity can be used to maintain partial anonymity and accountability for
agent actions when participating in negotiations. Use of reputation models in such
environments works as good incentive to correct behavior to participating agents.
Digital signatures can be used to provide proof that a certain party sent a message.
A message sender cannot claim that they did not send a message that they signed
unless their private key was stolen. Identity Management Systems for agents in
the execution environment have been implemented for example in AgentScape
to prevent an agent owner from repudiating ownership of an agent. Agents are
identified by the middleware using a global unique identifier (GUID). The GUID is
private to the middleware and cannot be used by elements in the agent environment
to send or receive messages from the agent. Instead a hash of the GUID concatenated
with a counter is generated and published to a directory service for public access.
All agents in AgentScape are signed by the agent owner to provide non-repudiable
ownership. Unlike MoVir whose security mechanisms are based on AgentScape
middleware, TrinAge and MAGNET frameworks do not have security mechanisms
for providing both anonymity and accountability services.
3.3.5 Collusion attacks
Formation of coalitions in negotiations can be advantageous to both suppliers and
customers. Customers get a chance to bargain for lower prices due to expressions
of higher demand (with bulk purchases) for products and services. On the other
hand suppliers get an opportunity for bulk sales. However, unsupervised coalitions
can also be used by colluding buyers to unfairly out-compete other participants.
In situations of bidding, suppliers may not receive competitive prices if customers
collude to purchase services at low prices. All the three negotiation frameworks
studied are vulnerable to collusion attacks.
Collusion countermeasures
A solution to collusion attacks based on public verifiability of winner determination
data in case of a dispute was presented by Shi et al. [59]. Participants with secret
keys to winner determination data would be able to retrieve the decision making
data. This solution is inadequate and cannot address the problems presented in
subsection 3.3.5 since collusion trails cannot be found in decision making data.
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Tab. 3.4.: Security Requirements and Mechanisms
3.4 Discussions and conclusions
This section has taken a detailed study of assets and stakeholders involved in the
negotiation frameworks and investigated possible risks that would be experienced
in the event of an attack. An attack model that is based on internal, Dolev-Yao and
Agent attacks is discussed and applied to the three negotiation frameworks. Standard
cryptographic techniques are available to prevent most Dolev-Yao based attacks, but
the design choices for implemented security protocols may introduce vulnerabilities.
This scenario can be found in the security protocol presented by Jaiswal et al. [40] to
mitigate weakness in MAGNET, but did not cater for replay attacks as noted by Shi et
al. [59]. TrinAge makes effort to protect components of the customer agent against
malicious platforms, but does not completely achieve this because the information
collected by the worker and itinerary register agents (which visit hostile platforms)
could still be destroyed with these two agents. TrinAge further provides mechanisms
for detecting when an offer has been removed from the collection of offers, but does
not provide prevention mechanisms against this attack before offers are submitted to
the controller agent. The publish/subscribe system proposed in MAGNET provided a
more secure centralized control for market transactions than the mediator agent in
MoVir and the mobility functionality in TrinAge. In table 3.4, we present a summary
table mapping security requirements in negotiation framework to various security
mechanisms. As much as this chapter presents security mechanisms that can be
used/deployed to mitigate threats, it does not address weaknesses in these security
mechanisms. Security problems that exist with reputation models, publish subscribe
systems, distributed trust and security protocols are addressed in the second section
of this chapter.
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4A privacy preserving approach in
electronic-trading applications
In section 4.1 we present an introduction to publish-subscribe systems,
their relationship to the consumer buying behavior model and security
requirements for their deployment in a multi-agent environment. Sec-
tion 4.3 presents related work for secure publish-subscribe mediated
environments and their shortcomings. In section 4.4 we present a secure
design for a publish-subscribe mediated environment and a description
of security protocols and cryptographic hash functions needed to achieve
this goal. We perform an evaluation of the proposed security protocols
and security mechanisms in section 4.7. We present conclusions to this
study in section 4.8.
4.1 Privacy and confidentiality in consumer buying
behavior models
Publish-Subscribe systems are commonly used in highly dynamic environments
and systems to support many-to-many (asynchronous) service and communication
requirements. Such electronic markets typically involve suppliers advertising their
goods and services in a common electronic repository. Customers in the environ-
ment would then search for these goods and contact suppliers for completion of
the transaction. A prominent model for supporting customers and suppliers in
autonomic markets was previously been defined by Guttman et al. [60, 61] in a
Consumer Buying Behavior (CBB) model mediated by agents. Figure 4.1 presents
the seven stages that constitute a CBB model. The seven stages of the CBB model
are: (1) need identification, (2) product brokering, (3) buyer coalition formation, (4)
merchant brokering, (5) negotiation, (6) purchase and delivery and (7) product or
service evaluation. We note here that not all stages described in the CBB model
are mandatory for consumer transactions. Some transactions may-not for example
involve negotiations or formation of coalitions. In this chapter, we consider privacy,
confidentiality and integrity challenges for an electronic market in which two or
more virtual markets are mediated by publish-subscribe systems. We consider a
scaled down version of the CBB model, in which only three stages are operational,
namely; product identification (by consumers) , product and merchant brokering (by
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Fig. 4.1.: Consumer Buying Behavior Model
Fig. 4.2.: Publish-Subscribe Mediated Market
the Brokers); and suppliers (publishers) have to send in their products (publica-
tions) too. The other stages of the CBB model such as buyer coalition formation,
negotiation, product delivery and evaluation are outside the scope of this chapter.
Figure 4.2 presents a high-level overview for the virtual organization architecture
under consideration. The organizational setup is mediated by Publish-Subscribe
systems. The Brokers ( B1 and B2) are responsible for aggregating subscriptions
and publications from Subscribers (S1, S2 and S3) and Publishers (P1, P2 and P3)
respectively. Virtual markets A and B collaborate on subscriptions and publications
through Brokers B1 and B2. In case Subscriber S1 is interested in a subscription that
is not available in B1, the request would be forwarded to B2 by B1. The presented
scenario requires information to be handled and disseminated across virtual markets
containing Subscribers and Publishers with diverse interests; some of which could
be malicious towards some Publishers or subscribers.
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4.2 Security requirements and assumptions
This chapter considers a scenario in which Subscribers and Publishers do not wish to
reveal their identities to other participants in a publish-subscribe mediated system.
An environment in which Publishers, Subscribers and Brokers are interested in learn-
ing about transaction details of other parties is assumed. This implies that curious
Brokers may want to know what Publishers and Subscribers are respectively selling
and buying. Publishers may want to access information concerning transactions
for particular Subscribers. Conversely, curious Subscribers could be interested in
knowing identities of Publishers selling particular categories of products.
We consider three categories of security requirements, namely; confidentiality, pri-
vacy and integrity. These are further explained in the enumeration below.
i. Confidentiality: This requirement applies to the objects which are being
traded in the publish-subscribe mediated systems. Publications (offers) and
Subscriptions (requests) are supposed to be kept secret from all participants in
the environment
ii. Privacy: This requirement applies to identities of Publishers and Subscribers.
Publishers and Subscribers do not wish to have their identities revealed to any
parties (i.e. Publishers, Subscribers and Mediators) in the environment.
iii. Integrity: Messages and objects exchanged in the trading protocols are sup-
posed to be protected from tampering by unauthorized entities.
Use-case scenarios for such requirements can be found in the stock market or job
recruitment agencies. Considering an example of recruitment agencies, markets may
desire their identities to be kept secret until subscribers or job applicants have sent
their applications. Applicants may also desire their job searches to be kept private
in the publish-subscribe system. There are various reasons for such requirements
whose rationale is outside the scope of this research.
4.3 Related work
This section presents a review of solutions previously suggested in literature to
provide for confidentiality, privacy and integrity requirements in publish-subscribe
mediated environments. Their weaknesses are highlighted in this section and a new
scheme to mitigate these weaknesses is presented in section 4.4.
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4.3.1 Multi-layer encryption scheme
Shikfa et al. [62] suggested a technique for guaranteeing confidentiality and pri-
vacy in publish-subscribe networks by using commutative cryptography [63]. This
scheme assumes that all the correspondents in the publish-subscribe environment
have already received shared keys. The suggested scheme relies on the commutative
property of the Pohlig-Hellman cryptosystem [64] to allow removal of encryption
layers while preserving others in order to enforce data confidentiality. The encryp-
tion and decryption keys in the Pohlig-Hellman cryptosystems differ; thus having
asymmetric properties. This cryptographic scheme requires that the encryption
and decryption keys are kept secret since anyone can generate a second key with
knowledge of either of the keys. Security of the cryptographic system depends on
hardness of the discrete logarithmic problem.
The multi-layer encryption scheme suggested employs four security primitives,
namely; (1) Encrypt-Filter: Used by subscribers to create filters. (2) Encrypt-
Notification: Used by publishers to encrypt notifications. (3) Secure-Lookup: Used
by Brokers to perform matching functions of filters to notifications. (4) Secure-
Table-Building: Used by Brokers to build a routing table and compare encrypted
subscriptions. The design of the four security primitives is based on commutativity
properties of the Pohling-Hellman scheme. Brokers can add and suppress encryption
layers on entries in the routing table and then remove some of them during lookup
without accessing details of the subscriptions or publications.
There are several short-comings of secure routing with multi-layer encryption using
a Pohlig-Hellman (commutative-homomorphic) scheme.
Firstly, is the key-distribution problem. Addition and removal of encryption layers de-
pends on the participants respectively having the required encryption and decryption
keys. This is a challenge for commutative cryptography where both (encryption and
decryption) keys are required to be kept secret. Unfortunately, the Pohlig-Hellman
scheme by design allows a second key to be generated with knowledge of one of
the keys. If an adversary or curious brokers gains access to one of the keys they can
generate the corresponding second key.
This challenge is assumed to be non-existent by Shikfa et al. [62]. We find this
assumption impractical. Key distribution and secrecy of all keys cannot be ignored
for practical deployment of such a system.
Secondly, Shikfa et al. [62] assume non-dynamic subscribers. This is clearly a
problem, since an on-line system cannot be expected to have a static number of
users. Consequently, assumptions concerning publishers having secret keys for
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all available subscribers are highly flawed. The secrecy of keys in commutative
cryptography requires a high degree of trust among entities possessing the keys of
correspondents. Any accidental or malicious disclosure of one of the keys would
lead to an absolute violation of all security requirements since corresponding keys
can be generated from either of the encryption or decryption keys.
Lastly, practical deployment of cryptographic schemes requires implementation of the
indistinguishability property so that a cryptanalyst may not gain useful information
from a given cipher-text. This property when implemented in the scheme presented
by Shikfa et al. [62], would make cipher-text comparisons absolutely impossible.
4.3.2 Secure publish-subscribe and matching schemes
Several schemes related to our work were previously reviewed in section 6 of
[62]. These included Secure Multi-Domain Systems, Event Notification Systems [65],
Content-Based Infrastructures [66], and Fuzzy Private Matching [67]. We encourage
the reader to review section 6 of [62] for details of weaknesses and strengths for
these schemes.
4.4 Proposed solution and system design
This section presents our suggestions for a solution to enforce privacy, confidentiality
and integrity in publish-subscribe mediated virtual markets. The proposed solution
is built on well established security techniques such as cryptographic hashes and
public-key cryptography. Trusted Anonymizers (TA) are also used to facilitate
processes required for enforcing security requirements specified in subsection 4.2. A
principle for separation of privileges [68] is used to enforce subscriber and publisher
privacy.
An overview of interactions between Brokers, Subscribers and Publishers was pre-
viously presented in figure 4.2 without details of security techniques deployed in
the system. Figure 4.3 presents a new architecture for secure publish-subscribe
mediated virtual markets by deploying Trusted Anonymizers (TAs) and Public-Key
cryptography. The Trusted Anonymizers (TAi) are used to enforce privacy require-
ments by acting as intermediaries for message exchanges between the Broker (Bl),
Subscribers (Sj) and Publishers (Pk). The crossed arrow in figure 4.3 is an indicator
that no direct interactions should happen between the two entities. The Brokers (Bl)
should never communicate directly with the Publishers (Pk) or Subscribers (Sj).
This design is motivated by scenarios in which brokers that are acting as market
enablers (information routers) may also have self interests in some of the transactions
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Fig. 4.3.: Secure Publish-Subscribe Mediated Market
taking place in the network. Such scenarios have been observed in agricultural
markets for agricultural produce in Uganda and similar develping countries in
sub-Saharan Africa.
It has been observed as indicated in subsection 2.2.2 that brokers act as aggregators
for produce and could at any moment act as buyers or sellers themselves. In such
circumstances, the privacy of buyer or sellers would be at risk. Having a Trusted
Anonymizer whose role is primarily maintaining system security helps to separate
privileges in the network.
The presence of Trusted Anonymizers is analogous to the presence of a Key Distri-
bution Center (KDC) in the Kerberos [69] authentication protocol. The presence
of Brokers in this application design is also analogous to exit-nodes in the TOR
(anonymity network) network [70]. Brokers act as linkages for markets that are
external to the current virtual organization.
Section 4.5 below presents details of the security protocol used to enforce confiden-
tiality, privacy and integrity requirements for participating parties.
4.5 Security protocol
The TA is the only trusted element in the security protocol for this publish-subscribe
mediated system. As previously indicated in the introduction section, security re-
quirements are enforced using public-key cryptography and cryptographic hashes.
The assumptions presented below are considered for the security protocol sup-
porting secure interactions between the Publishers (P ), Subscribers (S), Trusted
Anonymizers (TA) and Brokers (B).
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i. All participating entities can obtain verifiable public-keys for their correspon-
dents. That is to say, a public-key server is available to all entities to obtain
valid digitally signed keys.
ii. We also assume that the system inherits generic assumptions from public-key
cryptography. Such assumptions include secret-key confidentiality.
iii. The scheme trusts that the TAs will not reveal routing information to ad-
versaries. This implies that routing information collected by the TAs must
be protected and their computations are assumed to take place on a trusted
platform.
iv. The software executing on the Publishers’ and Subscribers’ terminals is as-
sumed to be trusted. This software is responsible for generating the salt to
be concatenated with the requests and offers. The process of concatenating a
salt to the messages is strictly automated (achieved by software). Publishers
and Subscribers cannot choose whether or not to concatenate a salt to their re-
quests or offers. This operation is mandatory and is enforced through software
on the Publishers and Subscribers terminals.
4.5.1 Publications
This subsection presents the component of the protocol for securely publishing
content in the publish-subscribe system. In (4.1) and (4.2) formal components of
the protocol are presented.
P1 æ TA2 : [hash(o er || salt)||TS1]KUTA2 (4.1)
TA2 æ B2 : [hashed _ o er ||TS2]KUB2 (4.2)
Where hashed _ o er = hash(o er || salt)
TS1 and TS2 are timestamps which are supposed to be checked by the recipient in
order to detect replay attacks. Furthermore, offers submitted by the publishers are
sent as hashed values after concatenating them with a “salt”. The concept of a salt be-
ing concatenated with the requests and offers is important for preventing dictionary
attacks on hashes by either malicious Mediators or Trusted Anonymizers. The factors
concerning the choice of hash functions and salt management scheme deserve
much attention. The details of these choices are further discussed in subsection
4.5.4. This component of the security protocol achieves three objectives:
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i. Privacy of the Publisher (P1) is enforced by the Trusted Anonymizer (TA2)
eliminating direct interaction with a possibly curious Broker.
ii. Integrity of the messages is also enforced by encrypting messages using public-
keys (KUTA2 and KUB2)
iii. Message confidentiality is achieved by sending hashed offers to entities partici-
pating in the protocol.
4.5.2 Subscriptions
This subsection presents the component of the protocol for securely requesting for
content from the publish-subscribe system by the Subscribers (Sj).
S1 æ TA1 : [hash(request || salt)||TS3]KUTA1 (4.3)
TA1 æ B1 : [hashed _ request ||TS4]KUB1 (4.4)
Where hashed _ request = hash(request || salt)
Again this component of the security protocol is used to enforce privacy for the
subscriber and to protect message confidentiality and integrity using principles
similar to those presented in subsection 4.5.1 above.
4.5.3 Routing tables
The Trusted Anonymizers (TAs) and Brokers (Bs) are supposed to keep secured
routing tables which would be used to identify correct destinations of responses or
feedback for participants.
The routing tables (I and II) created by the TAs are used to match Publishers or
Subscribers with their respective hashed offers or requests. In case Brokers send
feedback to the TA concerning a request which can be served (i.e. a match has
been found), the concerned TA has to search in the routing table for the subscriber
corresponding to a stored hash request for feedback to be sent.
The routing tables created by the Brokers (Bs) are used to match TAs to the
hashed requests or offers they forwarded so that a route for feedback can always
be established when a match is found. The brokers use the routing table to identify
a given TAl that sent them a particular hashed request or offer. Table III shows a
sample Brokers’ table of subscriptions.
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Publisher Hash Value
P1 [hash(o er || salt)]1
P2 [hash(o er || salt)]2
P3 [hash(o er || salt)]3
... ...
Pi [hash(o er || salt)]i
Tab. 4.1.: TAs’ table of Publications
Subscriber Hash Value
S1 [hash(request || salt)]1
S2 [hash(request || salt)]2
S3 [hash(request || salt)]3
... ...
Sj [hash(request || salt)]j
Tab. 4.2.: TAs’ table of Subscriptions
Likewise, the Broker has to store a table of publications which will be used to match
TAs to corresponding requests from subscribers. Table IV is a sample Broker routing
table for publications. After building Tables III and IV , Brokers B1 and B2 will
possess hashed values of requests and offers received from Trusted Anonymizers. The
presented sample tables do not have any optimization features such as indexing. This
would of course be a relevant feature in a practical deployment. For example, tables
III and IV could be combined by a Broker to create a match-making table consisting
of a Primary-Key, Requesting-TA, Offering-TA and Hashed-Match columns.
The Brokers do not communicate directly with the Publishers and Subscribers, but
they have the ability to perform matching functions between requests and offers
received through the TAs. A request will be matched to an offer by a Broker if the
hashes in protocol sessions (2) and (4) are equivalent. Whenever a Broker receives a
hashed request from a TA, this hash is compared with contents of the publications
table. In case a match is not found, the Broker (e.g. B1) would forward the request
to another Broker (e.g. B2) for a match to be found.
After finding matching hashes, the Broker would then notify both the “requesting”
TAi and the “offering” TAj about the success. The notification procedure is formally
presented below.
B1 æ TAi : [TAj ||hashed _ o er ||TS5]KUTAi (4.5)
Where hashed _ o er = hash(o er || salt)
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Trusted Anonymizer Hash Value
TA1 [hash(request || salt)]1
TA2 [hash(request || salt)]2
TA3 [hash(request || salt)]3
... ...
TAl [hash(request || salt)]l
Tab. 4.3.: Brokers’ table of Subscriptions
Trusted Anonymizer Hash Value
TA1 [hash(o er || salt)]1
TA2 [hash(o er || salt)]2
TA3 [hash(o er || salt)]3
... ...
TAk [hash(o er || salt)]k
Tab. 4.4.: Brokers’ table of Publications
The message sent to the “requesting” TAi consists of the identity of the “offering”
TAj , hashed value of the offer (obtained from the Broker’s table of publications) and
a timestamp to prevent replay attacks.
B1 æ TAj : [TAi ||hashed _ request ||TS6]KUTAj (4.6)
Where hashed _ request = hash(request || salt)
Similarly, the message sent to the “offering” TAj , consists of the identity of the
“requesting” TAi, hashed value of the request and a timestamp to prevent replay
attacks. The “offering” TAj then notifies the Publisher (Pi) about the demand for
their offer as shown in the protocol session below.
TAj æ Pi : [hashed _ o er ||TS7]KUPi (4.7)
Where hashed _ o er = hash(o er || salt)
This part of the protocol also enforces the required security requirements of privacy,
confidentiality and integrity for the publisher. The Broker will not be able to
tell the identity of the Publisher, due to the indirect communication through a
Trusted Anonymizer. Additionally, the TAi also notifies the Subscriber (Si) about
the successful discovery of an offer to request.
TAi æ Si : [hashed _ request ||TS8]KUSi (4.8)
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Where hashed _ request = hash(request || salt)
Now the Subscriber is required to generate a new unsigned public-key which will
be used to enforce confidentiality and integrity requirements for delivery of the
required publication. Presented below is the last component of the protocol.
Si æ TAi : [KUúSi ||TS9]KUTAi (4.9)
Here KUúSi is the new unsigned public-key to be shared with the Publisher.
TAi æ Pi : [KUúSi ||TS10]KUPi (4.10)
Now, the Publisher (Pi) has an unsigned public-key for the Subscriber (Si) received
through the Trusted Anonymizer (TAi) and can encrypt messages which can only be
retrieved by Si.
Pi æ TAi : [[Object ||TSú]KUúSi ||TS11]KUTAi (4.11)
Finally, Si can receive the secret object encrypted by the new unsigned public-key
after TAi has removed encryption layer in protocol session (4.11).
TAi æ Si : [Object ||TSú]KUúSi (4.12)
In the next section we present a discussion of issues surrounding cryptographic
hashing functions and their implications to the overall security of the proposed
protocol in a Publish-Subscribe Mediated System.
4.5.4 Properties of cryptographic hash functions
The guarantee of security requirements for the proposed system is highly dependent
on the strengths of the cryptographic hash functions. The enumeration below
presents key properties for hash functions previously suggested in literature [71].
These properties are a prerequisite for providing various security requirements to
any system considering to use cryptographic hash functions:
i. Given a message (m) it should be easy to compute a hash value (hash(m))
from the message.
ii. Given x = hash(m), it should be computationally infeasible to retrieve m from
x.
iii. It is computationally difficult for an adversary to modifymwithout the hash(m)
changing.
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iv. Given two messages (m1 and m2) where m1 ”= m2, it should be infeasible
finding hash(m1) = hash(m2).
Given the hash function properties above, the proposed scheme would always
generate unique hash values for various offers and requests respectively submitted
by the publishers and subscribers. Comparisons for equality between hash values for
offers and request would also be possible since hash functions are deterministic and
will always generate the same hash value for a particular input message.
If the hash function used in the system is poorly designed, then the hash values could
be easily cracked by attackers. Hashing schemes such as MD5-crypt [72, 73, 74]
and Bcrypt [75] use slow algorithms in-order to minimize the number of guesses
which can be made by an attacker. Basically, the attacker would need much more
time to crack a hash value with a slower algorithm as compared to other faster
alternatives such as SHA-2 [76] family of hash functions. We are also aware of
vigorous efforts for developing a more secure hash function (SHA-3) [77] conducted
by the United States National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) (http:
//csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/).
The guiding principles for creating and choosing the salt are further explained in the
next subsection (4.5.5).
4.5.5 Choosing a salt
The main objective of concatenating a salt with the messages (offers and requests)
is to minimize possibilities of successful dictionary attacks. Adversaries in the
network, curious brokers, subscribers and publishers may want to run dictionary
attacks on messages with the objective of compromising confidentiality and privacy
requirements.
Concatenating a salt to messages would tremendously reduce possibilities of dictio-
nary attacks on the hashed values. An attacker would not succeed in deriving the
plain text message from comparisons of hashes with those from words in standard
dictionaries. The random bits attached to the messages would make such attacks
very difficult in terms of storage requirements and computation. The salt has to be
kept secret from system participants and any-other external entities so that attackers
have limited information for guessing messages corresponding to hashed values.
The salt to be concatenated with the request or offer has to be carefully chosen in
the global environment of the system. This is important for feasibility of matches
between hashes of requests and offers to be preserved. Implementing a scheme in
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which randomized salts are appended to messages would definitely fail all compar-
isons between requests and offers.
It is important to note that the system software is responsible for generating a salt
for the Publishers and Subscribers. This implies that users do not have control over
the process of creating a salt. Equally, the timestamps appended to the messages are
system generated and the system has to rely on a time server for synchronizing all
clocks on participating nodes.
Salt protection
The software that generates and protects the salt from being revealed to buyers,
sellers and brokers is part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)[78]. The TCB is an
enforcer of security in an environment that is not trusted. An approach that has been
widely successful in offering a Trusted Computed Base in untrusted environments
is the deployment of Smartcards[79]. The costs for Smartcards is significantly low
yet they offer a computing platform that can be used to securely generate a salt and
also store it to prevent adversaries from tampering with it.
Smartcards are tamper evident: this implies that it would be possible to detect when
an adversary tries to compromise it. Smartcards are also tamper proof to a large
extent. Most modern smartcards are designed to be difficult to tamper with. The
skill and operation cost of tampering with a modern Smartcard without destroying
it and its content is very high and typically exceeds the gains anticipated from the
target.
The next subsection (4.6) provides more details on considerations for formatting
messages in the secure publish-subscribe system.
4.6 Message formatting
In order for comparisons in the system to make sense, message formats are supposed
to be kept consistent. The format in which requests are concatenated with a salt and
then encrypted, should be kept consistent with the subscriptions/offers.
This condition is particularly sensitive for the salt. If the salt concatenated with
requests differs from that concatenated with the offers, then matching between
offers and requests would be infeasible.
The global system environment is supposed to agree on a salt to be used for a
particular period of time. It would be desirable to frequently change the salt to
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minimize chances of successful guesses. Such correct guesses would also increase
chances of successful dictionary attacks on exchanged messages. Furthermore,
the salt has to be synchronized with the publishers and subscribers via a secure
channel.
A poorly chosen salting mechanisms will either render the security schemes unusable
due to computationally incompatible offers and requests or the hash values will get
easily broken by a curious broker and consequently users’ privacy broken.
Example matching with price information
In order to bring the comparison of offers into context, we consider a common
problem of purchasing drugs for example for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. The
purchase of these drugs by patients usually raises privacy needs most especially
for individuals that do not want to have their identities revealed as HIV sufferers.
Anti-Retroviral (ARV) drugs purchase example is shown below as an evaluation
example.
Publisheri æ Market : [hash(o eri || salt)||Price_of_o eri]KUMarket (4.13)
An example seller submission would be [hash(arv_drugs || salt)||50 euros]KUMarket
Publisherj æ Market : [hash(o erj || salt)||Price_of_o erj ]KUMarket (4.14)
Another example seller submission would be
[hash(arv_drugs || salt)||52 euros]KUMarket
Buyerb æ Market : [hash(requestb || salt)||Price_of_o erb]KUMarket (4.15)
An example buyer request would be [hash(arv_drugs || salt)||51 euros]KUMarket
We can observe from the examples that hash(arv_drugs || salt) is similar in all the
three submissions and therefore a comparison is possible based on fourth hash
property in subsection 4.5.4.
Since our privacy and confidentiality requirements are with the commodity being
traded and identity protection, the price information does not need to be part of
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the hashed value. Indeed adding price information to the hashed content would
generate incomparable hashes since seller prices would typically differ.
4.7 Solution evaluation
This section discusses the weaknesses and strengths of the proposed scheme for
providing confidentiality, integrity and privacy in publish-subscribe mediated virtual
markets.
i. Confidentiality of the salt generated at the Publishers’ and Subscriber’s ter-
minals is dependent on the trust in the software responsible for generating
the salt. The Publishers and Subscribers should not be able to gain access to
the salt. This implies that memory protection for the generated salt should be
provided. The choice of programming language for implementing this software
is critical for the security of the system. Requirements such as type-safety
and memory protection should be guaranteed by the implementation. Various
form of software vulnerabilities have previously been discussed in literature
[80, 81].
ii. The Trusted Anonymizers (TAs) may turn against the Publishers and Sub-
scribers to violate security requirements of privacy, confidentiality and integrity.
The seemingly easy requirement to violate among those presented is privacy of
Subscribers and Publishers by the TAs. The TAs are the first point of contact
for the subscriber and publishers when they want to respectively buy and sell
items via the Publish-Subscribe environment. It is practically infeasible to have
message encryption without sharing keys TAs so that message confidentiality
and integrity are preserved in the presence of an adversary in the environment.
iii. Attaching time bounds on validity of messages would not improve the secu-
rity situation. Confidentiality and privacy can still be attacked using off-line
techniques by a malicious Trusted Anonymizer. The broker has a chance to
compromise message confidentiality when they copy the message and use
available time and resources to learn about Subscriber and Publisher messages
long after the transaction was completed.
iv. If the brokers succeed in cracking the hashes, they will not know the publisher
of the item or in case of buying, they will not be able to tell who wishes to buy.
However, successful off-line attacks by the TA would break both confidentiality
and privacy of the message and Publisher-Subscriber respectively.
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v. It is difficult to eliminate the compromise on hashing technique since we need
to blind-match requests to offers. Encryption would have provided a solution
less susceptible to off-line attacks, but it would render comparisons impossible.
4.8 Conclusions
The proposed scheme is rigid as far as message formatting is concerned. Messages
should be created in a standardized format for all participants so that matching
requirements can be consistently met.
Although it is not our objective to prevent the TAs from knowing details of requests
and offers, the hashed messages make this implicit security objective possible. The
TAs will know identities of participants but will not have access to message details.
Performance of hash functions is guaranteed to be faster than other deterministic
cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryption schemes. The hash
generation procedure is assumed not to impose a performance penalty on the system
due to efficiency requirements for hash algorithms as stated in the enumeration of
subsection 4.5.4. The generated hash-value is far easier to encrypt than the original
message due to the significant size differences between a message and its fingerprint.
This presents the benefit of fast encryption for the resultant light-weight content.
We have presented a scheme which offers a practical solution for confidentiality,
privacy and integrity requirements in publish-subscribe mediated virtual markets.
The compromises made (stated in section 4.7) are also practically sound for the
target requirements.
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5An auction system for improved
agricultural trade in developing
countries
This chapter presents the need for developing an incentive compatible
electronic market that efficiently connects trader agents in search of
farmer agents with produce for sale and farmer agents in search of trader
agents in need of produce to buy. To this end, this chapter envisages
an auction market for agricultural trade that operates using a Short
Messaging Service (SMS) interface. In this chapter, we consider the
constraints for technology deployment in developing-world agricultural
markets and conclude that neither of the existing approaches is sufficient.
We argue instead for the introduction of a novel market mechanism better
adapted to these constraints—particularly, to the need for interacting
with the market via a basic (non-Internet-enabled) phone. In section
5.1 we present an introduction to electronic mechanisms for agricultural
trade. In section 5.4 we present our proposed auction mechanism for
agricultural trade and discuss the practical implementation of the auction
market in section 5.5. Section 5.6 presents a discussion of the reputation
system design and an evaluation of practical advantages of the auction
design presented in section 5.7. Section 5.8 presents conclusions from
our study.
5.1 Introduction
There have been recent attempts to use mobile and communications technologies
to create agricultural advisory services, with a major focus on providing price infor-
mation to farmers [3, 82, 83]. There have also been attempts to use phones and
the Internet to set up markets in the developing world, usually based on classified
advertisement listings or single-sided auction markets [84, 85, 82]. Several infor-
mation systems have been implemented in form of agricultural advisory services
in various developing countries [3]. The major goal of these technological imple-
mentations has been to help farmers in obtaining information for agricultural best
practices to enhance their farm yields. The implemented advisory services have in
most cases been used to provide farmers with access to market information. This
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information dissemination process has helped farmers to gain incites into market
trends to competitively price their produce.
The positive impact of agricultural advisory services has also been cast in doubt as
reported in the evaluation by [86] which found a minimal impact on agricultural
practices for farmers that were surveyed in 14 districts of cotton, onions and veg-
etable growing farmers in India. In 2005, Barrett et al., [1] presented a historical
account of various transformations which had taken place in the agricultural markets
of developing countries since the 1960s. Despite improvements in road networks,
telecommunication infrastructure and free market conditions in most economies,
some of the issues that impeded an efficient market place 50 years ago are still preva-
lent. Agricultural trade in developing countries is still based on informal contracts
and market information largely shared by word-of-mouth. Trade networks among
farmers and traders hardly grow beyond their historical social networks. Internet
based e-commerce systems which have been ubiquitously adopted in the developed
have not yet had a significant impact on agricultural trade in developing countries.
Low bandwidth conditions, poor electricity infrastructure and high entry prices for
computers have been significant hindrances to the adoption of Internet supported
commerce.
Agricultural trade in developing countries makes a large contribution to the national
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite inefficiencies that were indicated in chapter
2, agriculture still employees more than half of the Ugandan population and a
great deal of trade is conducted rurally. Uganda’s agricultural sector for example
contributes 24.4% ($12 billion) to GDP annually [5], is dominated by small-scale
farmers. Agricultural markets in developing countries tend to be inefficient, due
largely to poor information flow between buyers and sellers. Developing countries
such as Uganda have experienced growth in their telecommunications infrastructure
in recent years that have also been extended to rural areas. Within the last three
years, new opportunities have been presented by the widespread adoption of mobile
services such as mobile money transfer and by high mobile phone penetration.
The question as to why agricultural markets in Uganda are still inefficient remains
unanswered. We argue in this this chapter that previous electronic market designs
for agricultural markets have taken into consideration the incentives for a successful
market design.
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5.2 Obstacles to mobile-based trade
These qualitative and quantitative findings suggest that electronic markets would
have much to offer participants in Uganda’s agricultural market. However, such
markets face many practical obstacles. Specifically:
• The costs of SMS messages pose a barrier to participation in mobile-phone-
based auctions, particularly if a large number of SMS messages needs to be
exchanged to conduct a trade. To put this argument into perspective, we
analyze revenues for a farmer expecting to harvest 100 kilograms of maize
grain. This farmer would expect a gross revenue of 50,000 UGX ($20 USD)
given a conservative price of 500 UGX per kilogram of maize grain. Getting
the grain ready to sell requires field maintenance over 6 months of growing
the maize and approximately a month of drying the grain. Thus, the grain
yields the farmer approximately 240 UGX (or about $0.10 USD) per day over
these seven months. In contrast, the average rate for a single SMS message on
Ugandan networks is 100 UGX ($0.04 USD).
• Traders are accustomed to physically examining goods before purchasing,
claiming “seeing is believing.” They may feel skepticism about whether a
farmer will provide merchandise in the quality and quantities agreed upon
electronically through a mobile-phone market system.
• Traders are accustomed to finding sellers through personal recommendations,
and may be reluctant to trust a seller matched to them by an automated system.
For example, we heard a concern from an urban trader that thieves might pose
as sellers with cheap produce on a mobile market system in order to lure them
to a remote location and rob them.
• Farmers may deliberately misinform traders about the quality and quantities
of their products.
• Buyers who have committed to a farmer remotely may fail to arrive at the farm-
ers’ residences or markets to pay and take collection. Farmers are accustomed
to immediate physical cash payments.
• Most farmers, traders and brokers are neither good writers nor readers. A
complex SMS interface for participation in the trade would limit accessibility.
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5.3 Market design considerations
This research work started with a proposal to implement an auction mechanism for
agricultural trade. It was important that we designed a market mechanism met the
following requirements;
• Minimize the number of message exchanges between users before a deal is
concluded due to users’ sensitivity to the costs of SMS messaging.
• Ability to represent commodity details such as species and quality in a single
SMS message for listing on feature phones.
• Provide accountability in the system in form of a robust reputation mechanism
for users not to misrepresent their market submissions.
• Provide an incentive compatible mechanism for buyers and sellers in the
auction market.
A double auction mechanism [87] to facilitate trade using SMS messages on feature
phones was considered for these requirements. The proposed design envisioned an
auction mechanism in which farmers submit ask prices to the agricultural market for
the produce they want to sell and traders also simultaneous submit bids for produce
they wish to buy. The market would then match sellers with buyers that submitted a
bid price above that of the sellers using a clearing price determined by the clearing
algorithm. Parameters for setting the clearing price of the auction mechanism pose
one of the major design challenges for the auction system.
5.3.1 Auction design structures
As presented in section 2.2, agricultural markets in Uganda are enabled by brokers
and traders that buy produce from rural areas and transport it to urban markets. The
market environment is assumed to involve three entities, namely; sellers (farmers),
buyers (traders) and brokers who sometimes act as transaction advisors. We assume
that transactions would be performed on a predefined list of commodities and
geographical areas so that the SMS user interface is kept relatively simple. Traders,
farmers and brokers would be given a printed list for them to learn codes for different
districts in the country and commodities. In the listing below, we briefly present
the roles that were initially thought to be played by each of the entities in the
agricultural market and the information that would be needed for them to realize
their objectives.
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i. The farmers submit ask prices (asks) for which they would be willing to sell their
produce in the market. These submissions are used to register a product type
and capture the farmer’s locations. Listed below is the information included in
the traders’ submissions:
• Product name and species: Since the commodities being traded are agri-
cultural products, farmers need to indicate the product name and or
species.
• The quantity available for sell from the farmer.
• The ask price for the commodities.
ii. The brokers in the market are required to submit price estimations for the farm-
ers’ produce. This assignment is used on the assumption that brokers would
perform unbiased evaluation of the farmers’ produce. After each evaluation
the broker would submit a quality indicative unit price for the produce to the
market. This is necessary because traders and farmers currently do not have
any discrete measures for quality at the farm level. Quality is evaluated over an
informal continuous range or ’fair average quality’ estimates. Price on the other
side presents a value which implicitly includes quality evaluations. Given this
price information a quality rating estimation for the produce can be obtained
at the specified location using the demand-and-supply situations. The brokers
would earn reputation points on good recommendations and lose points on
inaccurate or poor evaluations. The information listed below is included in the
broker’s submissions:
• Brokers would submit an estimate price (product estimate price) to the
market for estimating produce quality.
• Farmer’s location from a well defined market reference point. The brokers
provide distance information from a predefined trade location to the
farmer’s premises. The distance information is provided in terms of time
required to travel to the farmer’s location from the nearest trading center
registered in the marker system. The usefulness of time is to distinguish
between equal distances with different road conditions. Some rural
seasonal roads are very poor during rain seasons and would have longer
travel time than others.
iii. The traders also simultaneously submit their bids to the market for the products
they wish to purchase. The information listed below is included in the trader’s
bids:
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• The name of the product (Product name) that the trader wishes to buy.
• The quantity that the trader is bidding for.
• The unit price range (minimum and maximum price) for items to be
purchased. This range of bid price is used by the bidding algorithm to
place bids on behalf of the trader.
• Maximum distance that the trader is willing to travel from the primary
rural trading point. This distance measure would be used to compute bid
prices for an distance between the best location and worst case distance
locations.
At the time of registration, the trader would indicate their preferences for
trading locations they would be willing to visit. These preferences would also
be used to deliver message alerts for new offers in the market. The traders can
also update these preferences by sending an SMS to the market system.
iv. Support for negotiation: Traders are highly accustomed to negotiation in the
current trade environment. It is important for the proposed system to provide
room for negotiation in order to achieve wide acceptance by stakeholders.
After successful matching between the seller (farmer) and the buyer (trader)
using a clearing price (p), the farmer and trader are notified. The trader is
given a time frame to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted by
the trader, this implicitly implies that the trader and broker can enter into a
negotiation for the final price above the ask price and below the bid price.
v. It is also further observed that numeric representation of reputation scores
would not be very informative for the target group. We need to represent
reputation in a meaningful style which can be easily communicated to the
traders, brokers and farmers. It is important for all parties to have a clear
understanding of the reputation feedback. We propose a scheme that is
represented in a natural language. Essentially, a range of reputation scores
in figures would be matched to a natural language range. Examples of such
ranges includes; Platinum , Gold, Silver, Bronze and newbie ratings for traders
and farmers. Since broker activities are mostly about trust, their scores could
be; Exceptionally trusted, highly trusted, trusted, lowly trusted and untrusted.
5.3.2 Filtering rules
Due to the constraints of communication because of messaging costs, market interac-
tions are required to be restricted to individuals with a high probability of actuating
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the trade. Listed below are some of the filtering conditions for traders’ and farmers’
submissions. The traders could place bids that are filtered by:
• The minimum reputation level of the broker or farmer they would be willing
to trade with, or restrict only to a list of “trusted” participants. Traders and
farmers would earn reputation points on successfully completed transactions
and would lose points on those where either sides is not satisfied by the
transaction outcomes.
• The maximum distance of the farmer from the trader’s primary trade location.
This is important because traders care about transportation costs involved in
collecting the produce.
• The minimum quality levels of produce that traders are willing to buy from
farmers. The quality information about the produce would have to be vouched
for by brokers.
The conditions listed below are proposed for optional broker involvement so that
the market stays adaptive while also promoting accountability:
• We envisaged situations in which brokers may not be available to verify in-
formation from farmers about their produce. Such situations would call for a
design in which the market system waits for feedback for a specific amount
of time, after which the offers are forwarded for possible bidders. A time
threshold would be set based on the nature of the product. If it is vegetables
with a short storage span, then notifications would be released in no more
than 3 hours. For products such as dry beans or maize, the waiting time can
be allowed to be longer.
• In case the amount of money involved in a transaction is small, then the
requirement of a broker would need to be relaxed. A threshold would be set
for an approximate value of the product being submitted for auction. Since
brokers are supposed to earn commissions from transactions on which they
give feedback, transactions involving low priced commodities are likely not to
be profitable in case brokers are required to perform quality checks.
• In case the trust level for the seller is high and above a specified threshold,
such offers might be exempted from quality evaluations by brokers. The trust
that the market places in any individual is defined by a reputation score which
grows as a result of positive market activities and is reduced when something
undesirable takes place. We are also mindful of scenarios in which some
buyers and sellers might use their high reputation scores to act dishonestly
because the market places a high trust in them. This issue presents temptations
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of brokers submitting reviews without actually checking the produce. Since
farmers also get notification messages about these ratings, it might be possible
that complains would be raised by the farmer that their merchandise was rated
without a physical inspection. In such cases the broker’s reputation would be
reduced by an amount that substantially reflects dishonesty and impacts their
reputation.
Since the market needs to ensure reliability and accountability, the following condi-
tions were proposed in order for this goal to be met: Presented in the listing below
are conditions in which broker reviews are mandatory.
• When the approximate price of merchandise is above a specific threshold, then
the market would require a quality verification by the broker. In this case the
broker would contribute to the reliability attribute of the transaction.
• In circumstances where the farmer cannot be trusted, because of a low reputa-
tion score, then the market would require the broker to verify the information
that was submitted by the farmer.
• We also consider scenarios in which the buyer explicitly indicates that they
need a broker to verify the merchandise before committing to the purchase.
5.3.3 Auction interaction protocol
In this subsection we present our initial double auction protocol design for message
exchanges in the proposed agricultural market systems.
i. We start is one part of the auction in which farmers submit products to the
market. These products are grouped into commodities depending on their
category or species and location. Presented in the session below is a structure
of a message from the farmer to the market system.
F æM : (Product_Species,Quantity,
V illage_name,Ask_price)
(5.1)
The product name in the message describes the product; for example beans,
and the species provides more information about the quality of the product.
The quantity is used to obtain a unit price from the Ask_price which will
make it possible to defined normalized values for comparison purposes. The
Location_ID is obtained from a list of predefined locations that have been
submitted to the farmers, traders and brokers. We further need to obtain the
Village_name since the predefined locations are likely to be within a radius of
10kms from the farmers’ actual locations.
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ii. After a farmer has submitted their produce to the market, a broker nearest to
them is sent a request specified below to go and verify the produce.
M æ B : (Trans_ID, Farmer_ID,Location_ID,
V illage_name, Farmer_mobile_number)
(5.2)
The transaction identifier (Trans_ID) is used to distinguish between commodi-
ties submitted by the same farmer. The mobile number of the farmer is
important for the broker to obtain additional information for directions to
the farmer’s location. The village name also contributes to the accuracy of
information to the farmer’s location. The Farmer_ID is used by the market
system when registering reports from brokers concerning the visited farmers.
The broker is given one minute to accept or reject the request. If the broker
rejects the request, two additional brokers are contacted. When they all decline
to review the produce, the commodity is listed with the status unreviewed.
iii. The message below would be sent by the broker to the market after reviewing
the farmer’s produce.
B æM : (Trans_ID,< OKAY |NOT OKAY > Location_ID,
Estimate_travel_time)
(5.3)
In the message above, the broker quotes the transaction identifier for a partic-
ular farmer’s submission. The location identifier for the farmer is confirmed by
the broker using the Location_ID. The estimated time (Estimate_travel_time)
required to travel from the registered location identifier to the farmer’s location
is also received from the broker. The estimated price Estimate_price for the
farmer’s produce is used to compute the quality rating of the produce. This
value is a unit price for the farmer’s produce which is used to estimate the
quality rating of the produce. The brokers are expected to be honest in their
submissions and failure to do so would lead to loss of reputation points.
iv. Presented here is a scheme for computing the quality for produce submitted
by the farmer. We note that the prices of produce in the country would differ
due to differences in demand and supply conditions. The prices of produce
can be mapped onto a quality scale between 1 and 10 using the lowest and
highest prices from a given predefined trading zone. Given a location (A) with
MinPA andMaxPA as respectively minimum and maximum prices for a given
product P (ProdP ). We can obtain the price for each unit scale of quality
(Quality_unit_pricePA) for ProdP using the equation below:
Quality_unit_pricePA =
(MaxPA≠MinPA)
10 (5.4)
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Given a broker estimate price (Estimate_PricePA), we can calculate the qual-
ity rating for the farmer’s produce at location A (Quality_ratingPA) using the
equation below:
Quality_ratingPA =
(Estimate_PricePA≠MinPA)
Quality_Unit_PricePA
(5.5)
Using equation 5.4 we can obtain the quality rating for a product
v. Given that the market has received detailed information concerning the
farmer’s produce, it is now possible to classify these submissions into com-
modities. The records required for defining commodities are Product name or
species, Location_ID, Quality and Ask_price
vi. Presented below is the message that is expected from the traders as they
place their bids in the market. It deserves mention that the trader’s asks are
simultaneously submitted to the market with the farmers’ bids.
T æM : (Product_name or species,Bid_amount, Location_IDs, FILTERS)
(5.6)
The FILTERS might include the following options: Max_time,Min_quality
andMin_broker_reputation.
The market would then match the trader’s request using the bid price and
any filtering options specified by the trader, for example during registration
or bid submission. The location identifiers indicate the places that the trader
would be willing to travel to buy produce. The maximum distance (Max_time)
indicates the maximum time that a trader would be willing to travel from the
specified trade locations preferences to the farmer locations.
vii. Presented below are details for the bidding algorithm to construct a bid on
behalf of the trader. We assume that the minimum reputation for the broker as
Rmin and the maximum time the trader is willing to travel as Tmax. For any
given commodity in the market, we consider it to have the following attributes
relative to a trader’s preferences:
• The reputation (R) for the broker that vouched for the produce in the
market system, where R œ {1, . . . , 100} and
• The time (T ) required to travel from one of the trader’s specified locations
to the farmer’s location where T œ {0, . . . , Tmax}.
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The function for the trader’s bid per unit quantity would follow as shown
below:
Bid(R, T ) = (Bid_amount) ·
1
R≠Rmin
100≠Rmin
2
·
1
Tmax≠T
Tmax
2
(5.7)
Using equation 5.7 we can determine the final bid amount (bid_amount) for
the trader.
The condition min_price Æ Bid(Q,R, T ) Æ max_price should be satisfied by
all bids submitted on the trader’s behalf.
viii. After the market has computed the bid price on behalf of the trader, the
final purchase price (Clearing_price) is communicated back to the trader after
finding a match. The message below shows the feedback contents:
M æ T : (MATCH_FOUND,Product_name,Clearing_price,
Location_IDs, travel_time)
(5.8)
The message to the trader contains the village name (village_name) in which
the farmer is located and the travel time (travel_time) required to the village
from a well know reference point (defined by a Location_ID).
ix. After receipt of this message the trader is supposed to either accept or reject
the offer.
T æM : (< ACCEPT |REJECT >) (5.9)
x. After the trader has accepted the offer, the farmer is also notified that their
ask has been accepted. The farmer is supposed to make final confirmation for
availability of the produce by sending an ACCEPT or REJECT acknowl-
edgement.
M æ F : (MATCH_FOUND,Clearing_price) (5.10)
The farmer has the final choice to accept or reject.
F æM : (< ACCEPT |REJECT >) (5.11)
When both the farmer and trader accept, the product is put off the market and
consider to have been sold. Transaction is expected to be completed by a trader
physically visiting the farmer and making payments. After such a visit trader and
farmer are expected to rate each others performance in the given transaction.
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The next subsection presents design goals for the reputation system which is in-
tegrated into the market design in order to establish trust mechanisms between
farmers, traders and brokers.
5.3.4 Service subscriptions
The service subscription phase provides provisions for market participants to update
their subscription preferences. The major items for the participants to update are
their product preferences. It is also required that group members are informed about
these updates. This would act like a social network status update that will promote
future interests among closely linked trade partners.
The protocol requires a personal secret challenge for individual subscriptions. The
personal secret is used to prevent automated subscriptions from malicious elements
that might wish to launch denial of service attacks. A nuisance or denial of service
attack would be successful if participants are subscribed to a large number of
products for which they have little or no interest. The service subscription and
update protocol follows the same arrangement for brokers, farmers and traders. The
term Participant is used here to refer to traders, brokers or farmers.
The protocol for service subscriptions and updates follows the example protocol
below:
i. Message request to add an item or product to a participant’s interest list.
ParticipantæM : [Add(ItemDescription)||PersonalSecret] (5.12)
ii. Message request to remove an item or product to a participant’s preference
list.
ParticipantæM : [Remove(ItemDescription)||PersonalSecret] (5.13)
5.4 Proposed auction mechanism for agricultural trade
in Uganda
We now describe our design of an auction mechanism to support SMS-based trad-
ing of agricultural commodities in developing countries. We propose a double
auction market (see, e.g., [87]) in which buyers and sellers submit binding bids
asynchronously, and the system periodically clears the market, matching compatible
buyers and sellers and setting prices that are agreeable to both.
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Algorithm 1: Assignment of asks and bids
Input: A set of Asks (A = {◊1, . . . , ◊n}) and a set of Bids (B = {⁄1, . . . ,⁄n})
Output: A setM containing tuples (⁄j , ◊i) for matches between various bids
and asks
MΩ ÿ ;
for ⁄j œ B do
Aj Ω ÿ ;
/* Find all feasible asks */
for ◊i œ A in decreasing order of qi do
if (cj = ci) · (li œ Lj) & (ai Æ bj) then
Aj Ω {Aj ﬁ ◊i}
/* Keep only Pareto-optimal asks */
for ◊i œ Aj do
for ◊k œ Aj do
if ak Ø ai · d(lj , lk) Ø d(lj , li)· (ak > ai ‚ d(lj , lk) > d(lj , li)) then
Aj Ω Aj \ ◊k
/* Select ask with largest quantity */
find ◊l s.t ql Ø qi ’ ◊i œ Aj \ ◊l ;
MΩM ﬁ (⁄j , ◊l) ;
AΩ A \ ◊l
We assume a set of buyers B, a set of sellers S, and a set of mutually exclusive
locations L. We represent the distance between any two locations using a function
d : L2 æ R. C is a set of commodity types to be traded. An ask is a tuple ◊i =
(li, ci, qi, ai), specifying that seller located at li œ L has qi œ N units of commodity
ci œ C that they are willing to sell at ai œ R+ per unit. A bid is a tuple ⁄j =
(lj , cj , qj , bj , Lj), specifying that a buyer located at lj is willing to pay up to bj per
unit for qj units of commodity cj in any location within Lj µ L. A bid ◊i and an ask
⁄j are feasible iff ci = cj , li œ Lj and ai Æ bj .
The goal of the market mechanism is to find a matching among the feasible pairs.
Whenever a bid and ask are matched, we set the price to be the same as the ask
price. We consider the fact that buyers prefer geographically closer asks, although
we do not know exactly how much each buyer values a given reduction in distance.
We propose a greedy algorithm to perform matches, which cycles through the bids,
offering time-limited matches to buyers that are Pareto optimal with respect to
distance and price. Specifically, we consider bids in the order received, and iterate
through the following steps (explained more formally as Algorithm 1):
i. For the next unmatched bid ⁄j , calculate the set of feasible asks Aj .
ii. Discard all asks from Aj that have been offered to another buyer.
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iii. Further discard all asks from Aj that are not on the Pareto frontier trading off
between distance and price. (That is, we discard each ◊i œ Aj for which there
exists another ◊k œ Aj such that ak Æ ai, d(lj , lk) Æ d(lj , li), and either ak < ai
or d(lj , lk) < d(lj , li).)
iv. If Aj is nonempty, choose the aj œ Aj for which qj is greatest and make a
time-limited offer to the buyer who submitted the bid ⁄j . Mark that ask as
being under offer.
v. If any offers have been accepted by buyers, match the corresponding bid and
ask. If any offers have expired or are rejected by buyers, mark them as not
under offer and delete the corresponding bids and asks as feasible pairs.
vi. If any feasible pairs remain, return to step 1.
We note that this greedy clearing algorithm could be replaced with one that optimizes
the quality of the matching using (e.g.) a mixed-integer programming formulation.
However, observe that we face an online optimization problem: the rejection of
a match by either party requires us to rematch the corresponding ask and bid.
Because we do not know which matches will be rejected, it is therefore impossible
for us to clear the whole market in a single, offline step. In ongoing work we
are investigating whether we can improve market outcomes by leveraging more
powerful clearing algorithms, and if so, whether these improved outcomes justify
the increased computational cost of clearing.
5.5 Practical implementation of the auction market
We implemented an auction system based on the above mechanism, offering users
both SMS and web interfaces. The SMS interface is accessed using a 4 digit short-
code that is easy for users to remember, and is available in three languages: English,
Luganda and Luo. Since most users in Uganda and other developing countries use
low-end mobile devices, SMS is the main form of interaction with the system.
We also implemented a web interface, with the aim of facilitating more complex
transactions for bulk buyers and sellers. Unlike the SMS interface where buyers and
sellers are presented with a single dominant match on the Pareto frontier to accept
or reject, the web interface presents a list of candidate matches.
Finally, we provide a helpline number with all SMS communications, which helps
users who are unable to manage either of the above to verbally communicate their
bids and asks. In practice we have also found it necessary to call back users who
send unintelligible SMS messages.
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The matching process occurs once per day. The matched asks to a bid are reserved
for a specific period and during this time, those asks are not available for matching
with any other bid. When the waiting period expires without the buyer accepting or
rejecting, the asks are put back to a pool of available asks. While traders are asked
to acknowledge acceptance or rejection of matches, we found that not all did so;
knowing which matches have been accepted by both parties has therefore posed
something of a challenge. We addressed this issue by matching a particular ask only
a certain number of times, and assume thereafter that it has either been accepted or
should be expired.
In addition to pages for buying and selling, our web interface offers a price discovery
page for users to obtain price information based on locations in the country for a
specified past number of days. Locations in the Ugandan setting have been defined
to the level of parishes (the smallest administrative region in Uganda, with 6254
parishes in the country). This gives a high precision for location based price discovery
services. More specifically, we defined each location as the centroid of a parish, and
calculate d(li, lj) as Euclidean distance from this point.
When a new user sends any message to the system, they are first asked to provide
their home parish. Following this registration step, the SMS interaction between
farmers, traders and the market is keyword based and is structured as described in
the following sections.
5.5.1 Farmer Asks
Farmers submit their asks to the market using a SELL keyword in their SMS message
sent to 8228. An example SMS to sell 4500 kilograms of beans at UGX 900 would
be defined in an ask SMS as follows; “SELL BEANS 4500 900”. The farmer would
receive an acknowledgement with an Ask ID that can be used for follow-up inquiries.
Note that farmers are not required to include their location information since this
information is already part of their profile.
During buying and selling there is no attempt to differentiate the quality of produce
on offer; we ask farmers and traders to assume ‘fair-average-quality’ (normally
produce that is not cleanly sorted or graded). This allowed us to keep the format
of the SMS message simple. Buyers are able to inspect produce and renegotiate if
necessary before making final payments.
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5.5.2 Trader Bids
The trader bid submission follows an SMS syntax similar to that of farmers, except
that the keyword changes to BUY. A trader who wishes to purchase 5000 kilograms
of beans at UGX 800 would send the message “BUY BEANS 5000 800”. Such a
bid will attract a possibility of matches for beans across all locations in the country.
Traders can optionally include location filters so that their bid matches with asks are
restricted to a particular location. Such a message will be constructed as follows;
“BUY [PRODUCE] [QUANTITY] [UNIT PRICE] [LOCATION]”. Bids can be made on
regions (5 across the country), districts (112) or parishes (6254).
5.5.3 Market Matches
Market matches are made using the double auction mechanism described above.
Matches are not permitted if either trader blacklisted the other. Buyers are given
a set of candidate offers along the Pareto frontier trading off price and distance.
The accept or reject request contains the clearing price and location of the seller.
Buyers are expected to respond in an SMS quoting the ID of the match. The syntax
for an ACCEPT or REJECT SMS is “ACCEPT | REJECT [MATCH ID]”. The match
ID is typically a system-generated integer. The implementation ensures that buyers
can only reject matches that belong to them; other REJECT or ACCEPT requests are
ignored. The request to accept or reject is time limited; if the buyer does not respond
after the specified period, then the match is removed and placed back to the pool of
available asks. The same happens when a buyer rejects the offer. As noted above,
however, this functionality was rarely used in practice, and so we set a limit on the
number of times a particular ask can be matched.
5.5.4 Price discovery
Since this is an auction system where users do not know ahead of time what typical
buying and selling prices will be, the system provides an SMS interface for users
to learn produce price information. The price discovery specification is similar to
that of the web interface. The SMS interface uses the PRICE keyword and the
syntax is as follows; “PRICE [PRODUCE] [LOCATION] [NUMBER of DAY]”. In this
syntax, location and number of days are optional. The user can simply send “PRICE
[PRODUCE]” and they will receive price information for a given produce for the past
7 days in Uganda. If location and time parameters are specified, then price discovery
will only provide price information for a particular location for the requested number
of days.
86 Chapter 5 An auction system for improved agricultural trade in developing countries
5.5.5 User registration
The registration phase is the first point of interaction between farmers, traders
and the market system. A market registration process is expected to ensure that
fake users (sybils) do not register on the system. Sybils are of particular concern
for an electronic system since adversaries might automate this process and flood
the system with invalid users. Such users would typically be used to submit fake
reputation scores to their owners or accomplices. Users registrations are captured
using the following syntax; “REGISTER [PARISH] [DISTRICT]”. The parish and
district elements are optional since we can obtain this information later on using
callbacks to newly registered users.
5.6 Reputation system design
In an environment where the traders are not certain that farmers will deliver the
promised goods and farmers being uncertain about the traders making payments to
the prepared merchandise, a reputation system is employed to provide an opinion on
trustworthiness of the involved parties. Farmers and traders may want to minimize
risks of trade by restricting their business transactions to only reputable parties in the
market. A reputation system that implements mechanisms for collecting information
concerning behavior of farmers, brokers and traders in the market would deter moral
hazards [88]. Reputation systems have been used in e-commerce systems to provide
a record of past behavior for individuals and organizations. Such information is used
as a basis for predicting behavior of entities before interacting with them. Reputation
systems have played a deterrent role for unscrupulous behavior in online systems.
A historical record of user actions and interactions acts as a reminder for actors
to behave responsibly in the trade environment[89]. In addition to deterring bad
behavior, reputation system also help consumers of various electronic services in
the decision making process[90]. Individuals could be saved time for analyzing
large amounts of information in order to form an opinion about an online service or
product. A review of recommendation information about an individual or product
is usually expected to give a satisfactory overview to support the decision making
process. Reputation systems provide a means for consumers to analyze trust metrics
[91, 92] normally represented as reputation scores collected from the network of
interconnected participants. The design of a reputation system in the mobile-phone
based market is aimed at creating a trust environment through which users can
determine entities to trade with. The network of traders, farmers and brokers is thus
expected to be self monitoring as actions by all actors are expected to be directly
reflected in their reputation scores.
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Dellarocas [88] previous presented the signaling and sanctioning roles of reputation
mechanisms to respectively alleviate adverse-selection and moral-hazards in trans-
actions. Adverse-selection refers to situations in which a lack of trust in the seller by
consumers causes them to always offer low prices for goods and services. Typically
such market habits could eliminate providers of high quality goods, since the lower
quality providers are happy with the price offers from consumers. Signaling in such
cases provides consumers with a tool or information to judge the quality of a product
or service [93]. On the other hand moral-hazards occur when participants in a
transaction do not act honestly. In the agricultural market, for example, farmers may
not deliver the promised quality of goods after receiving payments from traders.
5.6.1 Reputation system design goals
The main objective of the reputation system proposed in this paper is to offer trust
management between the farmers, traders, brokers and the market. Enumerated
below are the specific goals to be achieved by the design of a reputation system for a
mobile-phone based trading system.
i. The reputation system is expected to aid farmers in establishing trust levels
between them and the traders before committing to any given transaction
terms. Given bids between two competing traders, a farmer should find it
compelling to offer a good deal to a trader with a higher reputation score. In
so doing, traders that fail to get good deals from the farmers would also work
to improve on their reputations scores through good behavior in the trade
environment.
ii. To encourage brokers to submit genuine reviews concerning farmers’ products
under their review. Since brokers are responsible for informing the market
about availability of new trade opportunities. It is important that their reviews
can be trusted by other participants in the trade environment. A highly
reputable broker would have their recommended products showing up among
the favorites in the trade system. This arrangement is expected to promote
truthful reporting by the brokers in order increase value for their future
recommendations.
iii. Farmers to be truthful about their products. A successful trade indicated by
satisfaction of the trader would lead to an increment in reputation points. The
broker that vouched for a successful trade would also earn reputation points.
The reputation scores for individual farmers would also be reflected in the
farmer groups such that their cooperatives would know the people uplifting
them and those letting them down. This social network is expected to provide
a self monitoring mechanism amongst farmers, traders and brokers.
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iv. Traders to abide by their commitments: Failure by traders to fulfill their
agreements should lead to a reduction in reputation scores of the individual
and the trader group to which they belong. The trader group would then
provide peer pressure for the members to act responsibly.
v. The reputation system should provide traders and farmers a platform for
reliable evaluation of risks or utility involved in dealing with various parties in
the market. Reputation scores of individual farmers and their groups should
aid traders in making decisions of trading amongst farmers in the market.
vi. New entrants in the market should not be heavily punished for having little
or no reputation information. Additionally, the reputation score for a new
entrant should not rival with those of longterm participants. This objective is
intended to promote loyalty from existing system users as well as encouraging
new participants.
vii. The system should preserve confidentiality of reputation score submissions to
protect contributors from retaliation against each other. Some farmers, traders
and brokers may retaliate towards other participants in-case they get to know
individuals or groups that awarded them low scores.
5.6.2 Blacklisting reputation mechanism
We propose a blacklisting mechanism to manage reputation in the market systems.
If buyers or sellers have a negative experience of dealing with somebody they have
been matched with, they are encouraged to blacklist that user by sending a message
of the form “BLOCK [PHONE NUMBER]”. This results in that buyer and seller never
being matched again, and provides important information about the reliability of
users.
The number of ’blacklistings’ received by a market participant would affect their
future participation in market transactions. Good offers from reputable sellers or
buyers would not be matched with users with a low reputation score.
5.7 Practical advantages of the auction design
We now discuss why this auction design is well suited to the constraints of developing-
world agricultural commodity trading identified earlier.
• First, the sealed-bid, double auction mechanism requires very little communi-
cation between traders and the market. Each user has only to submit their bid
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or ask, and (in the case of buyers) to respond to individual offers. SMS costs
are therefore kept low.
• The process for dealing with location is necessary because it would be quite
complicated for a buyer to specify the price they would be happy with at
several distances from their home market, which might involve factors such as
vehicles available to the buyer, road condition, and so on. A simpler alternative
is to offer buyers a small number of Pareto optimal matches, and let them
choose their preferred trade-off themselves. The ability to specify simple bids
covering large areas is necessary in order to make offers to buyers outside their
accustomed trading areas, thus avoiding a fragmented market.
• We note that once a price is proposed to both buyer and seller, it can be
advantageous to allow them to negotiate further at the point of collection. It is
important for the proposed system to provide room for negotiation in order to
achieve wide acceptance by users, particularly as a mobile market system has
the problem of not being able to specify in detail the quality of a product as
accurately as a buyer would be accustomed to in face-to-face dealing. Indeed,
this explains why our system does not allow for the specification of produce
quality. (We note that produce of different qualities could in principle be
represented as different commodities, in which case we could extend our
definition of feasibility, since bids should be matchable to asks where the
produce is either of the quality specified or higher.) Instead, we quote all prices
for a baseline quality level, and allow traders to negotiate after a match has
been made in the event that quality falls above or below this baseline.
5.7.1 Incentives for truthful bidding
Our auction mechanism offers buyers the dominant strategy of bidding truthfully.
Thus, they do not need to reason about each other’s bids in order to maximize their
utility.
To back up this claim, we introduce notion for bidder utilities. Let vj be the price
at which the buyer expects to resell the produce in the market, and vi be the cost
incurred by the farmer to grow and harvest the produce. A buyer j’s utility for
trading at clearing price p is then uj = vj ≠ p; a seller i’s utility is ui = p≠ vi. Our
mechanism always sets the clearing price to the seller’s ask price ai, and matches a
buyer with a seller whenever the buyer’s bid weakly exceeds the ask price (bj Ø ai).
A bid is truthful if bj = vj .
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Proposition 5.1
Buyers who want to trade only with a single seller have the dominant strategy of
bidding truthfully under our double-auction protocol.
Proof 5.1 The result follows directly from the fact that truthful bidding is a dominant
strategy in second-price auctions; nevertheless, because the proof is simple, we
reproduce it here. If a buyer bids some amount bj > vj , he would either fail to
get matched (obtaining utility 0) or get matched to items whose ask price ai Æ bj ,
being required to pay the ask price ai. If ai Æ vj , the outcome is the same as under
truthful bidding, and so the buyer might as well have bid truthfully. If ai > vj , the
buyer pays more than he thinks the goods are worth, implying that he would have
preferred not to trade. Similarly, if a buyer bids bj < vj , he would either receive the
same match as before—meaning that he might as well have bid truthfully—or he
would fail to be matched at a price aj < vj at which he would have profited.
Observe that this result does not hold if buyers want to trade with many sellers and
have complex preferences that cannot be expressed in our bidding language; e.g.,
nonlinear preferences over bundles of goods, such as a desire to buy enough produce
to completely fill a truck, but no desire for produce beyond this amount. Even in this
case, second-price bidding simplifies the strategic problem for buyers, albeit leaving
sellers to their own devices.
We designed our market to favor buyers because our interviews made it clear
that sellers (farmers) are much more desperate to trade, meaning that they are
most interested in seeing more trades occur. Buyers also tend to be much more
sophisticated traders, making them more likely to manipulate the system with
untruthful bids if not offered dominant strategies. One might hope that dominant
strategies could be offered to traders on both sides of the market; unfortunately, this
is impossible in any efficient market that does not operate at an (unbounded) loss
[94, 95].
5.7.2 Price discovery
One substantial benefit of an electronic market is that it produces up-to-date price
information that can be shared with market participants. In our design, such
information is particularly valuable to sellers, since they can benefit by reasoning
about likely market prices when deciding how to bid. (In contrast, because our
market design offers dominant strategies to many buyers, they have much less need
to pay attention to historical price information.) To meet this need, our implemented
auction system provides an interface through which buyers and sellers can learn the
previous day’s prices for given commodities.
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5.7.3 Robustness to shill bidding
A shill bidder is an insincere bidder (or, in some cases, a sincere bidder bidding
under a second identity) who bids in order to extract more surplus from a sincere
bidder. Our market design is robust against shill bidders, as follows. Because both
sides of the market make sealed-bid offers that are revealed only when the market
clears, neither side has the opportunity to place shill bids in response to information
learned about a counter-party’s bid. Placing extra bids under a false identity cannot
benefit a buyer, because he already obtains all of the surplus in any trade, with the
seller taking the amount of his own bid. Thus, shill bidding will only drive up the
price a buyer pays. A shill bid can indeed yield a higher price for a seller; however,
the effect is identical to placing a higher bid, making shill bidding useless.
5.8 Conclusions
Motivated by evidence that previous approaches to mobile markets in developing
countries are ineffective, and that serious inefficiencies exist in traditional trading
methods in countries such as Uganda, we have designed and implemented a sealed-
bid, double-auction-based mechanism that is more compatible with the needs of
buyers and sellers. In particular, it is parsimonious in terms of communication and
offers a dominant strategy of truthful bidding to buyers.
92 Chapter 5 An auction system for improved agricultural trade in developing countries
6Evaluation of an incentive
compatible auction system for
agricultural trade
This chapter presents a discussion of the design decisions we under
took for the auction system and reputation mechanism to maintain an
incentive compatible market for agricultural produce. The sections in
the chapter showcase the initially proposed auction interaction protocols
and assumptions for the market environment. The results and evaluation
section presents the outcomes for the field trials that we conducted
through field visits and radio advertising. In section 6.2 we present design
considerations that we made in coming up with a robust reputation
system for the auction market. Section 6.4 presents results and evaluation
of our study. Section 6.5 presents a conclusion to the study.
6.1 Introduction
Our work with Kudu started with a major aim of building an auction market for agri-
cultural produce that could be operated using the readily available feature-phones
in developing countries. At the start of this project we had several assumptions
about the Ugandan market environment in which the system was to be piloted.
These assumptions ranged from the use of village level brokers to verify produce
submitted to the market and distribution of market information using primary and
secondary school contacts to popularize the system in rural communities. All these
assumptions among others formed a basis for initial implementation decisions for
the auction mechanism and subsequent implementation iterations. This chapter
presents a chronological journey of our research work that led to the final design of
the auction market for agricultural produce presented in chapter 5.
6.2 Initially proposed reputation system design
This section presents design techniques that we considered in our design of a
reputation system to facilitate mobile-phone based trading following a market design
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that was presented in section 5.4. The reputation system design presented here
follows from the reputation system goals discussed in subsection 5.6.1.
This section seeks to address various questions that arise from readers that wish
to know whether other design methods could have been feasible for our proposed
auction mechanism.
Section 5.2 highlighted some of the challenges arising from the presence of malicious
entities and uncooperative activities in the market. Actions such as a trader not
showing up at a farmer’s location after committing to a purchase would be likely to
frustrate farmers. Farmers also lying about the quality of their produce would hurt
traders’ profit margins and trader expectations. A reputation system design is hereby
proposed to reward good behavior with an indication of high reputation scores and
lower reputation values for uncooperative and malicious participants.
The reputation attributes considered in this setting presume an organization of
traders, brokers and farmers into cooperative groups for purposes of accountability.
This arrangement would be considered useful for trade environments in developing
countries where people are loosely connected to permanent residential addresses.
In cases of redress, these groups would provide a strong starting point for carrying
out investigations and tracing sought after individuals. It is assumed that the people
forming any group are known to each other. Such associations are expected to
encourage rational behavior and truthfulness so as not to fail their group members.
6.2.1 Considerations for reputation scores
The initial design requirements for the reputation system was to have the registration
process requiring farmers, brokers and traders to be organized into groups of at least
three individuals. We expect participants to rate each other based on a scale of 1≠ 5,
representing Poor, Fair, Good, Very Good, and Excellent experiences. We use this
feedback to generate scores on a scale of (0, 1) to represent the aggregation using
a better distribution [96]. Since the beta distribution is a continuous probability
distribution defined over the interval (0, 1), we map these score as follows: (1æ 0.2,
2æ 0.4, 3æ 0.6, 4æ 0.8, 5æ 1.0). Note that these are the – values. We obtain —
values using (1≠ –). After obtaining the – and — scores from transactions ratings
defined over a range of 1 ≠ 5, the overall reputation for any given user can be
obtained using the formula:
reputation_score = –/(–+ —) (6.1)
An alternative reputation scheme would involve aggregate reputation scores that
are normalized to a maximum value of 100 for all individual participants and their
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groups. The purpose for normalizing to 100 is to offer an easy to understand % age
scale for comparison purposes. The choice of this figure takes into consideration the
societal challenges of low literacy standards in developing countries. A normalizing
range between 1 and 10 would be very small for representing the accumulated
reputation values. A range beyond 100 would also pause comprehension challenges
for traders of agricultural produce on mobile devices. A range between 1 and 1000
would for example present figures such as 743 or 879. Such values would not be
reliably understood as compared with percentage scores between 0 and 100.
We also need to limit the overall number of transactions that are to be considered
for computing the user and group reputation scores. If we considered the entire
transaction history, then the reputation values would grow very big for well behav-
ing participants. Such reputation scores would encourage some users to behave
maliciously in some of the transactions, with the strategy that a minimal number of
malicious acts would have little impact on their overall reputation score. Reputation
information based on the most recent say 500 transactions would provide a mean-
ingful representation of the user’s recent behavior and would hinder possibilities
of attacks that take advantage of very high reputation values. A negative rating
would for example have a big impact on someone with a reputation score from 50
transactions than one with for example 10000.
6.2.2 Positive ratings
Positive ratings in the market are used to promote social good. It is anticipated
that when traders, brokers or farmers receive positive feedback, then they would be
encouraged to reciprocate the positive acknowledgement with good behavior. A high
reputation score would be an indicator of good behavior for a market participant.
Thus individuals with high reputation scores are considered more trustworthy than
those with low reputation scores. Consequently, the market design is such that
high value business opportunities are recommended to reputable individuals. The
proposed market design provides for traders and farmers filtering trade partners
based on a range of reputation scores. This implies that individuals with very low
reputation scores would not readily get favorable business opportunities in the
market.
We propose positive rating contributions that are directly proportional to the level
of trust that the market has in a given transaction. Market participants would earn
positive reputation ratings that are weighted against ‘ œ (0 . . . 1). If a transaction
involves only trusted entities, then positive rating of +1 is assigned to all those
involved in the transaction. Since it is not possible that all parties participating in a
transaction would have perfect reputation scores, the weighted positive rating would
always be less than 1 in majority of the transactions.
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It is worth noting that the positive rating of +1 is assumed in circumstances where
the parties involved do not explicitly rate each other, i.e., a trader rating the farmer
and the farmer also rating the trader. It is uncommon in digital markets such as
EBay to have the buyer rated. The agricultural market and the trade environment for
developing countries necessitates such measures. A traders reputation is important
since the nature of trade for agricultural produces provides room for the buyers or
traders to act fraudulently. As noted in subsection 5.2, it is possible for traders not
to deliver on their promises and thus hurt the farmer’s plans. Participants in any
given transaction are expected to rate each other on a scale of 1 to 10. This rating
is captured as a fraction out of 10 and again weighted against the overall trust the
market has in a transaction. The overall trust in a transaction TransTrustScore is
defined by the reputation score of all those involved in the transaction and the ratings
for the groups to which they belong. An individual with a high reputation score
participating in a transaction with highly reputable people would earn a positive
rating close to +1 for a successfully completed transaction.
A good reputation in the market would lead to several buyers gravitating towards
a reputable seller. We additionally propose to have reduced transaction fees for
reputable participants in market transactions. The value of the discounts would be
computed proportionally to the accumulated reputation. Since the market design
provides for buyers and sellers to filter their bids based on the reputation scores, it
is highly likely that a large number of high value business opportunities would be
given to individuals with good reputation values.
6.2.3 Negative ratings
Negative ratings just like the positive rating presented above, provide a scheme for
discouraging bad behavior or moral-hazards. We propose a scheme in which a nega-
tive rating of ≠10 is weighted against the trust in the transaction (TransTrustScore)
and reduced from the defendant’s overall reputation score. If the overall transaction
trust is 1 then the weighted negative rating assigned to the transaction defendant
would be ≠10.
The purpose for this big reduction is to promote truthfulness in the market while
substantially reprehending bad behavior. The market design does not facilitate
individuals to quickly build high reputation scores. In retrospect, it takes a few
dishonest transactions for market entities to have their reputation largely reduced.
In so doing, we expect the market to progressively eliminate untruthful characters
since the results of their actions would be quickly reflected in the reputation scores.
Negative ratings are assigned to farmers or traders, in case either party is unhappy
with the outcomes of a transaction. A trader may find that the goods promised by
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the farmer are far below the anticipated quality. Such a scenario might arise from a
farmer colluding with a broker to mis-represent the status of their produce. In such
circumstances, the trader would raise a negative rating for the farmer and broker
involved in the transaction. It is also possible for the broker to faithfully review
the produce, but the farmer goes ahead to exchange what was reviewed with the
poorer quality. Such acts can still be punished and the broker exonerated through
the arbitration process presented at the end of this section. The brokers cannot issue
negative ratings since they are passive participants in the transactions.
It is also plausible that some participants would retaliate on receiving low ratings
from other participants. Since ratings are from entities that together participated in
a given transaction, it would be easy to detect retaliatory ratings from the patterns of
reputation scores. Furthermore, negative ratings might attract colluding participants
into giving negative ratings. Such an attack would not be successful since ratings are
only allowed from entities that together participated and completed a transaction.
The negative ratings cannot be assigned by the market participants. These ratings
are to be assigned after an arbitration process between the parties involved in order
to determine the individuals that were at fault.
6.2.4 Groups and reputation scores
The group setups are used to foster accountability from all the market participants.
It is assumed that individuals that form a group are fairly known to each other.
For example, these might be people residing in the same location or trading from
the same market area. Each member of the group would receive a fraction of one
hundredth of the reputation score earned by a member’s transaction. The fraction
contribution is computed based on the number of members in a group. Given a
group j with n members, and a reputation score RSi,j earned by i a member of
group j, the reputation earning for each group member would be (RSi,j100 ◊ 1n).
The additions or deductions of reputation points occur whenever positive or negative
ratings are earned by any of the group members. The purpose for additions and
deductions from group members is to encourage peer pressure and a self monitoring
system for the market in which peers hold each other accountable for their actions.
All group members would receive message alerts for rating additions and deductions.
It is anticipated that such openness for group contributions would enable group
members to monitor each other and thus promote good behavior. Group contribu-
tions are likely to further present incentives for group members to maintain a small
group of people that would not let them down. Additionally, smaller groups would
have higher average single contributions than larger groups. However, the frequency
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Stakeholders and Reputation Attributes
Farmer Broker Trader
Farmer’s Reputation (FRep) Broker’s Reputation (BRep) Trader’s Reputation (TRep)
Farmer Group (FGRep) Broker Group (BGRep) Trader Group (TGRep)
Successful Transaction (STScore) Successful Transaction (STScore) Successful Transaction (STScore)
Failed Transaction (FTScore) Failed Transaction (FTScore) Failed Transaction (FTScore)
× × ×
Tab. 6.1.: Mobile trade stakeholders and reputation attributes
of contributions would be higher for larger groups than smaller ones due to a higher
probability of a group member carrying out a transaction.
Given xgi, ygi and zgi respectively as group reputation scores for farmers, traders
and brokers, whenever a transaction is successfully carried out, xgi, ygi and zgi are
incremented by one-hundredth of the “successful transaction score” (STScore) and
otherwise reduced by one-hundredth of the “failed transaction score” (FTScore). The
“successful transaction score” and the “failed transaction score” (FTScore) are weighted
against the overall trust that the market has in the given transaction before being
used in any additions or deductions. Table 6.1 presents a summary of attributes for
the reputation scores in the trade environment.
6.2.5 Ratings for new market entrants
The earlier design considerations for the registration process was expected to be
done off-line (manually) so as to eliminate possibilities of capturing fake identities
(sybils) which might later on be used for self promotion. An example of such a
registration attack would be a broker that registers themselves with a second profile
as a farmer using different mobile-phone numbers. Such a broker would be able
to submit produce with one identity as a farmer and at the same rate it highly as a
broker. The off-line registration process is expected to be carried out in villages and
trading centers after verifying identity cards of the individuals. This kind of scheme
is currently showing success for mobile-money services in Uganda.
We propose not to have a defined reputation value for new market entrants. A new
market entrant is defined as one that has not yet performed a single transaction. The
visible global status of such individuals would be represented as “New entrant”. New
entrants would earn a reputation score after performing at least one transaction.
The new entrant does not also receive reputation scores from the group before
completing a transaction of their own.
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6.2.6 Normalizing ratings
All ratings that are received from end-user input are supposed to be normalized so
that we prevent errors and malicious collectives from distorting reputation scores.
It is possible for example in the ratings of produce for the brokers to erroneously
rate the produce with a rating that is above 10. Additionally, malicious elements in
the market might also try awarding their accomplices positive ratings outside the
allowed range. Input validation for SMS submissions would be used to eliminate
possibilities of malicious and erroneous entries. A messaging alert system with a
limit for the number of erroneous messages permitted would be used to remind
users about incorrect submissions.
6.2.7 Considerations for user registration
The registration process is used to capture information concerning market partici-
pants. This information includes group composition details, participants’ locations
and their product preferences. During the registration process, we expect farmers,
brokers and traders to indicate their products of interest. This specificity is important
so that the market messaging system does not simply send all registered users in a
given location requests for items in which they have no interest.
The registration process for the market participants follows the process listed be-
low:
1. Each category of market participants (farmers, brokers and traders) identify at
least three people known to them as possible group members. Each member is
supposed to belong to a single category of market actors. It is not acceptable
for someone to register in a farmer group and at the same time register as a
broker or trader. The group sizes are also restricted to a maximum of 10. The
purpose for this is to encourage group formation amongst people known to
each other. A large group would most like have people little known to each
other. The other issues related to contributions of group reputation scores
were also presented in subsection 6.2.
2. The members of the created group present their identity cards and mobile
numbers at the registration center. The purpose for physical examination of
identity cards is to prevent users from creating or registering sybil profiles.
3. Each participant in the market is also assigned a secret or password that would
be used to update their profiles via the mobile phones.
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4. In additional to personal details information, the registration process would
be required to capture the details listed below concerning the farmer and their
group.
• Group Identifier : This is a unique identifier for the group to which the
group members belong.
• Group Secret : The group secret would be used in a challenge response
protocol for updating group membership lists.
5. Location Identifier : The location identifier is used by the market system to
route alert messages to individuals nearest to their trade partners. Traders,
Brokers and Farmers can also filter their requests based on the distance from
the farmer, broker or trader. Brokers and traders might for example not be
able to pursue business opportunities beyond a given distance measure. These
distance preferences would be captured using the location identifiers.
6. Product Preferences: A farmer would for example register products which they
would be able to supply to the market so that they do not receive message
alerts for products that they cannot provide. Traders not interested in beans
for example should be able to express this preference too, such that they do
not receive alert messages for beans. Furthermore, brokers should also express
the products that they would be able to evaluate. The system design and
implementation should also provide means of updating this list of preferences.
Interactions and message exchanges between the farmer, broker, trader and market
are presented as an interaction protocol in the subsection 6.2 below. The interaction
protocol shows various ways in which the reputation information impacts trade
decisions in the mobile-based market environment. This protocol assumes reputation
information which is represented as a numeric score. Such a score could be awarded
on a scale of 1 to 10; whereby 1 represents unacceptable behavior and 10 for the
most trusted or acceptable behavior. The range of 1 to 10 comes naturally to the
people in the great lakes region of East Africa. It so happens that several ancient
stories in the Ugandan region have this range (1 to 10) in their comparison schemes.
Additionally, the range of 1 to 10 also provides a good scope of evaluation for
produce quality. The continuous range of ratings between 0 and 10 is fairly easy to
translate into a quality rating for produce.
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6.3 Evaluation of our initially proposed market designs
The final design that was presented in section 5.4 proved to be robust during the
pilot phase. The market design that was initially proposed in section 5.3 had several
shortcomings which are discussed in the listing below;
• Subjecting market participants to a group setting was introducing bottlenecks
in the registration phase and user adoption rate. Users complained about
the time it took for them to find users that were as enthusiastic to join the
system. This difficulty was clearly understandable to us since the system was
new and most people have been accustomed to word of mouth marketing of
their produce.
• Group schemes for reputation had a huge messaging overhead for system
operators. The number of messages exchanged between the system and
farmers or traders increased by a magnitude directly proportional to the
number of group members. In the absence of group settings, a single message
notification was sufficient.
• The proposed reputation mechanisms in section 6.2 were still susceptible to
extortion attacks. Users in the market would have a possibility of threatening
their counterpart to give them a high rating in exchange for some favors. On
the others hand, the blacklist scheme proposed in section 5.6 presents the right
incentives for users to rate each other fairly. If a buyer has received a good
deal from a seller, they would not want to blacklist such a seller since the buyer
would wish to meet such a seller again.
6.4 Results and evaluation of the final system design
In order to evaluate our market design approach and environmental assumptions,
we conducted field trials in separate phases. The first phase took place during
September 2012 aimed at testing basic usability assumptions,the second evaluation
phase was started in January 2013 to August 2013. The most recent pilot executed
from January 2016 to April 2016 in partnership with the Innovations for Poverty
Action (IPA)(http://www.poverty-action.org/).
The system was made accessible to users throughout Uganda via a toll-free SMS
short code (8228). We communicated information about using the system to sellers
with a series of meetings in districts in farming-intensive regions of central Uganda,
as well as via radio broadcasts. Buyers were also recruited using radio broadcasts
in Kampala, and visits to wholesale markets to hand out flyers explaining system
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Fig. 6.1.: Distribution of asks for all products in the market (2013 trial).
Month Total Asks Total Bids
Jan 56 23
Feb 130 61
Mar 210 173
Apr 378 268
May 469 284
Jun 500 285
Tab. 6.2.: Cumulative numbers of asks and bids received in the period January–June 2013.
functionalities to potential users. We began with four commonly traded staple crops
(coffee, maize, beans and peanuts) and added new produce categories to the system
through user demand. The market currently has 70 produce categories.
6.4.1 Quantitative results
The auction market has been active since January 2013 and has been available
mostly in the central and south-western areas of Uganda. A total of 1024 traders
and farmers were registered between January and July, 2013. The total count of
bids and asks was 316 and 566 respectively. Not all registered users submitted bids
and asks: 219 users only used the system to ask for commodity prices. The total
value of asks from sellers was USD $1,700,000, and the total value of bids from
buyers was USD $960,000. Table 6.2 shows the cumulative numbers of bids and
asks each month. Bids and asks tended to be large quantities from wholesale traders;
for instance the largest bid received was for 120,000 Kg of maize (we verified the
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Fig. 6.2.: Distribution of bids for all products in the market (2013 trial).
Produce type Total ask quantity
Peanuts 512,375 Kg
Maize 1,711,935 Kg
Beans mixed 114,900 Kg
Coffee (Robusta) 36,800 Kg
Sweet Potatoes 2,221 Sacks
Tab. 6.3.: Quantities of the five categories of produce with the highest aggregate ask value
(2013).
details with the buyer and found the bid to be genuine). We received 53 bids and 94
asks for quantities exceeding 10,000 Kg. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the distribution
of bids and ask values for all products in the market.
Table 6.4 shows the total quantities of bids on the five produce categories with the
highest total bid values, and Table 6.3 shows the total quantities of asks on the five
produce categories with the highest total ask values.
We observed that market activity was highly dependent on the frequency of radio
adverts. The increase in the number of bids and asks was significantly higher in
months that had a higher frequency of adverts than those months with fewer adverts.
We attribute the low growth in May and June to this factor.
We sampled 30 unique mobile numbers from a list of 1,748 matches that occurred
in the market between the first of January and the first of July, 2013. We identi-
fied 4 users that registered successful transactions that led to exchange of money,
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Produce type Total bid quantity
Maize 917,300 Kg
Sesame 110,000 Kg
Beans mixed 179,050 Kg
Soya 40,000 Kg
Peanuts 35,050 Kg
Tab. 6.4.: Quantities of the five categories of produce with the highest aggregate bid value
(2013).
Commodity No. Asks No. Bids
Maize 235 78
Simsim (Sesame) 1 3
Beans mixed 24 33
Soya 14 6
Peanuts 15 14
Coffee (Robusta) 17 5
Potatoes 40 20
Tab. 6.5.: Distributions of bids and asks for the top 7 crops (2013).
representing a 13.3% success rate, albeit in a small sample. We also received calls
from 28 buyers and sellers who offered (unsolicited) feedback by calling the helpline
number, which helped us to confirm that real trade was occurring as a result of the
matches proposed by the system.
The market registered a total of 74 agricultural commodities that were all populated
based on farmer and trader market demands to sell and buy these particular products.
The top 7 crops for both Bids and Asks submitted to the market during pilot period
were; Maize, Simsim, Beans mixed, Soya, Groundnuts, Coffee and Potatoes. The
distribution of asks and bids among the popular commodities was as shown in the
table 6.5;
6.4.2 Evaluation of user perceptions and experiences
The market system registered its first 500 users in February 2013, a month and half
after starting the pilot (see Figure 6.3). We were encouraged by such quick adoption,
considering that users had no previous experience with a similar system.
Notwithstanding the encouraging adoption numbers, users have raised several
issues regarding the usability of an SMS-based interface. While we attempted
training sessions and radio announcements explaining message formats such as ’BUY
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Commodity Matches
Maize 444
Simsim (Sesame) 1
Beans mixed 83
Soya 17
Peanuts 22
Coffee (Robusta) 19
Potatoes 117
Tab. 6.6.: Distribution of matches between the top 7 commodities (2013).
Fig. 6.3.: User registration in the market (2013).
[PRODUCE] [QUANTITY] [UNIT PRICE]’, almost all the messages we received did
not follow this format well enough that they could be parsed automatically. The most
common issues were variations in spelling, ambiguous figures, or messages written
in free text. In practice, whenever a malformed message is submitted to the market,
we decipher meaning from the message if possible and then resubmit it on the users’
behalf. In circumstances where we cannot derive the meaning from the message,
we typically call back the sender to confirm their intentions. We note that this
would present difficulties if we faced very large volumes of senders, though note also
that labor costs are low enough in Uganda that considerable manual intervention
remains feasible. We plan to mitigate this problem with a USSD interface or an
interactive voice response system. Concerning the SMS interface, we also found user
feedback to be more positive in the second phase of trials when the SMS system was
translated into local languages, even for those who had no problem communicating
in English.
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Fig. 6.4.: Distribution of user submissions to the market (2013).
The mobile auction system was more quickly adopted by sellers than by buyers.
This seems to represent the fact that buyers have a stronger position in the current
market, and therefore less to gain by adopting a new system. However, we observed
particular interest from large-scale buyers, who face challenges in sourcing bulk
quantities of produce for export or factory processing.
The addition of new product categories on the market was demand driven. Most
of the species added were not anticipated by us at the outset of the field trials.
Some new products were added to the market on request and we saw immediate
popularity among both buyers and sellers. For example, we did not expect to sell
animal hides; a hides-and-skins buyer contacted us with a desire to find sellers. Once
the item was listed on the market and an announcement made on radio, 10 sellers
were enrolled and 10 matches happened as a result. Other unexpected produce
categories in which we saw market activity were eucalyptus poles, pineapple suckers,
ginger, and soya, the latter becoming a significant commodity as shown in Table
6.4.
We have seen several farmers act as aggregators for produce in their areas in order
to complete a large volume sale. We also find that brokers are able to become users
in our system, performing an important role of produce aggregation. The majority of
farmers do not grow produce in the large quantities that are sought after by traders,
making such aggregation a powerful approach to produce marketing.
In general the speed at which users grasped the double auction concept has impressed
us; we find this to be compelling evidence that our proposed system is more effective
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than traditional methods of agricultural trade. The market system had several repeat
users as shown in the distribution of user submissions in Figure 6.4.
Commodity Matches Estimated Deals (13.5%)
Maize 444 57
Simsim (Sesame) 1 1
Beans mixed 83 11
Soya 17 2
Peanuts 22 3
Coffee (Robusta) 19 2
Potatoes 177 23
Tab. 6.7.: Comparison between matches and actual deals that were completed for the top 7
commodities (2013 trial).
6.4.3 Analysis of matches between buyers and sellers
This subsection analyzes the distribution and results of matches between buyers and
sellers that took place using the automated matching algorithm presented in section
5.4.
We allowed for a maximum of 3 matches for each ask during the pilot to increase the
probability for a farmer to find a highly interested for a transaction to exchange cash.
This was particularly useful since the system was not handling payments that would
enable us to actually tell whether a transaction had gone through. The only means
of knowing whether a transaction had gone through was when sellers and buyers
volunteered call backs through messages of gratitude or when we called them back
during the data sampling phase.
Another approach we think could help us in determining success is to integrate the
platform with mobile-money such that buyers and sellers register escrow accounts
that would be used to temporarily hold funds on behalf of the buyers that would
only be released to sellers once the buyer has accepted the dominant match on the
Pareto frontier as defined in section 5.4.
Table 6.6 presents a distribution of matches between top 7 popular commodities.
We observed from the dataset that some popular products such as maize registered
scenarios of repeat bidders or frequent buyers that had their bids recycled particularly
because they want to buy the same produce without resubmitting bids. The design
of the platform allowed the interface administrator to re-register such bids on behalf
of the buyers.
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Table 6.7 presents a comparison between matches and estimate matches that resulted
into actual exchange of cash between farmers and traders.
6.4.4 Robustness of user reputation mechanism
Trust can be difficult to achieve in electronic markets: when market participants are
relatively anonymous, bad behavior (failure to honor an agreement; attempting to
trade in produce which is adulterated or otherwise below a reasonable standard)
can go unpunished, and traders therefore become cautious. To mitigate this problem,
it is necessary to institute some kind of reputation system in the market, to give
traders information about the reliability of the buyers or sellers with whom they are
matched [97, 98, 99, 100, 101].
The most common form of reputation system asks traders to rate their counter-party
after a trade has occurred. (For example, such a system is prominently used by eBay.)
However, we did not consider such a system to be appropriate in our setting. For
example, we were concerned that a buyer could extort a positive rating from a seller
at the moment of sale. We thus sought an alternate reputation system. Our goal was
to construct a system that would be resistant to the following forms of attack:
(self-promotion) users can dishonestly increase their own ratings;
(slander) users can insincerely decrease the ratings of others;
(whitewashing) users can discard an account with a bad rating and obtain better
reputation by starting anew;
(sybil) users can create false profiles and use them to give themselves a positive
rating.
We elected to use a reputation system with two components. First, we track positive
ratings implicitly, via trades that are accepted by both parties. Second, we track
negative ratings explicitly, by giving participants the opportunity to blacklist the
mobile numbers of counter-parties with whom they have previously been matched,
and with whom they want to be guaranteed never again to be matched.
This system resists the four forms of attack previously discussed as follows.
(self-promotion) Positive ratings in the market are captured from successful com-
pleted transactions as opposed to user-submitted ratings. In our scheme
self-promotion is not possible since all participants are considered to have
behaved positively towards each other unless they are blacklisted.
108 Chapter 6 Evaluation of an incentive compatible auction system for agricultural trade
(slander) Slander is costly, as false blacklisting denies a trader future access to a
counter-party. This strongly reduces the possibility of participants threatening
each other with low rating scores. Furthermore, since blacklisting is only
allowed between parties that transacted, bulk slander is impossible.
(whitewashing) The attachment of mobile numbers to the registration process
imposes a cost to whitewashing: the registered mobile numbers are the ones
that the market system uses for communication purposes.
(sybil) The success of sybil attacks depends on the cost required for creating a
new profile [99, 102]. In our system, the centralized user registration process
increases the cost of sybil attacks: each sybil profile needs a distinct, active
phone number to participate in the market.
Results of the blacklisting reputation mechanism
This subsection discusses results of the reputation scores that we experienced during
the pilot.
Farmers that blacklisted traders (blacklisted traders) were: 1
Traders that blacklisted farmers (blacklisted farmers) were: 4
All the farmers that were blacklisted resulted from the sale of a variety of cassava
that the buyers said had a bitter taste. A farmer never wanted to be matched again
with a trader that promised to buyer her produce and requested her to make it ready
but never turned up.
We received a total of 5 blacklists. Blacklisting of a buyer or seller is performed
on the basis that there was match (— transaction history — ) between these two
entities. If a given user mobile number has not traded before with another, the
blocking request will be notified as not permitted.
The reputation scores are also used in determining the Pareto optimal matches. A
user that has been blacklisted will not have an ask that dominates an ask from a
seller that has not been blacklisted. Sellers or buyers that had been blacklisted would
be rated low on the matching algorithm.
6.4.5 Results from 2016 trials
During the first agricultural season of 2016 (January to March 2016) we car-
ried out a randomized control trial (RCT) in partnership with IPA (http://www.
poverty-action.org/) in 20 districts of Uganda. The control and treatment dis-
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Produce type Total ask quantity (Kgs)
Maize 10,985,131
Beans (Nambale) 1,654,925
Beans (Yellow) 870,100
Rice (Kayiso) 97,000
Millet (Bulo) 25,000
Tab. 6.8.: Quantities of the five categories of produce with the highest aggregate ask value
(Jan to March 2016 season).
Produce type Total ask quantity (Kgs)
Maize 14,621,346
Beans (Nambale) 688,000
Beans (Yellow) 102,800
Simsim (Ntungo) 430,300
Rice (Kayiso) 55,000
Tab. 6.9.: Quantities of the five categories of produce with the highest aggregate bid value (Jan
to March 2016 season).
tricts were even distributed across the country from the Central, Southern, Eastern,
Western and Northern areas of Uganda. The field trials were carried out during this
period through field visits by a group of field agents that taught sellers and buyers of
agricultural produce on how to use the platform.
We obtained a total of 2900 new users registered on the platform and 383,000
kilograms of grain traded through the platform. The produce that was traded on the
platform amounted to $135,831 USD during the first agricultural season of January
to March 2016.
Presented in the tables 6.12, 6.9, 6.10 and 6.8 is a qualitative listing of buyer and
seller activities during the January to March 2016 period.
A second market update happened in the agricultural season of June to September
of 2016. During this period, we used radio broadcasts to advertise to listeners in
22 districts of central Uganda. The cumulative user registration graph in figure
6.5 shows a sharp increase in the number of user registration between May and
September 2016.
Table 6.11 presents the total number of Asks and Bids that were submitted to the
market for the two (January-March and June-September) 2016 seasons.
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Commodity No. Bids No. Asks
Maize 783 1131
Beans (Nambale) 96 245
Beans (Yellow) 16 70
Rice (Mukyele-Kayiso) 3 9
Cooking Bananas 2 7
Tab. 6.10.: Distributions of bids and asks for the top 5 crops (Jan to March 2016 seasons).
Fig. 6.5.: Cumulative user registration in the market (2016).
Tables 6.12 and 6.13 represent deals that traded on the platform the January and
June seasons respectively. We see from the transactions that were concluded in
the two seasons of 2016 that the market adoption was good and an enthusiastic
response based on buyer bids and seller asks in table 6.11.
We also observe that the rate at which bids and asks are converted into transactions
or deals is still low. We for-example registered asks worth USD 29.7 million but had
a total of USD 445,000 in transactions. A close analysis of the data indicates that
a large percentage of Ask prices were above the Bid prices. This phenomenon is
attributed to user expectations for a new market system. Buyers typically expect a
new market platform to provide them with access to commodities with lower prices
than the existing old-channels. Consequently, buyers submit low bid prices with
anticipation of finding good matches with sellers. Sellers on the other-hand also
have anticipation for the new market system to help them find new-buyers with
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Commodity Bids Value (USD) Asks Value (USD) No. Bids No. Asks
Maize 52,194,368 22,135,305 4,196 12,588
Beans 9,167,706 4,269,704 1,315 3,945
Soya 4,265,974 2,339,999 557 1,671
Simsim 1,645,439 210,642 108 324
Groundnuts 1,004,212 241,845 187 561
Millet 227,727 28,315 103 309
Rice 192,700 439,597 151 453
Sorghum 71,845 63,443 59 177
Totals 68,769,972 29,728,851 20,028 6,676
Tab. 6.11.: Comparison for count of Bids and Asks with Dollar-value for the top 8 commodi-
ties (January to September 2016 ). We observe from the table that the dollar
value of Bids is much higher than that of Asks despite Asks having a higher rate
of requests than Bids.
Commodity Number of trades Quantities (Kgs) Total trades (USD)
Maize 32 249,000 56,590
Rice (Kayiso) 5 64,000 38,787
Beans Nambale 6 60,000 36,363
Beans Yellow 1 10,000 6,666
Total 138,406
Tab. 6.12.: Top 4 deals that were completed on the market platform (Jan to March 2016
season).
better buying prices than their existing channels. This situation typically creates few
matches that are feasible between buyers and sellers despite having a large number
of bids and asks.
6.5 Conclusions
Based on the quantitative results, our auction mechanism design received enthusias-
tic adoption among buyer and sellers of agricultural produce. Field trials with a web-
and SMS-based implementation have shown enthusiastic adoption and significant
trading activity, providing strong evidence that our market platform meets local
needs.
Previous approaches to solve the information asymmetry and market efficiency
problem have largely tried to implement price advisory services, which we argue
have not been effective. Price advisory systems struggle with data accuracy and
relevance, given market participants’ strategic incentives to misreport prices. Other
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Commodity Total trades (USD)
Maize 205,143
Beans 72,364
Groundnuts 4,397
Rice 14,470
Soya 10,075
Total 306,449
Tab. 6.13.: Transactions (Deals) that were completed in the second agricultural season
(June to September 2016 ).
attempts to implement market services have most been classifieds or single auction
systems. Classified listings and single auction mechanisms require a significant
amount of information to communicate or represent an item electronically. This
technically requires an internet-enabled phones (which are not widely available) in
order to represent all the required information. These systems fail to capitalize on
the fact that agricultural goods are commodities.
Our proposed market design and implementation is a mobile-phone-based market
that offers a better alternative. Unlike all other systems, our proposed market
mechanism uses a sealed-bid double auction to achieve an effective and practical
electronic market for agricultural commodities. Notably, it operates efficiently over
SMS–with trades requiring only a small number of 160 character messages in one
of several local languages—thereby making it accessible to the majority of farmers
who lack internet-enabled phones. The system offers bidders incentives to place
sincere bids, tracks their reputations, and accommodates geographical constraints.
It uses bids to propose a match that both parties are free to decline; if both accept,
the system proposes a price, but traders are free to negotiate based on the quality of
produce being traded.
6.5 Conclusions 113

7Epilogue
In this thesis, we have studied the consumer buying behavior in Ugandan
agricultural markets, with a goal of providing a new and effective market-
mechanism that alleviates existing problems of information asymmetry
and trust in an open distributed environment. This chapter summarizes
our work and provides a highlight of our contribution in the context of
the consumer buying behavior.
7.1 Thesis overview
This thesis has presented a general outlook of agricultural trade in Uganda and
presented a general representation of agricultural markets in developing countries
using Uganda as a case study. The research work for agricultural markets in de-
veloping countries was approached with the aim of improving market efficiency
for trade in agricultural produce. This objective was motivated by an analysis of
historical agricultural market data to determine the presence and extent of temporal
and spatial arbitrage opportunities. As presented in chapter 2, the analysis results
indicated a strong presence of spatial and temporal arbitrage opportunities.
The large presence of such high levels of market inefficiency is largely attributed
to poor forms of market information exchange. Market information in developing
countries such as Uganda is performed using word-of-mouth techniques and through
a wide presence of mobile cellular networks. These techniques unfortunately do not
scale beyond the already established circles of interaction between friends, family
and acquaintances.
This thesis builds on consumer buying behavior models to develop a solution which
supports automated negotiations and secure interactions in various stages of the
auction mechanism with participants. We have presented a collection of techniques
for agent-systems which are used to model and design automated interactions
between buyers and sellers. We have also presented digital security techniques for
providing integrity of messages exchanged and presented a comprehensive solution
for enabling privacy and confidentiality in an open distributed environment.
Previous attempts to create electronic markets have yielded systems which are not
compatible with buyer and seller needs in the Uganda market systems. Despite some
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of these efforts having been supported by large organizations, they did not create
the right combination of technology and market interaction configuration.
This thesis has leveraged on agent-modeling techniques to design an agent-mediated
system for agricultural trade in developing countries such as Uganda. The design
and implementation are secure in terms of privacy, confidentiality and also incentive
compatible to requirements of farmers and traders.
7.2 Reflection on the research problem, objectives and
questions
This research work started with a goal of investigating techniques that would improve
efficiency in electronic trade using enhanced models of automation and robust
security frameworks in open-distributed environments. Agricultural markets in
Uganda presented unique opportunities and challenges for the study. The failure
rate for electronic-commerce systems in Uganda consistently been very high over
the past 10 years. Nonetheless, the rate at which attempts to create stable electronic
system was made was also very high. Google was present in the East-African region
with Google Trader and the Grameen foundation also had numerous initiatives. All
these efforts were however falling-short of delivering a robust electronic system
not-only for agricultural trade but also for other commodities trading in Uganda.
Based on these experiences, it seems as if electronic-trade in developing countries
such as Uganda needed an approach that was different from those established in the
developed world.
These experiences and observations led us to setting a main objective of contributing
towards techniques necessary for developing secure and incentive compatible electronic-
markets in developing countries.
In order to achieve this main objective, we set out to pursue the specific objectives
presented below;
7.2.1 Reflection on research objectives
i. The first specific objective was to design an incentive compatible auction
market for mobile-based agricultural trade in developing countries such as
Uganda.
Having observed that several electronic-commerce systems had failed in
Uganda and more-so in agricultural trade, we realized that it was very impor-
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tant for the electronic-system design to not-only provide means of information
exchange, but to also be incentive compatible with the participants. We need to
guarantee ourselves that we were designing and creating an electronic system
that would encourage farmers, brokers and traders to participate.
Agricultural markets in developing countries are largely dominated by brokers
and traders who benefit from the elevated levels of market inefficiency. Any
new system that is aimed at reducing their gains from the inefficiencies is likely
to face an indifferent adoption. Achieving an incentive compatible systems is
one of the most important attributes for a solution to market inefficiencies in
agricultural trade and generally other forms of electronic-trade systems.
This specific objective is achieved in chapters 2 and 5.
ii. The second specific objective was to develop extended threat models for agent-
mediated applications in an open-distributed environment.
An agent-mediated model was chosen as the approach for achieving automa-
tion in electronic-market interactions between participants. This specific objec-
tive aimed at presenting a detailed view of digital threats that are likely to be
faced by a system which is implemented based on an agent-mediated model.
The overall objective of this research was set-out to be practical — this meant
that the deployment of the application would have to be visible to threats in an
open distributed environment. In order to develop countermeasures to threats
in an open-distributed environment, we need to understand them very well in
the first-place and model them to the anticipation of our market design.
This specific objective is achieved in chapter 3, section 3.2.
iii. The third specific objective was to design and implement an agent-mediated
auction market for autonomic trading based in an open distributed environ-
ment.
This objective was used to set the stage for achieving a practical system which
farmers and traders would use to perform agricultural trade following a robust
design. We also set out a goal to eliminate manual methods of market matching
that were part of most failed system that had previously been launched in
Uganda.
This specific objective is achieved chapter 5.
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iv. The fourth and last specific objective was to test and validate the designed and
implemented applications based on the defined incentive compatibility and
security requirements.
In order to validate our design and implementation, we aimed with this objec-
tive to methodologically test various components of our system implementation.
We wanted to guarantee security requirements and also ensure that we can
test them in the open operational environment.
This specific objective is achieved in chapter 6
7.2.2 Reflection on research questions
i. What is the extent of agricultural markets inefficiency in Uganda? What factors
are leading to agricultural market inefficiency in developing countries found
in Sub-Saharan Africa?
This research question was posed to guide our research efforts for designing
and implementing an electronic system that would be acceptable to both
traders and farmers. We needed to obtain empirical evidence on inefficiencies
for agricultural in Uganda. We analyzed data from FEWSNET and presented
results of agricultural markets inefficiencies in section 2.4. As described in
section 2.2 we visited markets in urban areas and rural areas for a period of
more than one year to study causes of inefficiencies in agricultural markets
and to gain a detailed understand factors leading to this problem. Results for
these market evaluations are presented in chapter 2 and as such the questions
answered.
ii. How can we design market mechanisms that are incentive compatible for
trader, farmer and broker agents to participate in and adopt?
Having observed inefficiencies in agricultural markets from our evaluation
of historical market data, it became evident that existing methods of trade
were not appropriated for agricultural and commodity markets growth. It was
however crucial for us to understand in detail why these inefficient methods
had been practiced for centuries without pursuing alternatives as the rest of
the developed world had done. We needed to understand in great detail the
kind of incentives that we would have to introduce in our market designs in
order to get brokers and traders who have traditionally benefited from the
inefficient market configuration to participate in the new.
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The objective of this question was to help us obtain parameters which would
be included into the market mechanism design to create incentives for farmers,
brokers and traders to participate. Our market system adoption was highly
dependent on us obtaining the correct combination of attributes for stake-
holders participation. This question was sufficiently answered in chapter 5
section 5.7. The high levels of enthusiasm in adoption of the market systems
by farmers and traders is also a strong indicator that we sufficiently answered
this question as presented in chapter 6, section 6.4.
iii. How do security threats against agent-mediated applications evolve in adver-
sarial situations found in open distributed environments?
The objective of this question was to help us in identifying security challenges
and threats in an environment for agent-mediated applications that have to
interact with diverse participants. The objective of this research question
was to help us derive a threat model for an open-distributed environment
for the planned system designs. This question was answered sufficiently in
sections 3.2,A.5 and the appendix A which clearly demonstrate the differences
and similarities in threat models given deployment of application models in
varied agent-mediated platforms. The thesis demonstrates the threat models
using a book-trading application implemented with an automated negotiation
framework A.
iv. Privacy, confidentiality and integrity are key requirements for electronic trading.
How can public-key cryptography be used to guarantee privacy, confidentiality
and integrity for publishers and subscribers in a multi-agent environment?
The objective of this question was to guide our efforts in pursuing privacy,
confidentiality and integrity requirements for the prototype application that we
envisaged to improve agricultural markets efficiency. We needed to think up-
front about the challenges of privacy and data integrity in an open distributed
environment. The environment for the anticipated application was modeled
in section 4.1 using a publish-subscribe environment. This models imitates
publishers as seller in agricultural markets and traders as subscribers. The
results of our study and analysis in sections 4.4 show that our solution for
privacy and confidentiality in open publish-subscribe environments strongly
answers the this research question.
v. Understanding of shilling in both reputation mechanisms and auction markets
is critical for autonomic electronic-commerce environments. Which techniques
can be used to prevent shilling attacks in auction markets and reputation
mechanisms?
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Electronic markets that don’t have the correct techniques to protect against
shilling attacks would typically suffer from adverse-selection problems — in
which bidders would always bid very low prices anticipating poor matches
and buyers asking very high due to anticipation of troublesome buyers. We
spent a significant research effort in finding the right ingredients for reputation
mechanisms which would offer the correct incentives for good behavior but
also prevent bad-acts from going unpunished. We present in the appendix
5.3.2 a detailed evaluation of some of the choices we first made. These choices
appear robust and many readers would question our final design if they have
not evaluated the choices that we discarded. Our final design which presents a
blacklisting technique for bad-behavior is presented in section 5.6. The results
of pilots studies and feedback from participants are a good indicator that we
sufficiently answered this question.
7.3 Research results and contributions
In order to achieve the objectives listed in section 1.4 above, a number of contribu-
tions were made to the state-of-the-art techniques for automation and security in
the consumer buying behavior model.
• Our research work in Ssekibuule et al. [103] presents our contribution to the
development of secure negotiation frameworks in agent mediated electronic
commerce systems. Our contribution focuses on the configuration requirements
for a secure model of negotiation in an open distributed environment that has
to protect against self-interest actors. This research work also helps developers
of secure negotiation frameworks to better understand the threat environment
in a holistic framework of agent interaction.
• In Ssekibuule et al. [104] we contribute to the design of electronic markets
in environments with self-interest agents and provide an example implemen-
tation that is robust against strategic liars. Our research work in this area
provides a contribution towards design requirements for applications in re-
source constrained environments such as those found in developing countries
where people mostly use feature-phones that are not Internet connected. This
research work makes a contribution more particularly to the design of robust
auction mechanisms for agricultural trade in developing countries. The imple-
mented prototype demonstrates our contribution towards application designs
with a novel double-auction mechanism that offers incentives for truthful
behavior in an environment with self-interest agents.
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• Our research work in Ssekibuule et al. [105] makes a contribution towards
benchmarking techniques for protecting software agents against malicious plat-
forms. This research work presents an evaluation of state-of-the-art techniques
for protecting software agents and qualified limitations for these techniques.
This evaluation sets a landscape within which we developed security evalua-
tions for an agent mediated application [106].
• In Ssekibuule et al. [106] we make a contribution towards the practical
development of agent-mediated applications by implementing a booktrading
application using two agent platforms. This research work show cases design
and implementation requirements for a secure agent-mediated application and
highlights technical differences in platforms for autonomic computing. The
research work also makes a contribution towards threat analysis techniques
for autonomic applications and presents countermeasures and techniques for
preventing various attacks from being launched by adversaries.
• Security in electronic commerce goes beyond platforms and application sys-
tems. Human agents that own and use these systems usually have special
requirements such as privacy and self-determination. In Ssekibuule et al. [107]
we make a contribution towards a secure secure publish-subscribe scheme that
can be used in open-distributed environments for electronic commerce. This
research work makes a novel contribution towards the use of cryptographic
systems in applications of digital currency for untraceability or privacy and
confidentiality.
• In Ssekibuule et al. [108] we contribute to the evaluation of techniques for pre-
venting strategic liars in auction markets and electronic commerce systems in
general. An evaluation of techniques for reputation mechanisms in electronic
markets is done and a rating of their effectiveness presented. This research
therefore contributes to the understanding of attacks on reputation mecha-
nisms and techniques that are used by adversaries in electronic commerce
environments to achieve their goals. The research work provides a platform
for benchmarking security techniques for preventing shill attacks in autonomic
electronic commerce environments.
Our research contributions can be classified in three system levels, namely; the
platform level, application level and protocol level of application development.
7.3 Research results and contributions 121
7.4 Reflection on research limitations
We carried out the first pilot for the auction-market system in the first half of
2013. The pilot was executed in 4 districts of central Uganda, namely; Masaka,
Bukomansimbi, Sembabule and Kalungu. During the first phase of piloting we were
limited by financial resources to create a large scale awareness system for existence
and presence of the system. Despite having reached a small number of early adopters,
the word of mouth door-to-door awareness approach was not scaling to the numbers
we desired. We registered less than 50 users with this approach and literally no
market activity took place since most of the users were farmers, yet we also needed
traders for transactions to take place.
We later on decided to use radio advertising with a local radio station which covered
the central districts of Uganda. This approach got us about 1000 new users and
consequently improved our transactional activities. The number of market matches
subsequently improved but most of the matches did not turn into actual transac-
tions exchanging money. We got only 13% of the market matches resulting into
transactions exchanging funds. The limitation of these transactions resulted from
the fact that the system was new and it was the first-of-the-kind SMS-based trading
application. Many users were not sure whether they should commit their money to
a new system yet several other had failed in the past. The radio adverts were few
in number — we had a single 30 seconds advert once a week. Despite having got
us more users than word-of-mouth advertising, we could have done better with a
higher frequency of advertising.
The duration for once-a-week advertising was also short. We advertised for only 4
months and this did not create enough momentum for one thousand users to grow
further on their own. We needed new market entrants to keep the asks and bids
coming. Agricultural products are also seasonal; once farmer has sold their crop,
they have to wait another 4 or 6 months to be able to trade again. We needed to
have a steady market presence with radio advertising campaigns to bring on board
new farmers and traders. We stopped advertising after we had run out of funds. The
market activities went on decreasing for another 2 months and then we stopped
collecting data in the third month.
7.5 Conclusions and future research work
The thesis has presented a threat model and an analysis of threats in the environment
of software-agents and market entities participating an open distributed environment.
We have presented the paradigm of software-agents in an automated agent-mediated
negotiation framework and illustrated how threats in this environment evolve. We
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have additionally presented security countermeasures to evolving security threats
for agent-mediated solutions in an open distributed environment.
The current environment for agricultural trade in developing countries mostly relies
on centuries old techniques to achieve exchange of market information leading to
high levels of information asymmetry in the agricultural markets.
On the other hand we have market designs for other commodities in electronic
markets that do not typically work well with agricultural markets in developing
countries such as Uganda. The research work in this thesis has developed an
agricultural market system which is appropriate for developing countries and also
incentive compatible with existing rules of market engagements in order to drive
participation.
As indicated in the general objective, research work in this thesis has contributed to-
wards techniques necessary for developing secure and incentive compatible electronic-
markets in developing countries. We have demonstrated appropriateness of our
solution for electronic trade in agricultural produce through the two pilot launches
that we carried out in central Uganda. We have observed that the design and imple-
mentation results are robust towards confidentiality, privacy and availability threats
in a network environment.
The next phase of this research work shall mainly involve extending the clearing
algorithm to specify more robust constraints for bids and asks in market submissions.
The clearing algorithm will require integration of objective-functions to optimize
buyer and seller constraints given standing market parameters. The current market-
clearing algorithm performs distance measures between buyers and sellers using
centroids between parishes, districts and subcounties. As much as centroid measures
can be used to compute estimated distances between two locations, it is not a good
measure for true road distance between two trading parties. It would be more
desirable to implement a more reliable mechanism that depends on surveyed map of
road networks such Google-Maps [109] or OpenStreetmap [110, 111].
The market environment currently does not enforce quality specification for produce
since buyers and sellers currently follow a fair-average-quality. There is a need to
grow the market to a national scale so that the market can gather enough momentum
to push for standardized quality specifications across the country.
We experienced several malformed SMS messages during the two phases of piloting
for the auction system. The next frontier of research activities need to investigate
new approaches to predictive correction of SMS messages to reduce on the amount
of manual effort required to correct wrongly formatted SMS messages. Another
improvement related to user-interfacing is implementation and piloting of an Un-
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structured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) to be used to provide a structured
interface to end-users. USSD presents an interface to end-user with a trusted level
of input validation. Unlike SMS, USSD provides a stepwise approach for buyers and
sellers to submit their request to the market.
The planned USSD interface also has unknown variables which need to be analyzed.
USSD interfaces have been used in East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and
Tanzania to offer mobile-money services. These services are however supported by a
large network of support agents. There is a need to investigate whether end-users
with low-levels of literacy will be able to operate the auction-application on their
own without a large network of support agents.
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AAppendix: Security Analysis of an
Autonomic Application
This chapter presents a security analysis of an agent mediated appli-
cation in an open distributed environment. We use a case study of
a booktrading application that we implemented using AgentScape and
JADE agent platforms. We analyze whether security requirements, threats
and countermeasures for an agent mediated application change when
implemented on different agent platforms and presents countermeasures
to generic and application specific threats. In section A.1 we present
an introduction to agent platform components which are pertinent to
the development of agent-mediated applications, section A.2 presents a
booktrading application as an example for agent-mediated applications.
In section A.3 we present assets and components of an agent-mediated
application which form a foundation for performing security analysis.
Section A.4 presents security requirements for a secure agent-mediated
application and section A.5 presents a threat model for the application.
In section A.6 we present our experiences for developing the autonomic
application and the conclusions. Section A.7 presents possible future
work.
A.1 Introduction
Research and development in Agent system has seen tremendous progress in recent
years leading to the development of several agent platforms such as NOMADS[112],
AgentScape[33], Havana[113], JADE[114] and Aglets[115]. In order for agents
to execute tasks that have been assigned to them, they have to interact with other
agents in the open distributed environment whose intentions could be malicious.
Several researchers [116, 117, 118] have suggested solutions to different types of
threats that can be anticipated in agent-based applications and platforms. However,
most of these solutions are based on generic analysis of threats and security counter-
measures. Consequently, such solutions do not address specific application security
requirements and threats. To address this problem, we perform security analysis
using an agent-mediated case study and propose generic countermeasures to security
threats based on a concrete application. The study also proposes an approach for
performing systematic security analysis for agent-mediated application based on our
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results and experiences. The chapter also investigates whether security requirements
and threats change when an application is implemented using different types of
agent platforms.
A.2 The booktrading application
The booktrading application comprises of booksellers and bookbuyer software agents
that are ideally owned by separate individuals. The bookseller owners are responsi-
ble for maintaining bookstore operations which include stocking and setting prices
for books. Bookbuyer software agents are responsible for buying books from book-
seller agents on behalf of their owners. The implementation of the booktrading
application was done in AgentScape[33] (version 0.9.1) and Java Agent Devel-
opment Environment[114] (JADE version 3.6) agent platforms. The purpose of
implementing the application in two agent platforms was to investigate whether
threats, security requirements and threat countermeasures for the application would
change when implemented in either of the platforms.
The bookseller interface is used by the bookseller owner to store information about
books available for sale. In addition to the book title and year of book publication,
the bookseller also records the first price of the book and lowest price at which
he/she can sell a book. The first price is the best reasonable price that a seller finds
competitive in the market. It is in the best interest of booksellers to keep information
about the lowest price of the book secret from buyers and other sellers. Keeping
this information secret, prevents the bookseller from being exploited by buyers
during negotiation. Additionally, the bookseller might be helped in keeping pricing
information secret from other booksellers to avoid competition that may arise from
other booksellers in the environment setting their prices based on what they know
about the seller.
The bookbuyer interface is used by the bookbuyer owner to send out requests to
booksellers. Using the bookbuyer interface, the bookbuyer owner informs the agent
of the best price at which they wish to buy the book and the maximum amount they
are willing to pay. The bookbuyer agent also implements a protocol for negotiation
with the bookseller in case the desired book is found to be at a price higher than
the bookbuyer’s best price. The current implementation of the negotiation protocol
always proposes a price that is half the sum of the best and highest price. Ideally
this strategy should not be known to the bookseller, otherwise a bookseller agent
can exploit this information to sell at a higher price to the bookbuyer than they
should have done in case they didn’t know the buyer’s negotiation strategy. Figure
A.1 below presents an interaction protocol between the bookseller and bookbuyer
for the booktrading application.
The current implementation of the booktrading application does not support mobil-
ity of either the bookseller or the bookbuyer. The choice of having the bookseller
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Fig. A.1.: Interaction protocol for booktrading application
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stationary was a design decision made to support functionality for storing books in a
MySQL[119] database, while the choice of having the bookbuyer stationary was due
to limitations in inter-platform migration of JADE agents. The current version (3.6)
of JADE does not have proper support for inter-platform migration. The mobility
addon was developed for an older version of JADE and has not been since updated.
Similar design decisions where taken with AgentScape, but the implementation
limitations were different from those experienced with JADE. Nevertheless, security
considerations for having the bookbuyer mobile were considered. The requirement
of having the bookbuyer mobile could arise when it is deemed necessary to have the
buyer migrate to the platform that has the desired book. Such a necessity would
arise in case it is considered computationally expensive for the buyer to perform all
tasks from the bookbuyer owner’s platform.
A.3 Stakeholders and assets
This section presents stakeholders and assets in the booktrading application and
agent platforms that were used in the implementation of the booktrading application.
These stakeholders and assets are partly derived from the functional requirements
of the booktrading application.
A.3.1 Booktrading application stakeholders
(i) Application creator: This is the individual or organization that developed both
the agent bookseller and agent bookbuyer. (ii) Bookseller owner: The individual or
organization that owns the bookseller agent. (iii) Bookbuyer owner: The individual
or organization that owns the bookbuyer agent. (iv) Platform creator: The individ-
ual or organization that developed the agent middleware (here in referred to as the
agent platform). (v) Platform owner: This is the stakeholder category that owns or
administers the operating system (host) on which the agent platform is installed
A.3.2 Booktrading application assets
Bookseller agent: This is the agent code that is responsible for handling tasks
related to storing books in the bookstore and interacting with bookbuyers.
Bookbuyer agent: The agent code that represents the human bookbuyer in book-
trading tasks. The bookbuyer agents captures the title, the maximum age of the
book, best and highest price that the agent owner would be willing to pay for the
book.
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Fig. A.2.: AgentScape Architecture
Interaction protocol: The interaction protocol represents a set of rules through
which messages exchanged between the agent buyer and agent seller are interpreted.
In case the interaction protocol is is not followed, it is assumed that either party
would not understand what they other is saying. The format of interaction messages
were previous defined by Foundation of Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA)[16]. The
booktrading application extends the interaction protocol to include negotiation.
The negotiation protocol is implemented by the bookseller and bookbuyer agents
to handle the logic through which they can agree on an alternative price that is
different from the booksellers first price and the bookbuyers best price.
Agent platform: The agent platform provides the execution environment for both
the bookseller and bookbuyer.
A.3.3 Platform assets
This section presents platform assets for AgentScape and JADE agent platforms.
Separating the assets and possible attacks to the agent platforms created a basis for
thinking about generic countermeasures for attacks on agent platforms.
AgentScape platform assets
AgentScape system services: (The component represents core kernel services for
AgentScape. System services ensure that the right classes are used in the commu-
nicator. AgentScape system services provide lookup services through which agents
and services are registered and discovered. They also provide a communication
module through which messages are exchanged between agents and remote agent
management platforms.
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Fig. A.3.: JADE Platform Architecture
Agent server: Provides services for loading of agent code from the agent container,
startup and termination of the agent. Facilitates agent access to kernel services,
provides mechanism for making negotiation calls. The agent server also uses an
agentwrapper to provide interaction between a running agent and agentscape
middleware.
Host manager: AgentScape host manager provides agent container management
for mediating access to agent stores. The hostmanager additionally facilitates
data handling during agent migration. The host manager provides agent life cycle
management services such as migration, suspending, stopping and running of an
agent.
Location manager: Provides an agent management module that facilitates inserting
new agents into a location and handling of migration requests from local agents and
remote location managers.
Jade Platform Assets
JADE Core Base Service: Microkernel of the JADE system that provides a uniform
mechanism for management and service discovery.
Agent Management Services: Agent management services define the agent, pro-
vide platform administration, status information for agents and a unique naming
scheme.
Messaging Services: Microkernel service responsible for managing communication
between agents and other entities in across agent platforms
Event Notification Services: Represents events related to the agent life-cycle and
configuration.
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Agent Mobility Services: JADE microkernel provides an agent mobility service to
facilitate migration within containers on the same platform and migration from one
platform to another.
A.4 Security requirements
This section covers security requirements for both the agent platform on which
the agent-mediated application can be executed and security requirements for the
booktrading application.
A.4.1 Application security requirements
We use the Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication and Non-repudiation (CIAN)
taxonomy to define security requirements for both the bookseller and bookbuyer
agents. The Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication (CIA) taxonomy has been
reviewed by Howard et. al [120] in regard with risk analysis. This section presents
a forth requirement of non-repudiation and brief definition of CIA components.
Confidentiality: This is a security requirement that ensures information exchanged
and stored in the system is accessed by only authorized users. Integrity: This
requirement ensures that changes to information or application code are only done
by authorized users. Availability: This is a security requirement that ensures that
information and application resources can be accessed by all legitimate parties. The
legitimate parties may include users and software processes. Non-repudiation: This
security requirement ensures that all parties can be held accountable for their actions.
It ensures that all actions taken cannot be denied at a later time.
A.4.2 Bookseller security requirements
This subsection presents security requirements for the bookseller agent application.
Confidentiality: The bookseller should not release buyers private information to
the public and the information should be protected from attackers.
Integrity: Bookseller should prevent book reviews from being manipulated or
changed by people who did not write them.
Availability: (i) The bookseller should not prevent some books from being available
to some buyers for one reason or another. (ii) The bookseller should allow the buyer
to choose a book based on attributes such as price, publication date, quality and
relevance among others. (iii) The bookseller should not deny bookbuyers a chance
to negotiate when requested. (iv) The bookseller should not disable possibilities of
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writing reviews and posting them from genuinely critical reviewers and buyers. (v)
The bookseller should not prevent potential buyers from reading book reviews.
Non-repudiation: The bookseller should not be able to deny any information that
is exchanged with the bookbuyer such as having received payment from bookbuyers
or purchase orders.
A.4.3 Bookbuyer security requirements
This subsection presents security requirements for the bookbuyer agent applica-
tion.
Confidentiality: (i) Should be able to migrate from one platform to another and
perform computational tasks from local and remote hosts/platforms without leaving
information traces for attackers. Such information could include platforms/hosts
they have previously visited and budget information for their shopping. (ii) The
bookbuyer should have control on the type of information that they have to submit
to the operation environment. Withholding some information for privacy reasons
should not be a cause for denying them access to requested services. (iii) Book-
buyer should avoid forming a coalition in which it will be exploited. E.g exposing
information it carries to malicious bookbuyers.
Integrity: (i) The bookbuyer should not be manipulated to buy a book that is not
the best on offer. (ii) The information carried by the bookbuyer agent on behalf of
the agent owner, should be protected from attackers that might want to change it.
Availability: (i) Bookbuyer should be able to find a book available for sale. (ii)
The bookbuyer agent should protect the information it carries and prevent it from
being destroyed by attackers. (iii) Bookbuyer should not be prevented from forming
a coalition with other bookbuyers for mutual benefit.
Non-repudiation: The bookbuyer should not be able to deny that they ever ordered
for a book.
A.4.4 Platform security requirements
The agent platform security requirements are derived from the CIAN acronym that
was defined in subsection A.4.1.
Confidentiality: In case of agent migration, the agent platforms needs to protect
the migration path of the agent. The migration path might contain information
concerning platforms the agent has previously visited and intended destinations.
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Integrity: (i) The agent platform is expected to maintain integrity of agents (agent
code) and protect them from malicious attackers in the environment. It is important
to note that malicious platforms might try to do otherwise. (ii) The agent platform
should provide a mechanism for detecting compromised or malicious agents.
Availability: (i) The agent platform needs to ensure availability of messaging
service for agent communication. Termination of the messaging service would
prevent agents from communicating, while a comprised messaging service could
yield unexpected and undesired results for the intentions of the communication.
For example, attacker could delay messages for the intended destination whose
requests might have been time bound. (ii) The agent platform should have policies
for regulating access to system resources to prevent starvation of some agents by
others that may intentionally or otherwise over consume system resources.
Non-repudiation: The agent platform needs to provide a mechanism through which
agents can be accountable for the actions they perform when visiting platforms.
A.5 Threat modeling
We use the STRIDE[120] taxonomy to identify possible threats faced by the book-
trading application and the agent platform on which the application is executed.
Spoofing Identity: This is a form of attack in which someone or an entity pretends
to be someone else of another entity. For example agent X pretending to be agent
Y.
Tampering : Tampering attack refers to unauthorized changing of software code or
information.
Repudiation: This refers to a circumstance in which a software process or an
individual deny responsibility for their actions.
Information disclosure: This refers to unauthorized access to information.
Denial of Service: This is a form of attack that denies legitimate access to resources
such as information, storage space, processor and communication channels.
Elevation of privileges: This refers to a form of attack in which an entity with
lower privileges gains unauthorized higher privileges.
A more detailed explanation of the STRIDE components was presented by Howard
et. al [120].
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A.5.1 Application threat model
The book trading application is an agent mediated application in which one agent
acts as a seller and another agent as a buyer. The bookseller agent provides a variety
of books for sale in a manner similar to bookstores such as amazon, but in this
setting the bookseller expects the buyers to be software agents. The bookbuyer
agents are supposed to search in the books catalogue and compare prices and other
attributes such as publication date, relevance and book ratings on behalf of their
owners. The bookbuyer agent is expected to perform these tasks for a range of
booksellers that have books available for sale. This section covers possible goals
of the attacker against the bookseller and bookbuyer agents and suggests possible
countermeasures to the identified threats.
Possible goals of attackers against bookseller
i. Spoofing Identity: An attacker could spoof the identity of a bookseller and
requests payment from buyers for books that will not be delivered.
ii. Tampering: (i) The attacker may want to change information in the booksellers
catalogue so that book attributes such as price, publication date, quality and
relevance are not correct. These changes could lead bookbuyers into choosing
items that they were not supposed to buy. (ii) An attacker could change book
reviews and rating so that consumers will not buy books from that particular
bookseller.
iii. Repudiation: A malicious bookbuyer could deny having requested or received
a book from the bookseller.
iv. Information Disclosure: (i) The attacker could compromise the negotiation
logic implemented in the bookseller. E.g. if an attacker knows the price that a
consumer wishes to pay for a product, the attacker could lower their prices
to out-compete other sellers or simply to distract the buyer from making a
genuine negotiation or purchase. (ii) An attacker may wish to access and log
information concerning bookbuyers. The intention of this attack would be to
compromise buyers’ privacy.
v. Denial of Service: (i) An attacker could block the messaging service between
the bookbuyer and the bookseller. (ii) The attacker could try to remove
items from the bookseller’s catalogue of books so that books requested by the
bookbuyer are not available. (iii) An attacker could block buyers from writing
and sending reviews on books. Such an attack could negatively affect the
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bookseller if buyers wish to know whether the books on sale are good and
price worthy.
Possible goals of attackers against bookbuyer:
i. Spoofing Identity: An attacker could spoof the identity of a bookbuyer agent
and purchases books that could be reputation damaging to the agent owner.
This attack could be more severe in a general purpose e-commerce application
where many types of products could be bought.
ii. Tampering: (i) The attacker could alter message responses from the bookseller
to indicate to the bookbuyer that the requested book is not available, even
when it is actually available. (ii) An attacker could change book reviews and
rating so that consumers are lured into buying books that are not price worthy.
(iii) An attacker could change information requests from the bookbuyer to
indicate different requests to the bookseller from the ones submitted by the
bookbuyer. Such attacks could lead the bookbuyer into getting invoices for
books they did not order. Additionally, buyers could get false responses such as
requested books not being available, even in circumstances where the books
are available.
iii. Repudiation: A malicious bookseller could deny having received payment for
a book. In such a case, the bookbuyer would end up losing money.
iv. Information Disclosure: (i) An attacker may have interest in accessing private
information that is carried by a bookbuyer agent. (ii) An attacker could lure a
bookbuyer into forming a coalition in which it would be exploited. E.g leaking
information it carries to malicious bookbuyers.
v. Denial of Service: (i) An attacker could lure a bookbuyer into forming a coali-
tion in which it would be exploited. (ii) The attacker could block the messaging
service between the bookbuyer and the bookseller. (iii) The bookbuyer could
be denied a chance of forming a coalition with other buyers by withholding
coalition formation information. This attack could also affect the bookseller
by not making a needed sale. (iv) An attacker could prevent potential buyers
from reading book reviews. (v) An attacker could create a malicious bookstore
to prevent a bookbuyer from finding a genuine book to buy.
Application specific countermeasures
This section presents countermeasures for the security challenges that are likely to
be faced by the agent bookseller and bookbuyer. The countermeasures are meant to
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prevent attackers’ goals that were identified in subsection A.5.1. The countermea-
sures are combined for attacks on the bookseller and bookbuyer agents, because
these attacks are similar in nature. We also assume that safe coding procedures were
followed for both the application and agent platform. When software security flaws
such as buffer overflows exist in software, then authentication and authorization
schemes can be subverted.
i. Spoofing Identity: Spoofing of an agent’s identity can be prevented by provid-
ing an identity management system[121] through which agents are assigned
names (or identities) that are difficult to be changed by the agent or an attacker.
Authentication and authorization systems such as kerberos[122] or message
authentication codes [123] can be used to authenticate agents’ identity or their
owners. In this setup an agent would be required to submit a message to the
service provider indicating their identity and a small message encrypted by
their private key. The service provider would then retrieve a public key (from
the key-management system) that is needed to decrypt the short message. It is
assumed with public-key cryptography that the private key of the agent is key
secret.
ii. Tampering: Two things need to be protected against tampering. That is the
information or data carried by agents and the agent code. The countermeasures
available against these attacks fall into categories of prevention and detection.
Message authentication codes (MAC)[123] and digital signatures on the agent
code and data are used to detect any form of tampering on the agent code and
data.
iii. Repudiation: Public-key digital signatures can be used to prevent repudiation
by either a malicious bookseller or bookbuyer. In order to prevent repudiation,
digital signatures would be required on messages from either the bookbuyer
or bookbuyer. When a given agent (A) encrypts messages using their private
key, those messages can only be decrypted by a corresponding public key that
certainly belongs to the sending agent. The main challenge to this kind of
solution is that security depends on the secrecy of the secret key.
iv. Information Disclosure: This countermeasure should protect information
carried by the agent. Such information includes target book titles, best and
highest price that the bookbuyer is willing to pay for the book. Confidentiality
of this information can be provided by encrypting the information carried by
agents.
v. Denial of Service: The agent platform and agent execution environment
needs to provide strong authentication[122] and authorization for processes
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that access system resources. Authentication and authorization are useful
in preventing non-authorized users and processes from accessing privileged
resources that could be critical for correct functionality of the agent application.
Apart from preventing users and processes from accessing privileged resources
and services, authentication is useful for detecting users and processes that
may breach the imposed restriction. In detecting which users or processes
performed certain tasks, accountability can be achieved for all activities un-
dertaken in the system. The concept of a trusted third party can be used to
determine ratings of a bookseller before it can be considered by the book-
buyer for purchase of a book. A trusted third party would help in preventing
malicious booksellers from participating in booktrading transactions.
A.5.2 Platform threat model
The platform threat model is based on the Java Agent Development Environment
(JADE)[124] and AgentScape[33] platforms whose assets were presented in subsec-
tions A.3.3 and A.3.3 respectively.
Possible goals of attackers against agent platform
i. Spoofing Identity An attacker could launch counterfeit agents using the agent
platform to participate in a transaction they are not supposed to be involved.
For example, an agent Z (representing an attacker) could spoof the identity of
agent X in order to perform actions privileged to X.
ii. Tampering (i) An attacker could be interested in altering agent code through
the agent platform so that the agent does not do what it is supposed to do.
(ii) The attacker could use a weakness in the agent platform to reach and
subvert the communication channel for agents. (iii) The attacker could use the
platform to migrate an agent from a trusted platform to a compromised one.
iii. Information Disclosure
In circumstances where agent platforms keep a non-repudiable log of agent
events, an attacker could be interested in knowing about action of a particular
agent. An attacker accessing this information could violate agent’s confiden-
tiality requirements. Additionally, the attacker could use this information to
launch other forms of attacks against the agent.
iv. Denial of Service An attacker could be interested in subverting the Agent Man-
agement System (AMS), Directory Facilitator (DF) and Management services.
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v. Elevation of Privileges Exploiting a flaw in the agent platform to grant higher
privileges to malicious agents. Such malicious agents could be interested
in using free resources on platform hosts, or even over-consuming system
resources in order to deny services to legitimate users
Platform specific countermeasures
This section presents security techniques that are needed by the platform to achieve
the security requirements indicated in section A.4.4 and to prevent attackers from
achieving their objectives stated out in subsection A.5.2.
i. Spoofing Identity: Provide identity management: Only authenticated and
registered agent owners are allowed to launch booksellers into the environment
to prevent scenarios of malicious booksellers. A trusted third party can be used
to verify and certify credentials agents.
ii. Tampering: As indicated in subsection A.5.2 the attacker may want to change
the agent code or migrate an agent to a malicious platform. The action of
changing or tampering with agent code can be prevented by code signing [118]
with a digital signature. Agent migration to malicious platforms can prevented
by use of security policies to authorize sensitive actions to be executed by only
trusted parties.
iii. Repudiation: Combined with identity management, a non repudiable log kept
by the agent platforms would be useful in tracking actions that were performed
by various agents.
iv. Information Disclosure: Confidentiality of the agent logs resident on the
agent platform can be achieve through encryption. However, encryption has to
be applied with consideration for low resource platforms like mobile devices.
v. Denial of Service: Use of security policies for authentication and authorization
of users and processes to key assets for the agent platform would prevent denial
of service attacks.
vi. Elevation of Privileges: This attack can be stopped by preventing software
security flaws such as buffer overflows and SQL injection. Language based
security mechanisms such as static source code analysis to enforce safety
properties of the programming language, sand-boxing and proof carrying code
can be used.
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A.6 Conclusions and remarks
In this chapter, we present a systematic approach for performing a security analysis
of an agent mediated application. We have presented the Confidentiality, Integrity,
Availability and Non-repudiation (CIAN) framework through which security require-
ments for an application can be derived and combined it with STRIDE[120] to obtain
possible attacker goals. The proposed countermeasures (presented in subsections
A.5.2 and A.5.1) are clearly generic for any agent application and indicate generic
assets that need to be protected in an agent mediated application.
Our results indicate that security requirements for the agent application did not
change significantly when implemented with either AgentScape or JADE. In reference
to subsection A.3.3, the assets of the agent platforms fall in the categories of (i)Agent
Management Services, (ii) Directory Facilitator, (iii) Messaging Services, (iv) Mobility
Services and (v) Event Notification Services. This implies that these assets need to be
protected irrespective of the agent platform against all possible forms of attacks for
the agent environment to be considered secure. Furthermore, for any application
to be considered secure, its security requirements have to be catered for in the
implementation and assets protected.
A.6.1 Implementation experiences and challenges
This section presents some key issues and experiences that were encountered during
the implementation phase of the booktrading application on JADE and AgentScape
platform.
The implementation challenges were different for the platforms (AgentScape and
JADE) that were used. Intra-platform migration challenges were faced with JADE
(version 3.5 and 3.6) mainly because the mobility add-on was implemented for
lower version of JADE. In AgentScape, implementation challenges were faced with
service discovery facility due to the nature of requirements that were imposed by the
application. It is worthy noting that these middleware platforms (mostly especially
AgentScape) are still under heavy development and most problems are being solved
as they are reported by users.
A.7 Future work
The information disclosure countermeasure needs to protect the bookbuyer against
traffic analysis by an intelligent bookseller. In this example booktrading application,
the bookbuyer negotiates by sending a second price that is half the sum of the best
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and highest price. Using traffic analysis, an intelligent bookseller could be able to
generate these two (best and highest) prices of the bookbuyer. The bookseller know-
ing these prices puts the bookbuyer in a poor negotiation position. Furthermore, the
countermeasure should protect the negotiation protocol from revealing negotiation
strategy. Additionally, some malicious participants could start the negotiation pro-
tocol and then terminate it with the intentions of stealing information concerning
pricing and introducing annoyance attacks.
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